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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART XI.

JULY TO DECEMBER 1922.

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PART XI.

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Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XI.

CHAPTER I.—THE CAUCASUS.

[E 8359/165/58]

No. 1.

Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 593.)

My Lord,

Moscow, August 14, 1922.

WITH reference to the Earl of Balfour's despatch No. 769 of the 3rd August, I have the honour to report that, as stated in my despatch No. 277 of the 9th May, an agreement between representatives of the Caucasian republics in fact took place on the 10th March last.

I am advised by M. Karakhan that the conference of representatives led to a formal agreement between the three republics, which was signed on the 12th May, but which has not yet been ratified by the Central Executive Committee in Moscow. It is expected that the agreement will come up for ratification here in the near future. M. Karakhan has promised me a copy, which I hope to be able to forward by next bag. He tells me that the relations between Moscow and the Caucasus will not, in practice, be modified to any large extent when this new arrangement comes into operation; it will, however, introduce simplification into the relations between Moscow and the Caucasus, inasmuch as the Central Government will in future have to deal with one organisation instead of with three.

It is clear that the establishment of a Central Government in the Caucasus is merely a step directed towards the russification of that region—a step which has been made possible by the fact that the three republics are governed by Communist Administrations immediately controlled by the central committee of the party in Moscow. The task of governing through a single organ would bring the administration of the Caucasus into closer contact with the Central Government, and would certainly not secure to the Caucasian republics a greater measure of independence than they have enjoyed so far. On the other hand, the Moscow Government will, as in the past, continue to proclaim the independence of the Caucasus—they are already projecting the signature of a treaty of alliance with the Federation—on occasions when it is to their interest to do so, while in fact dictating the actions of the puppet Government from here.

I have, &c.

R. M. HODGSON.

Sir H. Rumbold to Mr. Oliphant.—(Received August 29.)

My dear Oliphant,

Constantinople, August 22, 1922.

I ENCLOSE a copy of a letter from a certain Nessim Rouso to Ryan, which appears to me sufficiently interesting to send home privately. I need hardly say that I send it for information only, as it does not in my opinion contain anything which could or should affect the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Russian problem generally or towards Caucasian affairs in particular.

The writer of the letter has been known to Ryan for a good many years. He is a Salonica Jew, formerly closely associated with Javid and the Committee of Union and Progress. After the armistice he blossomed out into an ardent Zionist, and played a leading rôle in the movement against the ex-Grand Rabbi Haim Nahoum. He appears to have broken with the Committee of Union and Progress, and Ryan believes him to be sincere in his devotion to Zionism. He is a lawyer by profession, and has been connected with the ex-Khedive in that capacity, but he took the precaution early in the armistice of explaining his relations with the ex-Khedive to this High Commission, and assuring himself that there was no objection to his continuing to serve him as legal adviser. He has spent a good deal of his time during the last couple of years in Europe. He has a finger in a great many pies, and is well-informed. He is married to a Jewish lady from Cairo, has several children, and makes money for them.

Rouso probably exaggerates the importance of French intrigues with the Azerbaijanis and Jemal Pasha. Ryan has been very guarded in his conversations with him, and he did not in these conversations put forward the suggestion that he should be employed by His Majesty's Government, though he advances it in a definite form in the enclosed letter. I am causing him to be informed verbally that there is practically no prospect in present circumstances of His Majesty's Government entertaining such a suggestion.

Yours ever,

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure in No. 2.

M. Nessim Rouso to Mr. Ryan.

Cher Mr. Ryan,

Constantinople, le 5 août 1922.

QUELQUES jours après mon retour de Paris, je me suis fait un plaisir de venir vous voir et de vous exposer les impressions que j'avais recueillies pendant mon long séjour en Europe—à Paris, à Berlin, comme à Rome—les courants d'opinion qui se manifestaient dans les milieux turcs ou turcophiles sur les projets des Kémalistes, des Djemalistes et des Enveristes, ainsi que sur la ligne de conduite qu'à mon avis il y avait lieu d'adopter par le Gouvernement britannique dans le Proche-Orient.

Vous m'aviez demandé, alors, de vous exposer, par écrit, toutes mes déclarations, que vous vous proposiez d'étudier. J'en avais pris l'engagement et je regrette, bien qu'involontairement, d'avoir retardé de le tenir, mes affaires personnelles ne me laissant pas assez de tranquillité d'esprit pour entreprendre ce travail.

Je profite aujourd'hui d'un moment de repos pour vous le consacrer entièrement. Je le fais avec autant de joie que la ratification et la mise en application du mandat palestinien ouvre pour moi, président de la Fédération sioniste d'Orient, un horizon de collaboration intime pour le succès et la gloire du grand Empire britannique, libérateur des peuples opprimés, auquel je voue volontiers tous mes services.

Cela dit, j'entre directement dans mon exposé.

L'idée principe de mon projet m'est venue à la suite de ma collaboration, comme conseiller politique du président de la délégation de l'Azerbaïdjan, à Paris, son Excellence Ali Merdan Bey Toptchoubachef, auprès duquel j'ai travaillé pendant toute une année et par lequel j'ai été mis au courant des moindres gestes kémalistes et du but du dernier voyage à Paris de Djemal Pacha, du résultat de ses entrevues avec M. Poincaré et des projets qu'il nourrissait et qu'il avait fait approuver par ce dernier contre la politique anglaise et en faveur de celle de la France en Orient.

Je dois vous dire tout de suite qu'Ali Merdan Bey, homme cultivé, caractère honnête et loyal, esprit pondéré, avocat de grand talent, réunissant à ces qualités l'expérience la plus clairvoyante dans la politique orientale, qu'il a appris autant par la

curiosité de son cerveau que par son mandat de Député à la Douma russe, n'a rien de commun avec les tendances d'aventuriers qui caractérisent les chefs unionistes. Il désapprouvait toujours, dans nos conversations intimes, tout ce qu'ils entreprenaient.

Il est de ceux qui pensent que la Turquie en tant qu'État indépendant est destinée à disparaître, tant qu'elle sera dirigée par la mentalité unioniste.

Cette conviction l'a conduit à un désaccord profond avec Moustapha Kémal Pacha, avec qui il était en correspondance continuelle au sujet de l'Azerbaïdjan.

J'ai été l'auteur de plusieurs lettres échangées entre Moustapha Kémal et Ali Merdan Bey pour jeter les bases d'une entente avec lui en vue de la libération de l'Azerbaïdjan—entente qui devait se faire sous les auspices du Gouvernement français pendant le Ministère Briand.

Les principes essentiels de cette entente étaient :

1. La France mettra à la disposition d'Ali Merdan Bey 40,000,000 de francs pour une expédition en Azerbaïdjan. Elle fournira aussi le matériel de guerre et les munitions nécessaires à cette expédition.
2. Une armée de 60,000 hommes allait être formée spécialement pour marcher contre les Soviets en Azerbaïdjan, dont les hommes seraient recrutés par Ali Merdan Bey et par Moustapha Kémal, par moitié, chacun sous la conduite des officiers fournis par ce dernier.
3. Ali Merdan Bey accordait à la France le "pipe-line" de Bakou à Batoum sous certaines conditions et à Moustapha Kémal la prise à charge par l'Azerbaïdjan de la dette extérieure turque.

Telles étaient les lignes essentielles de cet accord, qui était sur le point d'être signé quand l'offensive grecque sur le Sakharis l'avait ajourné.

Un incident très vif est survenu entre-temps qui a compromis définitivement cet accord. En effet, Ali Merdan Bey venait d'être nommé chef, à Paris, de la Confédération du Caucase et signait un manifeste par lequel il demandait pour les Arméniens la création du foyer national et réclamait la cession par les Turcs des vilayets de Van et d'Erzeroum, seul moyen de faire vivre la République arménienne.

Il écrivait en même temps à Moustapha Kémal une lettre écrite de ma propre main, par laquelle il l'exhortait, pour la tranquillité future de la Turquie, de consentir cette cession.

La fureur fut grande à Angora à la réception de cette lettre et la réponse insultante. Tout projet d'entente au sujet de l'Azerbaïdjan était définitivement compromis entre Angora et Ali Merdan Bey.

En recevant cette lettre, il me disait :

"Que voulez-vous ? Mon seul but en venant à Paris était de faire une entente avec le Gouvernement anglais au sujet de l'Azerbaïdjan. J'ai trouvé de ce côté toutes portes fermées. Je n'ai pu lui faire entendre ma voix. Et, pourtant, un accord avec l'Angleterre, qui a tant d'intérêts en Azerbaïdjan, est une question vitale tant pour nous que pour elle. La Fédération caucasienne sera le rempart naturel contre les tendances de descente vers l'Asie du Sud de tout Gouvernement russe. Le champ économique vaste que représente le Caucase sera acquis à l'activité britannique. L'Angleterre se leurre avec les Soviets et nous tue par ses agapes avec Moscou."

Nous sommes au mois de février 1922. Le 14 mars arrive Djemal Pacha à Paris et repart le 29 pour Berlin.

Ses entrevues avec M. Poincaré sont connues par Ali Merdan Bey, qui participe, à un moment donné, à leur conversation.

Djemal Pacha, avec le concours de la France, se propose de former une armée de 70,000 hommes pour libérer le Caucase des forces soviétiques et marcher ultérieurement plus loin contre les Soviets.

M. Poincaré, se souvenant du projet Briand, mande Toptchoubachef auprès de lui et fond les deux projets en un seul, mais cette fois il demande à Djemal, qui promet, de libérer aussi Moussoul des forces anglaises, et l'entente se fait à cet effet sur la reconnaissance des droits français à Moussoul—droits politiques et économiques.

Je ne sais pas si les balles qui ont mis fin à la vie de Djemal Pacha ont définitivement enterré le projet Poincaré-Djemal. Le fait est que l'idée d'une politique française en Orient contre les intérêts vitaux de l'Angleterre et avec le concours des Unionistes a pris corps au Quai d'Orsay et qu'il faut lui opposer une autre politique à la fois sûre et efficace.

L'accord franco-kémaliste avait été une des manifestations de cette politique orientale française. Et, malgré toutes les assurances qu'on a pu donner au Gouverne-

ment anglais, je proclame que des accords secrets ont été signés entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et Youssouf Kémal sur l'éventualité d'une pression turque sur l'Irak au profit de la France.

Je vous avais dit que je connaissais personnellement M. Franklin-Bouillon, qui m'avait proposé, à Paris, de l'accompagner jusqu'à Angora en novembre 1921.

J'étais venu avec lui de Paris jusqu'à Constantinople. J'ai refusé d'aller à Angora, en lui déclarant qu'il lui serait impossible d'arriver à une entente avec les Kémalistes en sauvegardant le prestige et la dignité de la France. Il ne m'a pas cru.

Et nous avons vu, par la suite, que tous ces accords constituent une capitulation humiliante pour la diplomatie française, qui en aura certainement à se repentir.

Cette politique que la France a inaugurée en Orient et dont la première manifestation a terni, il n'est plus possible de le nier, l'influence britannique en Orient, continue de se développer et pourrait devenir menaçante pour les intérêts anglais si les milieux financiers de Paris ne se montraient pas très réservés pour contracter des accords avec la Confédération du Caucase et surtout avec les représentants de Bakou à Paris et pour faire des avances d'argent à la mission.

Il s'agissait, comme je vous l'avais déjà exposé, d'accorder la concession de l'exploitation du "pipe-line" Bakou-Batoum à une société française dans laquelle le Gouvernement français allait participer officiellement pour un tiers.

Les crédits destinés à cette entreprise ont même été votés par le Conseil des Ministres quelques jours avant mon départ de Paris.

D'autres concessions de terrains pétrolifères, dont la plus importante était celle de 100,000 déciatines appartenant à l'État de Bakou lui-même et qui sont d'une richesse importante, s'ajoutaient à celle de l'exploitation du "pipe-line."

J'ai participé personnellement avec le gendre de son Excellence Ali Merdan Bey à toutes ces négociations, qui n'ont abouti à cause de la réserve très vive qu'ont manifesté les banques françaises pour les avances de fonds.

Je prends donc tout cet exposé et je me demande, avec le Président de l'Azerbaïdjan, pourquoi l'Angleterre ne voudrait pas se substituer à la France dans sa politique du Caucase.

Pourquoi ne voudrait-elle pas faire un rempart formidable en effet de cette confédération pour consolider sa situation politique en Asie centrale et éviter les soucis que lui causent toutes les agitations actuelles pour la paix des Indes anglaises ?

Je vais étudier le pour et le contre de ce projet et je répondrai sans réserve aucune. Je pose, d'abord, le problème :

"La politique anglaise doit s'orienter vers la Confédération du Caucase, qu'elle doit sauver, consolider et amener dans l'orbite de son influence en Orient."

Quels pourraient être les inconvénients de cette politique pour l'Angleterre ? Je n'en vois point.

Si les agapes avec Moscou pouvaient avoir quelque issue sérieuse et durable, on aurait pu comprendre l'hésitation qui pourrait s'emparer des diplomates anglais.

Je suis convaincu du contraire et certainement la diplomatie anglaise ne peut pas en penser autrement.

Que le régime bolcheviste est destiné à disparaître pas besoin de le confirmer. Aucune de leurs méthodes ne pourra subsister au premier souffle des lois naturelles, tant économiques que politiques, qui régissent la société humaine.

Et, alors, pourquoi ne pas, dès maintenant, divorcer franchement, si non publiquement, avec cette orientation provisoire de la politique anglaise en Russie ?

Si, jusqu'à ce jour, le tâtonnement pouvait être admis, il n'est plus permis à l'heure qu'il est.

Mes renseignements m'encouragent à proclamer que l'heure est solennelle. Encore quelques mois et la diplomatie anglaise pourra se trouver dans l'embarras du choix d'une directive, et cela n'est pas permis.

En effet, la chute du régime soviétique intégral, pour ne pas aller plus loin, pouvant survenir d'un moment à l'autre, quels seront les terrains propices de l'activité britannique en Orient ?

Pour moi, il n'y a que le Caucase, et les avantages pour l'influence britannique en seront énormes.

En effet, la constitution géographique du Caucase en fait un rempart solide. Les populations qui l'habitent ne demandent qu'une aide pour se soulever et chasser les bolchevistes, s'organiser d'une façon moderne et travailler en paix.

En tant que confédération, le Caucase ne peut pas constituer un danger pour

personne. Au contraire, le Caucase peut constituer un bon gendarme à l'est de la Turquie, kémaliste ou unioniste.

Les territoires qui se trouveraient enclos, d'une part, entre la Palestine et le Caucase et, d'autre part, entre le Caucase et les Indes seront certainement et sans inquiétude sous le contrôle de la diplomatie anglaise.

Une Palestine forte et bien organisée au sud, une Confédération du Caucase forte et bien organisée au nord, voilà deux observations sûres de la diplomatie anglaise en Orient.

Je ne veux pas entrer dans un exposé des intérêts économiques anglais au Caucase. Ils sont de notoriété publique à ne considérer que seulement les intérêts pétrolifères dans la région de Bakou. Cela étant exposé, comment réaliser le projet ?

Il faudra entamer immédiatement des négociations avec la délégation de l'Azerbaïdjan à Paris, sans retard, afin d'étudier, d'abord, l'accord à établir et, ensuite, les moyens propres à son application.

Il est très probable qu'on envisage d'agrandir les forces d'Enver par des contingents caucasiens, qui viendraient organiser la résistance aux Soviets et les chasseraient du Caucase. Ce n'est pas impossible. Il pourrait même servir ultérieurement contre les exigences exagérées des Kémalistes.

Je ne fais qu'entrevoir une possibilité. Le tout est dans l'application habile du programme.

Je ne veux même pas envisager ce qu'on pourrait faire d'Enver ultérieurement. Je n'ai pas une confiance durable dans aucun des chefs unionistes. Toutefois, leur caractère aventureux présente sans aucun doute des possibilités de les utiliser à des fins déterminées, quitte ensuite à agir suivant les circonstances.

En ce qui concerne la Confédération du Caucase, je suis convaincu de l'issue favorable des négociations que la diplomatie anglaise voudra engager avec leur chef, qui, en l'occurrence, n'est autre que son Excellence Ali Merdan Bey.

Je me propose personnellement pour entamer les premiers pourparlers avec lui à Paris et j'offre à cet effet mes services, qui, comme vous n'ignorez pas, cher Mr. Ryan, ont été toujours dévoués et toujours désintéressés, au point de vue matériel.

En vue de faciliter mes déplacements, j'ai besoin d'un laissez-passer diplomatique entre la France et l'Angleterre, ou plutôt une recommandation spéciale pour les facilités du visa de mon passeport de protégé italien.

Il faudra envisager aussi une centaine de mille francs pour mes frais de déplacement et autres dont je serai redevable du compte.

Veillez agréer, je vous prie, transmettre à qui de droit ce qui précède et m'avertir du résultat.

J'attendrai ici, à Constantinople, la réponse et partirai immédiatement pour Paris dès que vous m'en ferez signe.

N. ROUSSO.

[E 9419/165/58]

No. 3.

Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 671.)

My Lord,

Moscow, September 5, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 277 of the 9th May and No. 593 of the 14th August last, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of the Agreement of Alliance concluded on the 12th March (not the 12th May as previously stated by an inadvertence) between the Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

This agreement is already in force and will be followed in the near future by a single "fraternal treaty" between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Transcaucasian Federation, in place of the treaties which at present exist with the three States separately.

The federation will in all probability, though it is not yet decided, be represented in Moscow by a single delegation instead of by three delegations as heretofore. Similarly, the Russian Soviet Republic will have one representative in the federation. It is intended, however, that each of the federated States should retain its own economic representative in Moscow.

I have, &c.

R. M. HODGSON.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Federal Alliance of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia.

Treaty of Alliance of the Transcaucasian Socialist Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia (approved on March 12, 1922, by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries of the Central Executive Committees of the Transcaucasian Republics).

(Translation from Russian.)

THE conference of the plenipotentiary representatives of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, on the basis of the right of the self-determination of peoples proclaimed by the great proletarian revolution, recognising the independence and sovereignty of each of the contracting Powers and conscious of the necessity of uniting their forces for purposes of defence and in the interests of economic construction, have decreed that:—

The Socialist Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia enter from now on into a close military, political and economic alliance with one another on the following terms:—

1. The supreme power of the alliance of the republics shall be the conference of plenipotentiary representatives to be delegated by the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia to the number of twenty-five from each republic.

2. The executive organ of the conference of plenipotentiaries shall be the "allied Soviet," whose members are to be chosen and summoned by the conference.

3. The allied Soviet takes over military matters, finances, foreign policy, foreign trade, ways of communication, national liaison, the regulation of labour, the fight against counter-revolution and the direction of economic policy in the territories of the contracting republics.

4. The allied Soviet shall consist of a presidium, and, as members, the People's Commissaries for War, Finance, Posts and Telegraphs, Foreign Trade, Labour, Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection, the chief of the Department of Ways of Communication and the president of the Extraordinary Commission for combating counter-revolution.

5. At the head of the allied Soviet shall be a presidium of three persons, who in turns will take upon themselves the duties of president.

Remark 1.—Turn and duration of presidency will be determined by the allied Soviet.

Remark 2.—The corresponding People's Commissariats in the contracting republics are abolished, with the exception of the People's Commissariat for War and Marine, the Extraordinary Commissions for combating counter-revolution and the Peasants' and Workmen's Inspection, which are all to be retained in the republics, but will be subordinate to corresponding allied organs.

Remark 3.—The People's Commissaries for Finance, Labour and Posts and Telegraphs will have their representatives in the contracting republics, who will enter the Governments of these republics with the rights of members.

6. On all questions coming within the competence of its authority the allied Soviet shall issue decrees, regulations and instructions, and, in general, take all measures necessary for the execution of its task.

7. With the object of the unification of the work of all the economic organs on the territories of the contracting republics, a "Supreme Economic Council" is to be formed which will function as a permanent committee of the allied Soviet.

8. Into the composition of the Supreme Economic Council shall enter one of the members of the presidium of the allied Soviet as president, with the following as members: the People's Commissaries for War and Marine, Finance, Ways of Communication and Foreign Trade, representatives of the Economic Councils of the contracting republics, a representative of the Transcaucasian Bureau of Professional Unions and the People's Commissary for Allied Peasants' and Workmen's Inspection.

9. The Supreme Economic Council shall draw up a joint economic programme for the alliance of the republics, shall present it for approval to the allied Soviet, shall direct the work of the Commissariats of Economy in harmony with this programme, supervise its execution and make, where necessary, alterations in the programme.

10. Decisions of the Supreme Economic Council are to be binding on all allied departments and institutions and also on the Economic Councils of the contracting republics.

11. In cases where decisions of the Supreme Economic Council affect departments and institutions which are not unified, the Supreme Economic Council shall give effect to them through the Economic Councils of the corresponding republics.

12. The allied Soviet and organs subordinate to it in all their operations shall render account to the conference of plenipotentiary representatives of the allied republics. The conference of plenipotentiary representatives has the right to cancel or annul any decrees or decisions of the allied Soviet, of the Supreme Economic Council, or of other organs, whether on receipt of protests from the republican Governments or at its own discretion.

13. The allied republics shall establish mutual relations with the R.S.F.S.R. on the basis of a treaty of alliance.

[E 9420/165/58]

No. 4.

Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 680.)

My Lord,

Moscow, September 7, 1922.

BY Foreign Office telegram No. 198 of the 29th August, I was advised that, according to information received from Constantinople, the Georgian Government had recently suppressed the Italian vice-consulate at Tiflis and closed the Italian wireless station there. I received confirmation of this incident from my Italian colleague here.

I doubt whether the cause ascribed to the action of the Georgian Government in the telegram was the true one. The Italian vice-consulate at Tiflis has existed since the days of the Menshevik Government, and its legal position has never specifically been recognised by the present Communist Administration. Its existence has, however, been a source of annoyance to the Communists, since it gave other countries an argument for demanding similar privileges to those granted to Italy.

It was to be expected that the first opportunity would be taken for doing away with this anomaly, and the present moment, when the administration of the Transcaucasian States has been modified and a federation created, has been found suitable for the purpose. It is now to be expected that the new federal Government will adopt the stand taken by the Ukraine, that it will be opposed to having any foreign representatives, Italian or other, in its territory who are not the agents of Governments having direct relations with the federation. In the meantime, foreign Governments will require to take up matters affecting their interests in Transcaucasia through the Caucasian delegation in Moscow.

I have, &c.

R. M. HODGSON.

CHAPTER II.—ARABIA.

[E 6861/248/91]

No. 5.

Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, July 10, 1922.

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad:—

“Your telegram No. 744: Nejd pilgrimage.

“King Hussein expresses great delight and relief, sends friendly greetings to Ibn Saud and promises warm welcome to Ibn Saud's representative. He does not wish British official to meet them officially because of bad impression this might make. In this I concur. Three of my staff will be on pilgrimage.

“King Hussein anxious to know route they will take so that he may make necessary arrangements. Can you ascertain?”

[E 6881/248/91]

No. 6.

Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, July 11, 1922.)

(No. 484.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, July 6, 1922.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jeddah, No. 744:—

“Following from Ibn Saud via Bahrein, dated 26th June:—

“I beg you to thank His Majesty's Government for permission to Hajj, and I thank you for your personal advice. I assure you I will abide by my undertaking. Regarding difficulties mentioned I agree with you, and will curtail number for Hajj, only some of the townspeople will go and I will not permit Akhwan of Bedouin. I recognise importance of the matter, and you may rest assured that there will be no cause for offence given by us; in fact, fighting in Holy Mecca is forbidden by Shara. Have appointed Musaad Ibn Saud to take charge, and he will avoid all difficulties. I found in your telegram a hint that I should make peace with King Hussein. I am only too willing for good relations, and as proof thereof will send most friendly letter with Amir of Hajj. In the meantime, if you think fit, be good enough to wire him my thanks for permission to Hajj of my respect for his person and personal assurance of good relations. I beg that British officials at Mecca receive Hajjis and see them well treated lest any ill-meaning person cause unforeseen trouble. As regards attack on Ghamid, this is a fact, but details are as follows: We captured Bisheh and Ghamid in time when Turks were in Asir and Hedjaz. This year Hussein sent Ghazir to Turabah and letter to Sheikhs of Beni Shahar and Ghamid inciting them to rebel. I have the letters. When they killed people in Mosque at Turabar Khalid pursued them to Taif, but I forbade him to enter town out of respect for your wishes and in interest of Great Britain, but sent him to punish Beni-Shahar, who had treacherously attacked him. How can the Hedjaz claim what is part of Bisheh and under me for many years, and in treaty with me before Hedjaz became independent.”

“Political Bahrein adds that local reports indicate permission for Hajj was received too late for preparation on large scale, and numbers going very limited. As regards pilgrimage, I trust Ibn Saud's tone and attitude will be appreciated. I trust you will see fit to convey Ibn Saud's message to King Hussein, and that you can induce him to send an equally friendly reply. As regards Ghamid episode I do not feel able to offer useful comment offhand.”

(Copies sent by Colonial Office to Admiralty, Air Ministry, India Office, and War Office.)

[E 6914/656/91]

No. 7.

Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 49. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, June 20, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period 1st to 20th June, 1922.

Copies of this despatch and report have been sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Simla, Transjordan and Damascus.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 7.

(Secret.)

Jeddah Report, June 1 to 20, 1922.

Political.

KING HUSSEIN, accompanied by Emir Zaid, arrived in Jeddah on the 9th June. He came to inspect the two steamers recently purchased by the Hashimite Government, and he gave a banquet on the larger of the two boats, the “Tawil,” on the evening of the 10th. About seventy guests were invited. King Hussein left again for Mecca on the 11th.

On my first visit to King Hussein the French representative was present, and, without warning, His Majesty at once opened the question of the imprisonment in Syria of Arif Darwish, head of the Hedjaz agricultural mission sent by the King to Syria to purchase equipment. King Hussein said he dealt only with Great Britain, and, as he had received no satisfaction from the French in this matter, he wished Great Britain to intercede for him. I pointed out that this was impossible, that I knew the French representative would do everything in his power to settle the matter, and that His Majesty must await the reply from Syria. It is said that the French representative now receives no replies to any of his official letters to Mecca, and even his announcement of his appointment as Belgian consul (*vide infra*) was not acknowledged.

My interview with King Hussein on the subject of the Nejd pilgrimage was reported to you in my despatch No. 48 of the 11th June. Two hours later the Dutch consul called on the King to bid him farewell; the King burst into tears, said he was a most unfortunate man, and recounted all his misfortunes since childhood's days.

2. The situation in Ghamid district remains obscure. It is said that Khalid and the other chiefs have returned to their own towns. The sheikhs of Ghamid sent a petition to the King informing him that 200 had been killed, seven villages burnt, and that they had been robbed of money, dates, merchandise, sheep, cattle and camels. They asked permission to take refuge in the King's territory.

An expedition under Marzouk Garara left Mecca for Ghamid district, but it is said to have been defeated by the Mudayyana four days' journey south of Mecca. They returned to Mecca and have been sent to Taif.

In Kufuda it is said that fear of Mudayyana attack has reached such a degree that many of the inhabitants spend the night on the sea.

3. Mudayyana activity is reported in the Juheiwah country, where villages near Umlejh have been captured and looted. On the other hand, Amir Ali is leaving for Mecca early in July, and is bringing some of his army with him, so one can presume that things are quiet in and around Medina.

Pilgrimage.

A large caravan left Mecca for Medina after the Id. They went in different parties; the total number of camels was about 7,000, and the number of pilgrims about 12,000. The King's share has been raised from 2l. to 3l. per shukduf.

Three Turkish doctors and one dispenser have arrived here for service with the Hashimite Government. One, a surgeon, has gone to Mecca, and two have remained in Jeddah. All are poor and travelled third class from Constantinople to Jeddah. They arrived by an Italian boat, which, on arrival, was put in quarantine. When the

Director-General of Quarantine, Dr. Thabit, saw that his medical compatriots were on board, and that he must send them to the quarantine island, he altered the bill of health to free pratique.

Dr. Thabit wrote to the kaimakam that sick pilgrims were not being sent to the hospital and that the mutawwifin should be instructed to send all sick pilgrims there. The kaimakam informed me that the hospital is in a disgraceful state, that Dr. Thabit attended for only half an hour daily, that most of the sick are treated by the dispenser, and that a sergeant in the Shereefian army died twenty-three hours after admission without being seen by a medical officer.

The Persian Shia pilgrims are now allowed to pray in the Prophet's mosque at Medina, a privilege never extended to them before the war. Orders have also been sent to the Medina authorities to respect all Shia pilgrims.

The total number of pilgrims now in the country is approximately 32,000.

Ten Indian pilgrims left Mecca for Medina on foot without water and without a guide. King Hussein brought them back and told them to wait for a caravan.

The first two destitute Indian pilgrims for this season have applied for repatriation before completing the pilgrimage. One left India with a single ticket and 200 rupees. The other was sent by Mohammed-Din of Lahore, with another man. The latter has gone to Medina and taken the money. They said they understood, before they left India, that there was a repatriation fund and that all they had to do was to apply for repatriation.

General.

1. Captain Ibrahim Depui, the French consul, has been appointed Belgian consul in Jeddah. The Belgian flag is flown over the side door of the French consulate.

2. It is said that King Hussein has asked Habib Lotfallah to go to America as Arab agent there.

3. King Hussein informed me that he hoped in about two months to install an electric light plant and an ice machine in Jeddah.

4. One of the Arab aviators has been detected selling aeroplane equipment in Jeddah, and the matter is at present under enquiry.

5. The steamship "Tawil" left on her maiden voyage under the Shereefian flag on the 12th. She was going to call at Rabegh, Yembo, Umlejh, Wejh, Dibbah and Akaba and then return to Jeddah. Two mountain guns have been mounted on board. The Director of Customs, Mohammed Tawil, is on board and is going to inspect the customs stations on the coast.

Press: "Al Qibla."

No. 590.—1. Shereef Ali-bin-Asam, Governor of Kheibar, receives the 4th class of the Order of Al Nahda. The officer commanding the artillery and the officer commanding the gendarmerie at Kheibar receive the 5th class of the same order.

2. Description of the Id-ul-Fitr in Mecca.

3. Telegrams, &c., of protest against events in Syria sent and received by the executive committee of the Syrian-Palestinian Conference in Egypt.

4. An extract from the "Mara'at-al-Gharb" of New York.

No. 591.—1. Three columns of "Nahda" and "Istiqlal" decorations.

2. Events in Syria; recent reports state that the country is in a ferment and that Nuri Shalan and other prominent tribesmen have joined the revolutionaries. Warning to the civilised world of imminent disaster in the East.

3. A Belgian consul has been appointed at Jeddah.

4. Medina caravans: Over 7,000 camels have gathered outside the walls of Mecca since the Id. Of these, two-thirds left with pilgrims for Medina on the 4th June.

5. Letter from a Syrian pilgrim in praise of Hedjaz public security arrangements.

6. Extracts from "Al Ahram" of Cairo, "Al Mara'at-al-Gharb" of New York, and "Al Ommah" of Cairo.

No. 592.—1. Prominence is given to an extract from "Al Carmel" applauding the swift response of the Hedjaz to the appeal of Syria.

2. Wahhabi raids in the Ghamid district; an incident described.

3. Extracts from "Al Moqattam" and "Al Alwal" as to progress in Syria and the Lebanon. Mr. Crane's sentence of twenty years (in default) is commented on.

4. The appearance of the new Arab paper, the "Saut-ush-Sha'ab" of Bethlehem, is welcomed.

The "Carmel" of Haifa and the "Jazira" of Mosul are also advertised as good reading for Arab Nationalists.

No. 593.—The first number of the seventh year of "Al Qibla." The price is raised from 30 Turkish piastres (inland), 10 fr. (abroad), and $\frac{1}{4}$ Turkish piastre (per single copy) to 80 Turkish piastres, 15s. (at gold rate), and $\frac{3}{4}$ Turkish piastre respectively.

1. Editorial on the birthday ideals of "Al Qibla."

2. Description of the Royal reception on board the Hashimite Government steamer "Al Tawil."

3. Retort to a notice issued by the Governor of Sourabaya warning pilgrims of the lack of water in Jeddah, of the customs dues on pilgrims' effects, and of the insecurity of the Medina road.

"Al Qibla" denies that any of these criticisms are true, calling on the 30,000 Javanese pilgrims now in the Hedjaz to witness this, and quotes the Koranic injunction to pilgrimage.

4. Speeches made at the complimentary banquet given to the Palestine delegation in London.

5. Extracts from the Egyptian and European press on the state of affairs in Syria and on the subject of Mr. Crane.

6. The demands of the Conference of Arab Peoples presented by that body to the Genoa Conference.

King Hussein has also sent to this agency a copy of No. 247 of the "Lisan-ul-Arab" of Jerusalem of the 1st June, 1922, containing the terms of the "secret treaty" said by that paper to have been concluded between the French and Ibn Saud.

These are:—

1. Recognition by the French of Ibn Saud's sovereignty within his own territories, the boundaries of which are later to be defined.

2. Supplies of money and ammunition to be granted him as the General Staff at Aleppo and Damascus may decide.

3. The French Government guarantee him aid against any aggression from the Hedjaz, Irak or Transjordan.

4. The French Government recognise the extension of Ibn Saud's frontiers to a point near Deraa, provided that the frontiers of the Hauran are extended and that Ibn Saud undertakes not to attack that district.

The editor of the "Lisan-ul-Arab" predicts that this "treaty" will establish the frontiers of Ibn Saud between Medina, Jauif and Western Irak, and will make him ruler of the whole interior of the Arabian Peninsula.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

APPENDIX.

Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From.	To.	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
Mansourah ..	British	Port Soudan	Suez ..	May 31	June 1	96	..
Koweit ..	British	Karachi ..	Basra ..	June 1	" 3	1,075	7,157
Dakahlieh ..	British	Suez ..	P. Soudan	" 5	" 5	..	932
Asmara ..	Italian	Massawa ..	Suez ..	" 8	" 8	..	682
Chinkoa ..	British	Calcutta ..	Aden ..	" 8	" 16	..	59,693
Rushdi ..	Hedjaz	Kunfuda	" 8
Borulos ..	British	Aden ..	Suez ..	" 9	June 11	224	1,800
Massawa ..	Italian	Suez ..	Massawa ..	" 10	" 10	..	267
Dakahlieh ..	British	Port Soudan	Suez ..	" 11	" 12	85	370
Tawil ..	Hedjaz	..	Akaba	" 12
Mansourah ..	British	Suez ..	P. Soudan	June 15	" 15	42	295
Bellerophon ..	British	Singapore ..	New York	" 18	" 18	280	..

[E 6861/248/91]

No. 8.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 17, 1922.

WITH reference to your letter of the 11th instant on the subject of the Nejd pilgrimage, I am directed by the Earl of Balfour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram of the 10th instant from the British agent at Jeddah containing a repetition of the reply which Major Marshall returned to the telegram addressed to him by the High Commissioner for Irak on the 6th instant.*

2. Major Marshall has been instructed in a despatch, of which a copy is enclosed, to endeavour to persuade King Hussein to send a friendly letter to Ibn Saud if the Nejd pilgrimage passes without any untoward incident of importance.

3. Meanwhile, Lord Balfour will be glad if Sir P. Cox can be instructed to convey, in suitable terms, to Ibn Saud King Hussein's message of greeting and his promise to welcome the Nejdi pilgrims

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

Enclosure in No. 8.

The Earl of Balfour to Major Marshall (Jeddah).

(No. 80.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 15, 1922.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 41 of the 10th instant, I shall be glad if you will make every endeavour to persuade King Hussein to send a friendly letter to Ibn Saud in the event of the Nejd pilgrimage terminating without any untoward incident of importance.

2. Such a communication would best be sent by the hand of Musaad Ibn Saud, who is understood to be in charge of the Nejdi pilgrims.

I am, &c.

BALFOUR.

[E 7601/248/91]

No. 9.

Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, July 31, 1922.

NEJD pilgrims, approximately 1,800, arrived at Mecca to-day with presents and letters from Ibn Saud to King Hussein, and were cordially received; seventy of them are royal guests.

(Sent to Bagdad.)

[E 7618/656/91]

No. 10.

Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 57. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, July 10, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period 21st June–10th July, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Simla, Damascus and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

* No. 5.

Enclosure in No. 10.

*Jeddah Report for the period June 21–July 10, 1922.**Pilgrimage.*

The total number of pilgrims disembarked at Jeddah to date is approximately 43,000. It is expected that the sea pilgrimage will be only a little, if any, short of the number last year, and it is said that the land pilgrimage will be bigger.

Up to date 5,500 Indian pilgrims have registered at this agency. Only 581 return tickets have been issued from Bombay, 407 of which have been deposited here. 222 pilgrims have deposited money amounting to 76,744 rupees. No single Bengali or Malabari has made a deposit of money; only Punjabis and Sindhis appear to carry out this useful precaution. It is difficult to forecast the result, but all single-ticket holders who have not deposited money are potential destitutes.

The caravans returning from Medina have had to pay heavy fines to the Bedouin. Some Indians in a recent caravan were held up by Bedouin for six days at Bir Bakhit and had to raise 1,000 medjidiehs to get through. All routes seem to be occupied by the Bedouin. One caravan paid 9 medjidiehs a camel and Dr. Mohammed Hussein, at one time Indian vice-consul at Jeddah, says another caravan paid a lump sum of 150l. and 19 medjidiehs per camel. The Ahamda have fixed their tax at 16 medjidiehs per camel.

The customs charges continue to be a great hardship to pilgrims. Without any previous warning, a tax of 50 per cent. was imposed on the import of Turkish medjidiehs. The pilgrims from Bahrein arrived with 35,000 medjidiehs and the customs took half. King Hussein fixed the rate at 7 medjidiehs to the pound, but the actual rate of exchange in Jeddah is about 9, so, assuming that the pilgrims bought the medjidiehs at 15, their loss is considerable. Another hardship is the confiscation of all Maria Theresa dollars by the customs. Some pilgrims arrived from Yemen with no other currency. The matter was referred to the King, who replied that the money should be kept in the customs and handed back to the pilgrims on their return journey. In the meantime, these pilgrims are in the country without any means of support.

Some Afghan pilgrims arrived with a sack of rosaries in order to trade during the pilgrimage, as is allowed in the Koran. The cost of these was 800 rupees. The customs charge was 38l. gold.

It is rumoured that the King has been offered 40,000l. a month for the Jeddah customs. It is unlikely that he will accept, but it gives an idea of the local estimate of the customs revenue.

Nejd Pilgrimage.

This question has now been satisfactorily settled. The High Commissioner, Bagdad, telegraphed that Ibn Saud agreed that the pilgrims should be limited to town-dwellers and that he had forbidden Bedouin and Akhwan to attend. He further sent complimentary messages to the King and said that the Nejd pilgrimage would be under the charge of Husaad-bin-Saud who would carry a letter from Ibn Saud to the King. Ibn Saud repeated his assurances for the good behaviour of his pilgrims. He asked that a British official might meet them in Mecca.

This message has given great pleasure and great relief in Mecca, and the King has promised a warm welcome to Ibn Saud's representative. It is said that he is already making preparations for their reception. He does not wish a British representative to meet them officially in Mecca, and in this I concur, as it would suggest to the Moslems there that we were responsible for the Nejd pilgrimage and that we did not quite trust King Hussein.

This may be the beginning of better relations between King Hussein and Ibn Saud.

Political.

1. The Kaïmakam of Wejh, with an armed force, proceeded to El Ula on inspection duty. Between El Ula and Medain Saleh he encountered Farhan-el-Aida at the head of an armed force. In the ensuing battle Farhan-el-Aida was defeated, is said to have been killed, and his force scattered, with a loss of 100 killed. The losses in the Sherifian forces were small. As Farhan-el-Aida was the chief instigator of Wahhabi attacks in the north the situation there is quieter. Emir Ali is now on his way to Mecca via Yembo.

2. A report has been received from Mecca of a Wahhabi attack on the Beni Nasir tribe in the Southern Hedjaz. No details have been received.

3. King Hussein has sent me two letters from Abdul Aziz-bin-Mohammed, Deputy Governor of Ghamid. One is addressed to the King and the other to the Kaimakam of Kufuda. He describes the attack of the Wahhabis, who plundered their property, burnt the houses, took away the women and killed the men. He says that Ibn Saud's son, Abu Sharin, came to Bisha with a big force and letters from Bin Atiyan. He sent letters to every tribe of Ghamid, saying that those who embraced their doctrines must come and meet him at Bisha, and warned those who did not accept of the result of their non-acceptance.

4. The condition of Medina remains unsatisfactory and there are rumours of a revolt after the Hajj. A municipal tax of 10 piastres monthly per house for night watchmen and the high cost of tobacco, owing to the high Jeddah customs charge, are both causes of complaint by the inhabitants. The "ashur" (tithes charged on fuel, fruit, dates, &c.) payable by the producer to the Government has been farmed out at 6,000*l.* per annum. It is said that some of the officers are selling arms and ammunition from the Government arsenal to the Arabs. Sherif Nasir, brother of Sherif Shahat, Kaimakam of Medina, was ordered by King Hussein to go to Akaba, but he refused.

General.

1. H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived here on the 23rd June and left on the 27th. Soon after her departure she captured a dhow with thirty slaves on board off Kidan. I am at present in correspondence with King Hussein on the question of slavery, but his first reply showed a disinclination on his part to interfere with the traffic owing to the religious side of the question.

2. The Sherifian Government steamer "Tawil" has returned from Akaba. When she reached Yembo on her return voyage the coal was finished, and she had to burn wood to within 10 miles of Jeddah, where dhows with coal on board met her. They fired salutes on entering all the ports. She has returned to Yembo to bring Emir Ali's troops to Jeddah.

3. It is said that King Hussein will pay a short visit to Jeddah before the pilgrimage. If so, he will probably come to meet Emir Ali on his arrival from Yembo.

Press ("Al Qibla," No. 594).

Decorations: Lieutenant-Colonel Peake, of the Transjordan gendarmerie, receives the 2nd Class of the Order of "Al Istiqlal."

Alleged Treaty between France and the Sultan of Nejd: The article of the "Lisan ul Arab" (of Jerusalem) announcing the conclusion of this treaty and purporting to give the terms agreed upon is reproduced, with the remark that Mohammed Pasha-al-Oseimi has played a large part in the negotiations.

King Hussein's letter of 21st Zil Ka'da 1336 and his *obiter dicta* since that date are sufficient commentary on these sad events.

Egyptian Government Wheat for the Haramain: Reported on the way. Blessings on the new Egyptian Government.

Distinguished Visitors: Sheikh Mahmoud Ali Mansour and Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shafei of Alexandria have arrived.

Refugees from Taraba: Over a hundred families of the Buqum tribe have fled from Taraba to Mecca.

Pilgrims visiting Taif: A number of wealthy pilgrims have left Mecca for Taif, making the journey in comfort and safety. (In fact they were attacked at Mudciq and had to pay toll.)

The Government steamer "Tawil" has left for Akaba via intermediate ports to bring pilgrims and cargo thence.

Foreign Press: Articles from "Al Moqattam" on the conference of Eastern peoples at Genoa, and from "Al Ommeh," of Tunis, on the sufferings of Tunis.

No. 595.

Official proclamation to the effect that customs duty of 50 per cent. will be charged on Turkish medjidiehs (20 Turkish piastres) brought into the Hedjaz. Five medjidiehs per head are allowed free of duty.

This notice is repeated in following issues of "Al Qibla."

French—Ibn Saud Treaty: Arab traditions impose united Arab action. Arab swords brought the French back from Bordeaux to Paris. A vigorous call to the spirit of Arab unity, with frequent quotations from King Hussein's previous statements.

Public Security: Reproduction of a telegram said to have been sent by an Egyptian agricultural engineer in Mecca to all the Egyptian press to the effect that public security in the Hedjaz is complete, and that pilgrims need have no fear of any discomfort, thanks to the measures taken by King Hussein.

No. 596.

Good news for the Public: The new wireless installation has been set up at Akaba. It is working. The charge is 5 Turkish piastres per word.

"One thing recalls another": Reproduction of a long communication addressed to the President of the Arab National Party in the Argentine by a correspondent in the Lebanon under the title "In the Service of Country and of History." The editor applauds the sentiments of the author, and hails as an inspiration this evidence of Arab national spirit overseas.

No. 597.

Leading Article—"Have Patience": Suggested by a telegram received by King Hussein from the Palestinian delegation in London, reporting the result of the House of Lords debate on the subject of the Palestine mandate.

Reproduces the text of the Anglo-French declaration regarding their intentions towards liberated countries and of General Maud's proclamation to the inhabitants of Bagdad on the capture of that city by British troops.

Liberal elements in England and France cannot fail to insist sooner or later that these promises be kept in the spirit and in the letter.

Distinguished Visitors: Es Sayed Hamdi, Mudir of Mesopotamian Waqfs, and Sheikh Khalil-al-Hilali of Wadi Musa have arrived on pilgrimage.

No. 598.

A "qasideh" (one of the Mu'allaqat) by Al Harith-bin-Hilizah-al-Yashkuri is offered to the more cultured readers of "Al Qibla" as being of topical application.

Egyptian Pilgrim ships: Programme of sailings, &c.

Foreign Press: Articles from "Al Biyan" of New York, and "Al Iraq" of Bagdad, on Arab unity.

No. 599.

Leading article on familiar lines addressed to the French President with reference to his slighting allusion to Feisal in a recent speech.

Feisal would have failed in honour if he had not fought the French when they attacked him in his own country. The French call Feisal a criminal, the English, their allies, encourage his accession to the throne of Irak. If the English do not share the French view, how could they sit still and watch Feisal driven out of Syria?

The Arabs have at least one claim to fame, they have become victims to their reliance on British honour. (This phrase occurs in most of King Hussein's letters.)

Foreign Press: Articles from "Al Ahram" of Cairo on "The Awakening of the World of Islam," and from "Al Istiqlal" of Cairo on mandates in the East, giving the findings of the Popular Party and of the Fascist Parliamentary Party in Italy. Also a reproduction from "Al Istiqlal" of a manifesto issued by the "Union française des Démobilisés des Armées d'Orient."

No. 600.

Leading article, in continuation of that in the previous issue, on the text of "the Arabs as victims of their reliance on British honour":—

"We blame no one but the British, who first introduced us to Europe and Europe to us. They are responsible for all the crimes committed against us. Great Britain's reputation in the past was good, but if Parisian civilisation has overcome the factors that made Britain great that is another thing."

"The Arabs have been played with, as others greater than they have been played with before. Look at Serbia and Montenegro and Bulgaria and Roumania. Look at America, but for whom the war would have gone against the Allies."

Mr. Asquith's speech in the House of Commons on the invasion of Belgium by Germany is quoted as proof of the gulf between Great Britain's former sentiments and her present policy:—

"The sacredness of promises! Where is this principle more clearly traversed than in Arabia, in the tyrannous and bestial savagery of Syria under French

dominion, where mosques are closed and muezzins forbidden to call the faithful to prayer?

"The Senegalese and other Moslem French troops will see in time what the Moslem world thinks of them.

"Britain's promises and her pledges to the Arabs have been torn up like that other 'scrap of paper.' There may be noble spirits in England and France to deplore this betrayal of their national honour, but the Arabs' main hopes are upon God."

(This article is of more bitter tone than most against Great Britain.)

Foreign Press: "Al Aukat-al-Iraqiyyeh" of Basra on "Syria and the Arab Revolt," and "The British Mandate in Palestine."

"Al Watan" on "France and Tangier."

"Al Moqattam" on Mr. Crane's interview with the "Times."

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
Homayun ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Aden ..	June 21	June 23	942	Packages. 16,047
Tangistan ..	British ..	Basra ..	Port Soudan ..	" 21	" 22	801	"
Mansourah ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 21	" 22	422	384
Massaua ..	Italian ..	Massowa ..	Suez ..	" 22	" 22	"	2,003
Arabestan ..	British ..	Bombay ..	"	" 24	"	1,748	"
Andromachi ..	Greek ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	" 23	" 27	"	19,643
Borulos ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	" 25	" 25	177	570
Cetiana ..	British ..	Aden ..	Aden ..	" 27	" 29	34	2,845
Shushtar ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Karachi ..	" 30	July 2	807	"
Keneh ..	British ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 30	June 30	713	"
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 30	July 1	890	"
Shuja ..	British ..	Basra ..	"	July 1	"	925	25
Dara ..	British ..	Bombay ..	"	" 1	"	1,425	4,317
Massaua ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massowa ..	" 1	July 1	203	312
Borulos ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 1	" 2	508	41
Tawil ..	Hedjaz ..	Akaba ..	Yembo ..	" 2	" 6	"	"
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	" 5	" 5	142	542
Massaua ..	Italian ..	Massowa ..	Suez ..	" 6	" 7	14	832
Homayun ..	British ..	Aden ..	"	" 8	"	112	642
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	Suez ..	"	" 10	"	975	"

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on June 23 and left on June 27.

[E 8628/4453/91]

No. 11.

Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 60.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, August 2, 1922.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 26 of the 8th June last, I have the honour to inform you that representations have been made to King Hussein on the question of slave traffic in the Hedjaz.

In my letters I informed King Hussein that His Majesty's Government learned with deep distress of the continuation of slave traffic in the Red Sea and of their importation into the Hedjaz, and asked his co-operation to abolish this iniquitous trade.

In his replies King Hussein treats the question entirely from a religious point of view, and for this reason he cannot abolish it nor oppose it, while at the same time he cannot oppose any efforts we may make to stop it. He points out that the taking of free people as slaves is forbidden, and that he and his Government have always opposed this when it occurred in the Hedjaz. He further states that the matter is in our hands, as the traffic originates from the colonies of Great Britain and her Allies, and that we control the sea, the only route by which slaves are imported into the Hedjaz.

The capture of a slave dhow by H.M.S. "Cornflower" on the 28th June off Kidan has for the time being had a salutary effect. This appears to have been the first consignment of the slaves collected at Midi, which, in spite of the report by the political officer at Hodeida, I still consider an important collecting station. It is said here that a caravan may proceed direct from Midi to Mecca by land.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

[E 8630/656/91]

No. 12.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 62. Secret.)

Jeddah, August 10, 1922.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 11th July to the 10th August, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Simla, Damascus and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Jeddah Report for the Period July 11–August 10, 1922.

Pilgrimage.

THE total number of pilgrims who came by sea to this year's pilgrimage was 56,319, only about 900 less than the number arriving by sea for last year's pilgrimage. All pilgrims arrived in ample time, and so far as we know no pilgrim has missed the Hadj. Pilgrimage day was the 3rd August, and the Id on the 4th, 5th and 6th. The weather was entirely favourable, and all reports received say it was a most successful pilgrimage. The number of pilgrims present at Arafat is estimated at about 65,000. The health conditions were good, and it is said that only twelve deaths occurred at Arafat and thirty-four at Mona.

The Mahmal arrived from Egypt on the steamship "Dakahlieh" on the 24th July. Unfortunately, it arrived twenty-four hours before the scheduled time, and preparations for its arrival were not complete.

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived the same afternoon. On the following morning, when the Mahmal procession left the Jeddah pier, H.M.S. "Cornflower" fired a salute, and all ships were dressed. The annual reception at the British agency was held on the 26th, and the Mahmal left for Mecca on the 27th.

The Nejd pilgrimage caravan arrived at Ashairah on the 25th, and reached Mecca on the 30th. The King sent a sherif to meet them. The total number is said to be about 1,800, mostly villagers from Boreidah and Anaizah districts. About 100 of them were armed and carried a Wahhabi banner, but King Hussein decided not to interfere. The Emir of the Nejd pilgrimage is Musaad-bin-Suweilim of Boreidah, and not Musaad-bin-Saud as previously reported. They brought two camels and two horses as presents, and friendly letters, and I understand from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that Ibn Saud's letter to the King was very well expressed. The King is treating seventy of the Nejd pilgrims as his guests. I wrote to King Hussein to tell him how grateful we were for the cordial reception given by him to the Nejd pilgrims.

What might have been a most untoward incident was the later arrival of fifty pilgrims from the Dawasir tribe. The Emir of the Nejd pilgrimage did not inform the Mecca authorities that these were coming, and they reached the frontier without previous warning. Luckily, nothing happened, and they arrived in Mecca without mishap.

King Hussein took every military precaution, as he was undoubtedly nervous about the coming of the Nejd pilgrims. Emir Ali brought his troops from Medina.

[9941]

Many of the garrison were taken from Jeddah, and the hills surrounding Mecca were garrisoned and fortified.

The later Medina caravans seem to have had a bad time and to have paid heavy fines to the Bedouin. The Ahamda tribe were particularly aggressive. A Persian caravan of 400 camels paid 3,000*l.* and the Indians paid about 30-50 rupees each. Some Indians were unable to pay this amount, and had to take another route. One Persian caravan was not allowed to pass on any payment, and returned to Mecca without having been to Medina. The Dutch consul informs me that another caravan consisting of Indian and Javanese pilgrims reached Bir Ali, within sight of Medina, and was then turned back by Bedouin, and returned to Mecca.

An Indian police inspector who returned from Medina on the 16th July said that the pilgrims were badly treated, and the Government authorities incapable of doing anything. All pilgrims paid money to the Bedouin, and the Persians especially had to pay a large sum. He said murders were common in Medina, but if a Bedouin murdered a pilgrim no justice was meted out against the murderer.

This year the Syrian pilgrims came direct from Beirut to Jeddah in three steamers, one flying the French flag and two the Egyptian flag. There are two different local agents for these boats. The Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company have also changed their local agent. The firm of Khandwani, the previous agent, is now running a pilgrim boat, so Suleiman Gabil, the Reis of the Belediah in Jeddah, is the new agent for the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company. He is a great friend of the kaimakam, head of the firm of Haji Zainal Ali Reza, who has hitherto done all in his power to fight against the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company and to oust them from the pilgrim traffic. This year there are four shipping companies taking pilgrims to Bombay, the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company, the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company, Namazi and Khandwani, and the result should be that the fares for pilgrims will be low. The fare quoted for the first boat is 30 rupees.

There seems to be no limit to the taxes imposed on the pilgrims in the course of the pilgrimage season. The two most recent are a tax of 2 mejidis on each camel proceeding to Arafat, and a tax of 4 mejidis on each person leaving Mecca after the pilgrimage.

Political.

1. The new Persian consul, Manieh-ul-Sultanah, who ranks as a consul-general, arrived in Jeddah on the 15th July, having come direct from Tehran via Constantinople. I had previously informed the King of his coming, and had asked that he might be accepted officially as the Persian representative. The King replied that he could not do this until the Persian Government recognised his Government, as he fully explained to the Persian consul last year. At the same time, he said that he had no objection to the British agent looking after the interests of the Persian pilgrims. The King sent the Kaimakam of Jeddah to welcome M. Manieh-ul-Sultanah, but at the same time orders were sent to the Mutawwifs that the Persian pilgrims were on no account to go to the Persian consulate, and that the consul and his assistants were not to be allowed access to the pilgrims.

No objections were raised to Manieh-ul-Sultanah going to Mecca, so I strongly advised him to proceed there and to see the King. He has stayed for the pilgrimage, and was well received by the King, but I have not yet heard officially the result of the interview.

2. As I reported in my despatch No. 58, a local demonstration took place in Jeddah on the 14th July to protest against our pro-Zionist policy in Palestine. The chief speakers were Suleiman Gabil, the Reis of the Belediah, and Constantine Yanni. They visited all the foreign representatives.

A similar demonstration took place in Mecca, where the Palestine delegation has been spreading propaganda among the pilgrims. King Hussein addressed the demonstration, told them to go peacefully to their homes, and that he would do all in his power to see that the rights of Moslems were protected (*vide press*).

General.

1. Sherif Ali-bin-Mansour, the Kaimakam of the Bedouin between Jeddah and Mecca, has been recalled to Mecca, and Sherif Bekhait, of Hadda has been appointed in his place.

2. Emir Ali arrived from Medina, via Yambo, on the 27th July. He was given a most cordial reception, both at Jeddah and at Mecca. Emir Zeid came to Jeddah to meet him.

Press.—"Al Qibla," No. 601.

Leading Article on the Arab Question.

A condemnation of European civilisation, which is said, while giving the world new scientific inventions, to have forgotten the old virtues of honour and truth to a plighted word.

The police in Paris have instructions to arrest perverts who throw ink on ladies' dresses. These are the manners of the people who are to be granted a mandate for Syria!

Long extracts from the speeches of Lord Islington, Lord Sydenham and Lord Buckmaster in the House of Lords debate on the Palestine mandate.

On England and France the editor says: "We cannot imagine a case where parties have pledged themselves to a common end, the attainment of which requires loss of life and property in common and where one of them turns on the share of his comrade, won by this co-operation after bloodshed and loss, as our Allies Great Britain and France have fallen upon us, the Arabs. They pledged themselves and bound themselves to us in co-operation in the war, as they have repeatedly admitted and declared in their use of the words 'the common foe,' and they have seized our share—that is, our lands—usurping them with pretexts and a show of legal excuse."

Oh, Lloyd George! "The tyranny of a friend is bitterer than a sword-cut." And either God rules His own affairs or his Excellency (the Prime Minister) is naturally corrupt beyond all correction, and in that case we must excuse him.

Arrival of the Emir Ali at Yambo.—Distinguished Visitor to Mecca.

Sheikh Mudasser of the Soudan has reached Mecca from Medina. He has written the editor an account of his delight with the treatment accorded to pilgrims in Medina, the public security and comfort of the roads, &c., which the editor considers too flattering to publish.

News from Asir.

The editor learns that a special messenger sent by the "Aal Ayidh" Emirs of Asir to King Hussein has brought news of the eviction of the usurpers (*i.e.*, the Wahhabis) from Ebha and from all Asir and of the capture of their leaders, this having been effected by the union of the tribal and other chiefs of Asir with those of the Shahrani and Qahtan, all of whom are prepared to accept the guidance of His Hashimite Majesty and his Government in all their needs. A special delegation is being sent to express their congratulations and loyalty to the Hashimite throne, on this strengthening of the bonds connecting them with the Hedjaz, and the return to earlier conditions. Identical news has arrived from the sheikhs of the men of Alma (Suleiman-bin-Ali) and the leaders of Mahail.

Alliance between Abyssinia and the Yemen.

The "Fat-ul-Arab" of Damascus (No. 230) is quoted as reporting the conclusion of a military alliance between the Yemen and Abyssinia, which, being directed against Great Britain, has caused her some alarm.

Extracts from the Foreign Press.

A page-long article from "Al Sabah" of Jerusalem on "The Allies and their Love for the Arabs."

An article from "Al Moqattam" of Cairo on "The East."

No. 602.

Official Notice, reminding the public of the prohibition on the export of gold.

Leading article, in reply to the Governments' statement in the House of Lords, that King Hussein had, during the last four months, taken no steps to conclude conversations on the subject of the treaty, and that, as the frontiers of the Hedjaz were still undefined, it was untrue to say that Ibn Saud's adherents had occupied Hedjaz territory.

"Al Qibla" refers to Hedjazian efforts in the war, and compares them with this contemptuous treatment of the Hedjaz since, and says that not only has King Hussein not signed the treaty referred to, but he has refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, because both treaties traversed the rights of his country and his people. "And your discussion of our hesitation to sign the treaty causes us discomfort, oh Excellency! For your own pacts and your own promises you have broken like pie-crust."

For the conviction of the British Government and the world at large, King Hussein's letter to Sir H. MacMahon of the 21st Zil Qida, 1336, is once more reproduced, in full.

"Can any shadow of blame," the editor enquires, "attach to the author of such declarations?"

As for the frontiers, readers are reminded of what King Hussein said to the Hedjaz delegation during the pilgrimage of 1919, that either things should be again as they were in the time of his own and Ibn Saud's fathers and grandfathers, or he would, with pleasure, hand over his country to Ibn Saud.

"Could anything more public spirited, more useful to the peace of the peninsula, have been said? Could any ulterior motive lurk behind such sincerity?"

Palestine Delegation in Mecca.

Arrival of part of the delegation under Sheikh Abdul Qader Muzaffer. Excellent reception by King Hussein and the populace of Mecca.

Distinguished Arrivals.

El Sayed Hassan Husny Bey, charged by the Egyptian Government with the supervision of Egyptian pilgrims' affair, and El Sayed Mohammed Ismail Effendi Murad of Dessouk, have arrived in Mecca.

Refusal of the Mandate.

Reproduction of an article from No. 8 of "As Saut-esh-Sha'ab" of Bethlehem.

"Oppressed Palestine."

From "Al Lewa-al-Masri" of Cairo.

No. 603.

The leading article, issued two days before as a special edition, describes the demonstrations in Mecca against the Palestine mandate under the title: "Lamentations in the Mosque of Al Haram." "Enormous and spirited Islamic Demonstrations in Mecca."

The article, in which the Islamic aspect of the demonstrations receives all possible emphasis, states that, since the arrival of the Palestine Moslem delegation, the mandate for Palestine has been the sole subject of conversation in Mecca. Moslem feeling against that mandate which is to give to the Jews the third most Holy Place of Islam ran so high that a monster demonstration alone could give it expression. Vast crowds of Moslems of every race paraded the town, calling for a free, Arab, Moslem Palestine and protesting against the Jewish National Home. "Al Qibla" finds no words to describe the force of this wave of lofty Moslem sentiment. Pilgrims of every race of Islam participated, the Egyptians being especially notable for their zeal.

The Ulema, the Guardians of the Kaaba, and other notables, proceeded to the Mosque of Al Haram and there implored God to save from this disaster Palestine and other Moslem countries. The general assembly completely filled the Maidan of Qasr-al-Ali and rent the heavens with their cries of protest against the offence done to Palestine and to other countries—(variously described as "Islamic" and as "Arab")—by the policy of colonisation. Schoolboys carried Arab flags.

Their sighs and groans reached the ear of King Hussein, who appeared with the Emir Zeid, the Ministers and the Palestinian delegation. Sheikh Abdul Qader Muzaffer, president of the delegation, made a speech and evoked a storm of protest by pointing to a picture of the Mosque of Jerusalem, capped with a Zionist crown. King Hussein in a speech promised that all possible steps should be taken to ensure the realisation of Moslem wishes for Palestine. His Majesty later received representatives of the demonstrators until the hour of prayer.

Telegrams of protest against the Palestine Mandate.

Copies of those sent by the Palestinian delegation to "Al Mufid" of Bagdad, King Feisal and to the Emir Abdullah; by the Grand Qadi and other notables of Mecca to the League of Nations; and from pilgrims of Java, the Yemen, the Soudan (Sabr Ahmed Hamed Musa, of the White Nile Province), Kurdistan, Turkey, Egypt (Taj-ud-Din Mohammed, Ismail Metwalli and Es Sayed Ahmed Omar, of Shargieh, and Hufny Mustafa Shehata of Daqahlieh), Afghanistan, Syria, the Punjab (Wahid Baksh Pir Baksh), Hyderabad, Deccan (Ali Mohammed Qabatallah), and Bengal (Hankul Khan Samir-ud-Din), to the League of Nations, the Prime Minister, the

"Times," the French and Italian Ministers for Foreign Affairs, "Le Temps," the Pope, and the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Kurdistan and Irak.

Representatives of the people of Sulaimania and Bagdad have declared themselves and their countrymen ready for any sacrifice to save Palestine from the Jews and to safeguard the sanctity of Moslem Holy Places. (The names given—Haji Suleiman of Basrah, Haji Abbas of Sulaimania, &c.—are of little value for purposes of identification.)

Arrival of the remainder of the Palestine Delegation.

El Sayed Abul Khair Effendi Al Mowaqqa and El Sayed Amin Effendi Nurallah have reached Mecca.

Demonstrations in Jeddah.

A description of the manifestation of anti-mandate sentiments by townsfolk and pilgrims in Jeddah on lines similar to those followed in Mecca. Chief spokesman, Constantine Yanni. The foreign representatives' attitude.

The leading article of No. 104 of "Al Sabah" of Jerusalem is reproduced with comments.

No. 604.

Leading Article.

"An open letter to the League of Nations," signed by "a party of the sons of Islam in Mecca."

A vigorous appeal to the League of Nations to be true in this moment when all Western civilisation is on trial before the Moslem world, to the principles of article 22 of the Covenant, and not to act as catspaw to England and France. If the League accepts the Syrian and Palestinian mandates, the writer declares that what happened in Russia with the Bolsheviks is nothing to what will happen in the world of Islam. The League is adjured to reply to France and England with the words: "You shall not with our hands destroy to-day what with your own hands you constructed yesterday, nor will we become a rag for you to wipe the filth of your hands upon."

(The style throughout suggests that King Hussein is the author.)

Reception.

In honour of the Palestine delegation, given by the Emir Zeid.

Foreign Press.

"The Palestinian Question and the Moslem World," from "Al Mufid" of Bagdad.

No. 605.

"One of the readers of 'Al Qibla' in Mecca"—(from internal evidence the most distinguished)—contributes an article inspired by the Government's reply to Mr. Ormsby Gore on the 11th July.

Mr. Churchill is said to condemn himself out of his own mouth in admitting that His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking to King Hussein to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within certain territorial limits, excluding the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. The Arabs have yet to see this promise realised in respect of these four towns. What does it matter what Feisal may have said in 1921, since the language of the earlier pledge is clear? It is of no use explaining away the pledge with commentaries and exceptions. The Arabs know that they were promised their independence by Great Britain, when England and France were in sore need of help, and now, because of the surrender of Palestine to the Zionists, the encouragement of Wahhabism in the peninsula and the sanction given by His Majesty's Government to the servitude of Northern Syria, Great Britain's reputation for fair dealing is lost. The Arabs will know how to defend their rights, and every English stick and stone, if not the English people, will approve their action.

The Syrian and Palestine Mandates.

The League of Nations has approved these. This proves that the rôle of the League of Nations is that of a registry office only.

Egyptian Pilgrims in Quarantine.

"Al Ahram" of Cairo having protested against the imposition of twenty-four hours' quarantine on Egyptian pilgrims, "Al Qibla" points out that there was plague in Suez at the time, and suggests that the editor of "Al Ahram" should amuse himself with "Om Kalthum" (an Egyptian actress) or at the pigeon-shooting, and not with criticism of the Hedjaz Administration. A telegram in which Egyptian pilgrims complain of the arrangements made for their accommodation by the Egyptian Government is appositely reproduced.

Reception.

Given by King Hussein in honour of the Palestine delegation at the barracks in Mecca, with a review of troops, &c.

The Egyptian Mahmal.

Arrival in Jeddah reported.

No. 606.

Official Notice.

Explaining that the caravan of pilgrims which was stopped for two days by Bedouin at Watar and which later turned back to Mecca without visiting Medina, did so at the wish of the pilgrims themselves, after the camel men had offered to conduct them by another road to Medina. A statement to this effect, signed by some of the pilgrims, is reproduced. The Government is enquiring into the matter. The pilgrims are said to have been afraid of arriving too late at Mecca if they continued their journey to Medina.

(Outside reports are emphatic that the Bedouin refused this caravan passage at all costs and bade them seek redress from King Hussein.)

Leading Article.

"Mandates."

The theory of mandates and the practice in Syria and Palestine are contrasted, in a tone which suggests that the last link binding the Arabs to England is now broken.

"We can see in this mandate—(that over Palestine)—no purpose except Great Britain's desire to provoke the Arabs in Arab countries and to compel them through hatred of herself to oppose her views and her aims by every possible means of essential defence. This is the fact and this the inevitable result which from henceforward we must prophesy. We do so with great sorrow, for it was never our wish that the Arabs and the British should one day confront each other as foes."

Nejd Pilgrims.

We learn that more than 1,000 Nejd pilgrims will shortly arrive from Boreidah and Anezah, and that the Government has sent out a party to receive them and to protect them on their journey.

His Highness the Emir Ali.

Has arrived at Jeddah from Yambo: met by His Highness the Emir Zeid.

Mecca and Moscow.

King Hussein has received an appeal for help from Russian Moslems.

Ceremonial Reading of the "Sahih" of the Imam Bokhari.

This ceremony—which is generally understood to signalise national affliction—took place in the Mosque of Al Haram, in the presence of the Palestine delegation, when God was implored to avert impending disaster from the Arab and Moslem world in general and from Palestine in particular.

(No better means could have been found to impress the mass of pilgrims, who do not read "Al Qibla," with the idea that political developments in Palestine and the peninsula threaten the best interests of Islam.)

"Comedy and Tragedy."

Article reproduced from "Al Sabah" of Jerusalem.

No. 607.

Leading Article.

Addressed to the League of Nations, warning that body that the Hedjaz is in a delicate position owing to the impossibility of refusing help to brother Arabs in revolt against the Palestine and Syrian mandates.

The Arabs rely on God first and then on themselves—(hitherto Great Britain has always had the place next after the Deity in the King's effusion)—and they must defend their cause to their last breath.

Arrival of the Emir Ali in Mecca.

Description of the ovation His Highness received, with a review of troops, speeches and the recital of complimentary verses.

Arrivals.

The Syrian delegation: El Sayed Ahmed Bey Mariud; El Emir Ali Adil Arslam; El Sayed Mohammed Ismail Bey, with a private secretary, El Sayed Omar Shakir, of the newspaper "Al Falah," secretary of the League of National Defence of Ammam.

The Sahih of the Imam Bokhari.

Text of the eloquent prayer for the deliverance of the Mosque of Jerusalem from the Jews, offered during the ritual.

The Palestine Delegation.

Their reply to the Palestine Government's refutation of their alarmist propaganda.

The Egyptian Mahmal.

Arrival in Mecca.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.

APPENDIX.

Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
							Packages.
Dakahlieh ..	British	Suez	July 11
Keneh ..	" ..	Suez ..	" ..	July 11 ..	" 12 ..	866	..
Mansourah ..	" ..	Port Soudan ..	" ..	" 11 ..	" 12 ..	663	71
Sultania ..	" ..	Basrah ..	" ..	" 12 ..	" ..	860	16,855
Akbar ..	" ..	Bombay ..	" ..	" 12 ..	" ..	1,329	3,678
Jeddah ..	" ..	Basrah ..	" ..	" 13 ..	" ..	437	506
Zayani ..	" ..	Bombay ..	" ..	" 14 ..	" ..	1,004	750
Mahmoudieh ..	" ..	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 14 ..	July 14 ..	719	..
Borulos ..	" ..	" ..	Port Soudan ..	" 15 ..	" 15 ..	480	4,342
Tawil ..	Hedjaz ..	Yambo ..	Akaba ..	" 16 ..	" 17
Syria ..	French ..	Beirout ..	Suez ..	" 16 ..	" 17 ..	361	286
Berkshire ..	Egyptian ..	" ..	Port Soudan ..	" 16 ..	" 22 ..	762	..
Acora ..	British ..	Bombay ..	" ..	" 17 ..	" ..	478	..
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Massaua ..	Suez ..	" 20 ..	July 20 ..	202	1,169
Borulos ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	" ..	" 21 ..	" 22 ..	703	4
Massaua ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massaua ..	" 22 ..	" 22	4,372
Keneh ..	British ..	" ..	" ..	" 22 ..	" ..	843	..
Mahmoudieh ..	" ..	" ..	" ..	" 23 ..	" ..	525	..
Teucer ..	" ..	Singapore ..	London ..	" 24 ..	July 25 ..	241	300 tons.
Hedjaz ..	" ..	Bombay ..	" ..	" 24 ..	" ..	638	5,281
Amazonia ..	Egyptian ..	Beirout ..	" ..	" 24 ..	" ..	452	18
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	Suez ..	" ..	" 24 ..	" ..	707	..
Tangistan ..	" ..	Bombay ..	" ..	" 25 ..	" ..	727	..
Koweit ..	" ..	Basrah ..	" ..	" 25 ..	" ..	59	8,556
Mansourah ..	" ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	" 25 ..	July 25 ..	216	761
Tawil ..	Hedjaz ..	Akaba ..	" ..	" 27 ..	" 28
Berkshire ..	Egyptian ..	Port Soudan ..	" ..	" 29 ..	" ..	180	4 mules.
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suskin ..	Suez ..	" 30 ..	July 31	115
Tawil ..	Hedjaz ..	Port Soudan ..	" ..	Aug. 1 ..	"
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Massaua ..	Suez ..	" 3 ..	Aug. 3	376
Massaua ..	" ..	Suez ..	Massaua ..	" 5 ..	" 5	305
Borulos ..	British ..	" ..	Port Soudan ..	" 5 ..	" 5
Antenor ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	" ..	" 9 ..	"	6 tons.
Bahrein ..	British ..	Bombay ..	" ..	" 10 ..	"

The French cruiser "Colmar" arrived on the 14th and left on the 16th July, 1922.

[E 9524/656/91]

No. 13.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 66. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, August 30, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period 11th to 30th August, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Simla, Damascus and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL,

British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 13.

(Secret.)

Jeddah Report, August 11-30, 1922.

Pilgrimage.

THE health conditions of the pilgrimage remain entirely satisfactory. The first returning pilgrims left Jeddah on the 12th August, and since that date there has been a steady stream of pilgrims passing through Jeddah. Approximately 36,000 pilgrims have now left Jeddah for different destinations. For the most part the ships have been despatched promptly, and a good deal of credit is due to the local authorities, more particularly as the pilgrims were sent away from Mecca too quickly and there was a big accumulation of pilgrims in Jeddah.

The Nejd pilgrims left Mecca on the 12th August. According to the regulations of the country they were searched for gold before crossing the frontier. It is said that 700 gold pounds were found in their possession, and that mejidis, at the rate of seven for one gold pound, were paid instead. I understand that both Emir Ali and Emir Zeid were very kind to the Nejd pilgrims and took a great interest in their welfare.

Approximately 4,500 pilgrims have gone to Medina after the Haj. The majority of these are Indians. It is said that owing to the experiences of the previous caravans many pilgrims did not want to go, but a good deal of pressure was brought to bear on them by King Hussein, probably on account of the financial gain to be derived therefrom.

We are receiving further particulars about the experiences of the caravans which went to Medina before the Haj. One party of Quetta Indians on the return journey were deserted by their camel-men, had to leave all their baggage and followed on foot to the next watering-place, where they hired a share of the camels from the other pilgrims. It is said that the fact that two caravans were unable to reach Medina (see my report of the 10th August) has had a very bad effect among the pilgrims, and it has shown that the Government's claim that the public security is good on the Medina road is false.

The Dutch consul informs me that on some occasions the soldiers from Medina came to escort the pilgrims into the town and demanded money from the pilgrims. One Javanese pilgrim refused to pay the amount asked for and was shot dead by the soldier.

The Sheikh of Bashir has gone against the King and occupied the Rabegh to Mecca road between Qadhimah and Asfaan. He would not allow a caravan to pass, even on payment, and the Bedouin fired on the caravan which changed the route and came via Jeddah.

In one Persian caravan it is reported that four pilgrims have been killed, eleven wounded and many plundered on the way to and from Medina.

An Indian named Emir Ali Shah of Amritsar, who is a spiritual leader by profession, was so upset by the hardships of the Medina journey that he refused to proceed to Mecca for the Haj. He held to his resolution for some days, but his mutawwif eventually persuaded him to go to Mecca.

We are having the same difficulties as in previous years with the quarantine of northern pilgrims at Tor, and the same dislocation of ordinary passenger traffic. A special despatch on this subject will be submitted to your Lordship.

The postal service to Mecca during the pilgrimage, either intentionally or unintentionally, is thoroughly untrustworthy. One pilgrim wrote to me twice, and

the letters have never been received, and a letter sent to Inspector Said Hassan from Jeddah was also never delivered. On the other hand, I received all the letters sent to me by Dr. Munir-ud-Din, the Indian vice-consul.

There were a good many robberies at Arafat, and the thieves were summarily dealt with. Eleven had the left hand cut off, and one, who stabbed a woman fatally, was put to death on the same spot by Royal order. The cutting off of hands is not the usual punishment for robbery in this country—there are many thieves, among them the King's spy, Mujjahid, who are condemned to simple imprisonment—but it was carried out to impress upon the pilgrims that Sharia law is here still respected and carried out.

Palestine Delegation.

The general consensus of opinion is that the Palestine delegation did not achieve any great success with their propaganda work among the pilgrims. The Indians and Javanese, who did not understand the speeches, were for the most part apathetic. The Emir of the Egyptian Haj informed me that the delegation asked permission to visit him and to deliver a speech. He replied that he would be pleased to receive them on a friendly visit, but that there must be no speeches and no politics, as he was there purely in a religious capacity. It is said that one Egyptian, who believes that Abdul Kadir Muzaffer is a Kemalist agent and cares nothing for Palestine, did all he could to oppose the delegation, and even informed the King that Mecca, instead of being known as the most holy place of Islam, would lose its religious importance and become known as the centre of political intrigue.

King Hussein gave a banquet in honour of the delegation. At the speeches delivered after the banquet one of the delegates suggested that they should found a society called the "Al Mu'tammar Al Islami" (Islamic Conference), and that King Hussein should be president. King Hussein, while expressing himself in sympathy with their aims, refused. It was further suggested that this conference should aim at the collection of 1,000,000L., and that this capital should be kept in the Hedjaz for propaganda and other work.

It is said that King Hussein promised the delegation financial assistance to the extent of 3,000L. and 1,500L. to the Syrian delegation.

Persian Consular Affairs.

The Persian consul-general, Mani-es-Sultaneh, returned from Mecca without having come to any definite settlement with King Hussein other than, as previously reported, that he could not accept him officially pending recognition by the Persian Government, and that he had no objection to the British agent, in the interim, looking after the interests of Persian subjects. It was arranged, therefore, that the Persian secretary should work in this office, and orders were issued from Mecca that all Persian pilgrims should come to this agency. This has worked admirably, but was spoiled by the fact that the Persian consul-general, without notifying me, signed a good many passports in his own house.

Mani-es-Sultaneh came to see me on the 19th August and said he was suffering from hæmoptysis. I found that he was suffering from tuberculosis of the lungs, and recommended that he leave here as soon as possible as he is sixty-seven years of age and quite unfit to remain in this climate. He left for Constantinople on the 22nd August. The secretary remains here until the return of the Medina caravan and continues to work in this office. His work is entirely satisfactory and his books and accounts are correct. I have authorised him to rent two floors of the present Persian consulate for this Arabic year, so that, should a Persian consul arrive next year, he will reoccupy the same building, which is in a central position and very suitable for pilgrim work.

General.

1. Efforts are being made to revive the Hedjaz flying corps. M. Nugdenof, the Russian aviator, has returned. He has already flown the De Havilland and Farman machines, but so far has made no long-distance flights. It is said that five mechanics are coming to assist him.

2. Mohammed Bey, the officer commanding the Mecca garrison, has been dismissed by the King and has gone to Syria. Fuad-el-Khatib says he is a very nice man and that his departure is regretted.

3. Some Egyptian pilgrims have been purchasing revolvers in Jeddah and concealing them in circular tins specially made by the tinsmiths here. At the bottom

of the tin there is a closed compartment for the revolver. The upper part is open and in this they carry a lamp, cooking utensils or anything of no importance. One Egyptian also purchased a Turkish rifle and hid it in his bedding. The High Commissioner in Egypt was informed by telegraph.

4. King Hussein forwarded a telegram from King Feisal, who informed his father that he is suffering from appendicitis and that an operation has been necessary. He asked that Emir Zeid might be sent. The King has consented and has chartered a Bombay Persia steamer to take Emir Zeid and his staff to Basra at a cost of 65,000 rupees. This is, in our opinion, an unwarranted waste of money, which would have been better spent in paying the army or in compensating some of the pilgrims. There is a British India cargo boat now in harbour ready and willing to take Emir Zeid to Aden, where he could proceed by passenger boat to Bombay and Basra. If King Feisal's wife and children had been going one could have understood it.

5. The Khedivial mail steamer "Borulos" went ashore on the Shaab-el-Kebir—about 25 miles north-west of Jeddah—very early in the morning of the 25th August. The steamship "Mahmoudieh," of the same company, went to her assistance and towed her off the reef on the 28th. The survey has shown that she is not seriously damaged and she will continue her journey to Port Soudan.

6. The Hashimite steamer "Rushdi" left for Akaba on the 25th instant. She had on board 170 pilgrims, about 100 soldiers, 2 Krupp guns, 800 rifles, 100 cases of rifle ammunition, 30 cases of shells. The majority of the soldiers are simply returning to their station, but I presume that the extra munitions are on account of the Wahhabi activities in the north. Among the pilgrims on board was Ahmed Mirwat, who was supposed to be concerned in the attack on General Gouraud.

7. Dr. Mohammed Hussein, for fourteen years Indian vice-consul in Jeddah, has returned from Mecca. He says the King offered him the post of head of the Medical Department in Mecca. He refused. He says there is great discontent throughout the country against King Hussein, who is becoming more and more suspicious of everyone and whose spies are everywhere. He says Emir Ali is very unwilling to return to Medina.

8. It is rumoured that King Hussein wrote to two of the generals with Mustapha Kemal suggesting that Mustapha Kemal should make peace with Feisal. The reply came that it was now too late.

9. King Hussein informed the Emir of the Egyptian Haj that the British were helping Ibn Saud against him.

Press: "The Qibla."

No. 608.

Notice.—A wireless station has been opened by the Hashimite Government at Kufuda.

Official Communiqué.—Text of telegrams exchanged between the Jewish National party of Palestine and King Hussein.

The Pilgrimage.—Description of the proceedings at Arafat, &c., which 200,000 persons are estimated to have attended.

Tribes of Asir and the Tehama.—Present their greetings and homage to King Hussein. By what the "Qibla" describes as a happy coincidence, the Palestine Moslem delegation met the party *en route* and exchanged speeches.

Honourable Sentiments.—A body of Egyptian pilgrims having called at the "Qibla" office to express their amazed delight at the perfection of the pilgrimage arrangements made by the Hashimite Government, the editor states that the Government are fully conscious that no efforts can be too great when the welfare of fellow Moslems is in question.

The Egyptian Mahmal.—Departure from Mecca reported.

Departure of Pilgrims for Jeddah.—On the first day after permission to leave Mecca was granted, 7,773 pilgrims left for Jeddah. The "Qibla" hopes that the shipping companies will see to it that the departure of pilgrims for their homes is facilitated, and that they will not be detained in Jeddah.

India and the Arab Question.—The publication by the Indian Caliphate League of a pamphlet advocating, *inter alia*, the removal of all foreign control in the Arabian Peninsula inspires the "Qibla" to point out that Indians and Arabs are alike Moslems and that their aims in this matter are one. The Arabs have always considered that the Caliphate is a subject for Moslems to decide, and the Indian Caliphate League are thanked for their expression of sentiments so firmly held by King Hussein.

No. 609.

Eulogy.—The editor thanks the fortunate accident which has brought him a copy of a letter written to His Majesty King Hussein by a "notable of the Yemen." The letter, which extols in prose and verse His Majesty's virtues, is a model of Oriental hyperbole. It has no other claim to interest.

Syrian and Palestine Delegations.—Good wishes accompany them on their departure from Mecca.

No. 610.

Decorations.—Four columns of them.

Official Notice.—Legal documents emanating from the courts in Constantinople refer to the Hedjaz as being under British protection. The Hedjaz is under God's protection alone. Constantinople knows very well, and so does the world at large, who it is who is under British protection.

Henceforward the Hashimite Government will neither recognise nor endorse any notification emanating from a Constantinople tribunal.

Tricks of Policy.—Article reproducing two telegrams received in Mecca from the Emir Abdullah, announcing Wahhabi raids on transjordanian forces led by Ibn Mahya and Suwaid-ibn-Tawiq.

The article attacks Ibn Saud and, by implication, His Majesty's Government.

The Hashimite Fleet.—The "Tawil" has left with about 500 pilgrims for Hodeidah.

The "Rushdi" is to leave shortly with pilgrims and troops and military stores for Akaba.

A Distinguished Visitor Leaves.—Es Sayed Ahmed Bey Marioud leaves Mecca for Jeddah.

No. 611.

"One blow can be parried, but two . . . ? . . . but three . . . ? . . ."

An article of a tone at least as violent as anything which King Hussein has hitherto allowed himself to publish, against His Majesty's Government and France, "our two Allies who have divided Arab lands between them." French atrocities in Syria; British hopes that the Zionists will kill the Arabs in Palestine; Ibn Saud, subventioned and incited against Irak, the Hedjaz and transjordanian; the "Lisan-ul-Arab" of Jerusalem suspended for telling the truth; the Egyptian press criticising the imposition of quarantine at Abu Saad while returning pilgrims from a perfectly clean Hedjaz are quarantined by the Egyptian Government at Tor; Senegalese fighting under an infidel flag against their fellow Moslems; story of a Senegalese who was refused permission to enter the Hedjaz for pilgrimage because his military past proved him an infidel. Only one thing is clearly established, says the "Qibla": The intention of His Majesty's Government to harm the Arabs.

Extracts from war-time declarations are quoted with their usual piquancy.

Mr. Churchill's statement of gratification at the security of British lives and property in Palestine and Mesopotamia is condemned as a wanton deception of the British nation. The peace and security of these countries, as all the world knows, is due solely to the presence and influence of the Emir Abdullah and King Feisal.

If Britain continues in this illusion she will have a sad awakening and will have cause to repent her deception when repentance is no longer of avail.

The Arabs have learnt their lesson. They have seen the misery into which trust in the famous British honour has plunged them.

Henceforward, God and their own right arm!

Medina Caravan.—Departure of this caravan of 2,400 camels. Very few pilgrims left in Mecca.

No. 612.

Official Notice.—For the year 1341, all rents are to be paid at the rates prevailing in 1332 dwelling-houses in two instalments, and half in gold, half in mejidis at 7 mejidis (140 Turkish piastres) to the pound sterling; shops, &c., in gold and in advance.

(This announcement is for foreign consumption only. Rents have everywhere been raised for the year 1341 above the already high rents of 1340, and petitioning tenants get no sympathy from the authorities. King Hussein is himself a big landlord in Jeddah.)

Article against the Senegalese troops in Syria and Ibn Saud.

Reproduction of an article from "Al Moqattam" on Mandates in the East.

W. E. MARSHALL.

APPENDIX.
Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1922.	1922.		Packages.
Bahrein ..	British	Bombay	Aug. 11	..	296
Borulos ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	Aug. 11	12	108	266
Peleus ..	British ..	Liverpool ..	Singapore ..	11	14	1,013	..
Celebes ..	Dutch ..	Antwerp ..	Batavia ..	11	13	993	..
Keneh ..	British	Tor..	12	1,018	..
Mahmoudieh ..	British	Tor..	12	730	..
Dakahlieh ..	British	Suez	12	608	..
Billiton ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia ..	12	14	1,000	..
Teenkai ..	British ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia ..	12	14	822	..
Antenor ..	Dutch	Batavia	13	943	..
Jeddah ..	British	Bombay	13	1,182	..
Shuja ..	British	Bombay	14	1,377	..
Sultania ..	British	Bombay	14	1,432	..
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	15	15	532	367
Antiochus ..	British ..	Liverpool ..	Singapore ..	15	15	995	..
Merauke ..	Dutch ..	Rotterdam ..	Batavia ..	15	15	1,403	..
Arabestan ..	British	Batavia	16	1,693	..
Tangistan ..	British	Bombay	16	931	..
Accra ..	British	Bombay	16	565	..
Dara ..	British	Bombay	17	1,427	..
Akbar ..	British	Basrah	17	1,168	..
Tawil ..	Hedjaz	Hodeidah	18	577	..
Mahmoudieh ..	British ..	Tor.. ..	Tor.. ..	18	18	750	..
Amazonia ..	Egyptian ..	Suez ..	Beirut ..	18	18	950	..
Berkshire ..	Egyptian	Beirut	18	959	..
Hyson ..	British ..	Liverpool ..	Singapore ..	18	19	994	..
Keneh ..	British ..	Tor.. ..	Tor.. ..	19	19	880	..
Syria ..	French ..	Suez ..	Beirut ..	20	20	409	..
Laertes ..	British ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia ..	20	21	915	..
Mansourah ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	21	22	..	1,923
Ronds ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia ..	21	22	1,394	..
Tydeus ..	British ..	Liverpool ..	Singapore ..	21	22	994	..
Hejaz ..	British	Basrah	23	874	..
Djembar ..	Dutch ..	Hamburg ..	Batavia ..	24	25	1,400	..
Rushdi ..	Hedjaz	Akaba	25	170	..
Mahmoudieh ..	British ..	Tor.. ..	Tor.. ..	25	29	750	..
Keneh ..	British ..	Tor.. ..	Tor.. ..	26	26	937	..
Tawil ..	Hedjaz ..	Hodeidah	26
Massaua ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massaua ..	27	27
Krakatan ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia ..	27	28	1,648	..
Naderi ..	British ..	Bombay	27	8,302
Gandara ..	British ..	Calcutta	27	60,244
Orestes ..	British ..	Liverpool ..	Singapore ..	29	29	613	..
Borulos ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	28	30	..	318
Zayani ..	British	Bombay	29	883	..

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 13th and left on the 15th August, 1922.

[E 10355/248/91]

No. 14.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 2.)

Sir,

Downing Street, October 2, 1922.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, on the subject of an alleged agreement between Ibn Saud and the French Government.

I am, &c.

J. E. MASTERTON SMITH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.

(Secret.)
Sir,

Bagdad, August 18, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your secret despatch dated the 27th July, 1922, with enclosures regarding an alleged agreement between Ibn Saud and the French. I have also received copies of despatches No. 217/158 P., dated the 19th July, and No. 226/167 P., dated the 26th July, 1922, from His Majesty's consul, Damascus, on the same subject.

In reply I would invite your attention to the enclosed translation of a letter from Ibn Saud, of which I telegraphed the purport in my telegram No. 536 (No. 825 to Cairo, Jerusalem and Damascus), dated the 2nd August, 1922. The sincere and emphatic tone of Ibn Saud's letter, which was written entirely spontaneously, constitutes a sufficiently convincing answer to the allegation made against him, and will remove any misconception as to his attitude towards His Majesty's Government that has arisen from the intrigues and misrepresentations of Muhammad-al-'Asaimi.

The despatches from His Majesty's consul, Damascus, above quoted, provide abundant proof that Muhammad-al-'Asaimi has been engaging in intrigues with the French authorities in Syria, in which he has represented himself as Ibn Saud's accredited agent and acting under his definite instructions, and it appears by no means improbable that 'Asaimi has by this means entered into some explicit or implicit agreement with the French. This fact would sufficiently account for the somewhat inconclusive *démenti* issued by the French Government. The evidence adduced by His Majesty's consul that 'Asaimi was, in fact, acting on definite instructions from Ibn Saud rests mainly on the frequent interchange of messengers between the two and on a letter alleged to have been written by Ibn Saud to 'Asaimi, which was seen by Muhammad Bassam. As regards Ibn Saud's messengers, His Majesty's consul has pointed out in former despatches that they are completely under the influence of 'Asaimi, who interprets their messages as best suits his purpose, while the terms of the alleged letter seen by Muhammad Bassam are so vague as to make this piece of evidence of little value.

Moreover, this inconclusive evidence is directly refuted not only by the enclosed letter from Ibn Saud, but also by his former letters regarding the appointment of an agent at Damascus, of which translations were forwarded with my despatches No. 271, dated the 11th May (purport telegraphed to Damascus under my No. 218/S, dated the 3rd May), and No. CO/522, dated the 14th August, 1922 (No. CD/60, dated the 17th August, 1922, to Damascus), respectively. In these letters Ibn Saud explicitly denies that he has ever appointed 'Asaimi as his agent or authorised him to act on his (Ibn Saud's) behalf in any matter whatever, either at Damascus or at any other place. He admits that he has corresponded with 'Asaimi and that his subjects may have had recourse to 'Asaimi in the absence of an accredited Nejd agent owing to his influence with the French, but declares, in his second letter, that, having been informed by me of 'Asaimi's true character, he has no further confidence in him and cannot offer him any post.

The tone of these letters further convinces me that Ibn Saud was quite unaware of the intrigues which 'Asaimi was conducting in his name, and that 'Asaimi has succeeded in deceiving him as he has apparently succeeded in deceiving those with whom he has come into contact in Syria.

It is my belief that the circumstantial report of the conclusion of this treaty is the work of interested parties to whom the intrigues of Muhammad-al-'Asaimi at Damascus offered a ready opportunity for attempting to discredit Ibn Saud in the eyes of His Majesty's Government. The representations of the Hashimite Government, spontaneously offering corroborative evidence in support of the report, cannot be regarded as unprejudiced.

In view of certain allusions in the despatches of His Majesty's consul at Damascus to the attitude of Ibn Saud towards His Majesty's Government and to his intentions as regards Irak and the Hedjaz, I would draw attention to the conciliatory attitude adopted by Ibn Saud towards King Hussein in the matter of the pilgrimage—which has been fully corroborated by subsequent events—to the friendly correspondence recently exchanged between Ibn Saud and King Feisul and to the consistently friendly tone of Ibn Saud's letters to myself.

While I have therefore no reason to doubt the sincerity of Ibn Saud and his loyalty in regard to his engagements with His Majesty's Government, I am fully

aware of the danger arising from the policy of the French towards Ibn Saud as described by His Majesty's consul at Damascus. The existence of this danger should, I submit, be taken into full consideration when dealing with questions of policy which affect Ibn Saud's interests.

I am forwarding copies of this despatch to the High Commissioner, Cairo, the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, and to His Majesty's consul, Damascus.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX,
High Commissioner for Irak.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

Ibn Saud to Sir P. Cox.

14th Bhil Qadah, 1340.

I WRITE this to inform you that the Cairo correspondent of Reuter's Company has lately despatched a telegram to the effect that a military agreement has been concluded between my Nejd Government and that of the French in Syria, whereby the French Government undertake, in the event of an attack being made against my territories by the Governments of Transjordan and Irak, to assist me to repulse such attacks, that the French Government and ourselves are working in co-operation to thwart His Britannic Majesty's policy in the Arabian Peninsula, and other falsehoods and groundless accusations.

These illusions have been given birth to in the imagination of the correspondent of the "Athranse" [sic], or, rather, he has been directed to give publication to them by certain people, who continue to spend their best efforts in creating systematic falsehoods, which they hope will cause coolness in the friendly relations with the English Government. I am not ignorant of the source of this news and the fabrications thereof, who wished to perfect and exaggerate their tale by the question of Ibn Shaalan, which is one of my internal affairs, as well as by every incident or occurrence that has taken place in my territories or within my frontiers.

Though these falsehoods are not the first of their kind which these villains have been spreading, I am, nevertheless, much affected by, and very much regret, the light-mindedness of Reuter's Cairo correspondent. I strongly protest against his action in relying upon these forgerers and in serving their aims by publishing without deliberation what they convey to him about essential questions like this with the sole intention on their part of depicting me before the English public opinion and the international political world as opposing and obstructing the policy of Great Britain.

I am, nevertheless, fully confident that His Britannic Majesty's Government and all British political circles in London and in the East are fully aware of my friendly policy towards them, and that rumours of this sort will not have any effect on them. I also consider this a great opportunity to express my sincere feelings and sentiments and to confirm the strength of my genuine respect to the covenants existing between us; and to give the lie with complete plainness to the publications made in this connection by the correspondent of the "Athranse" and those who directed him to do so.

I beg to request your Excellency to convey these expressions of my sincerity to His Majesty the King in London, and to direct Reuter's correspondent to give complete contradiction to these rumours before the whole world, and to make it plain that I have had no "interference" [sic] with any State, either Oriental or Western.

U.E.,
Seal of Ibn Saud.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

Sir P. Cox to Ibn Saud.

Extract from a Letter, No. 10632, dated August 6, 1922, from his Excellency the High Commissioner for Irak to His Highness Sir Imam Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Feisul-al-Saud, G.C.I.E., Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies. (In reply to Ibn Saud's Letter of 14th Bhil Qadah, 1340.)

(Extract.)

Bagdad, August 6, 1922.

AS to the Reuter's report, be sure that your friend never attached the smallest credence to it, and in proof of this I did not even ask you for a denial, but caused the

report to be contradicted forthwith. I am none the less gratified, however, by your emphatic repudiation of this calumny and by your renewed assurances of friendship to the British Government and of respect for the covenants between us. I have telegraphed the purport of your letter to my Government and to His Majesty's representative at Cairo.

[E 11189/656/91]

No. 15.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 73. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, September 30, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period 31st August to the 30th September, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Simla, Damascus and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Jeddah Report for the Period August 31 to September 30, 1922.

(Secret.)

Pilgrimage.

MANY of the Medina pilgrims have returned, some having come direct via Rabegh, others via Yembo. On the whole these caravans seem to have suffered less than the caravans which went to Medina immediately before the Haj. On the journey to Medina fighting took place between the Beni Salem camelmen and the Masruh camelmen. The fighting arose out of some trifling quarrel between two camelmen. Seven from the Beni Salem were killed and four from the Masruh. It is said that two Egyptian pilgrims and one Persian were killed, but this has not yet been confirmed. Sheikh Ismail of Rabegh went to the spot and settled the dispute, thereafter dividing the caravan into two parts, and sending one part, with Beni Salem camelmen, via the Sultania road, and those with Masruh camelmen via Ghayir, and the same arrangements have been made for the return journey, the Beni Salem taking their pilgrims to Yembo. Both the Beni Salem and the Masruh are sections of the Harb tribe.

The caravan which went by the Sultania road was stopped for eight days at Bir Abbas, even though the pilgrims signified their willingness to pay any fine. They finally paid 15 mejdis per head, and altogether took twenty-one days from Mecca to Medina. On the return journey to Yembo they were fired on between El Hamra and Kheif, and two Egyptian women and one man were killed.

The caravan which went by Ghayir was, at Sattah-el-Ghayir, surrounded by Bedouin, who asked for 50l.

The caravan offered to pay 30l., but this was not accepted by the Bedouin. Some of the camelmen with the caravan then fought the Bedouin, while the other camelmen took the caravan through in safety. The return journey was uninterrupted, and the caravan arrived in Jeddah ten days after leaving Medina; but I understand there was a good deal of robbery, with and without violence, by the camelmen attached to the caravan.

The majority of the pilgrims who went to Yembo came to Jeddah on the Shereefian steamer "Tawil." She carried nearly 800 pilgrims, and the conditions, due to overcrowding, lack of water and lack of sufficient latrine accommodation, were very trying for the pilgrims. The steamer spent thirty-six hours on the journey. The pilgrims paid 18 rupees for a ticket and 7 rupees for municipal and other taxes before leaving Yembo. The "Tawil" has returned to Yembo to bring more pilgrims. The other Shereefian steamer, the "Rushdi," brought 360 pilgrims, and the conditions on that boat were even worse. It is said that six pilgrims died during the voyage.

About 200 Egyptian pilgrims have arrived at Yembo and are awaiting transport to Egypt. The Khedivial agent there reports that about 170 of them belong to the official Egyptian pilgrimage and carry special passports, but have not now sufficient

money to purchase a new ticket. I telegraphed to the High Commissioner, Egypt, suggesting that the next Khedivial mail boat, leaving here on the 2nd October and Yembo on the 3rd October, should take all Egyptian pilgrims, and that pilgrims with green passports should be taken free of charge and the cost adjusted afterwards between the Egyptian Government and the Khedivial Mail Line. No reply has yet been received, but the local agent has received instructions to take only eighty-four class and deck Egyptian pilgrims and ordinary passengers, and only on payment, so I anticipate trouble when the Khedivial mail boat arrives in Yembo on the 3rd October. I cannot understand why this steamer should not be allowed to take all the Egyptian pilgrims. Tor is now closed, but I can see no reason why 200 pilgrims should not be quarantined at Suez. There are also more than 200 Syrian pilgrims awaiting transport, and I do not know when or how they will get away, as the Egyptian pilgrims will have prior claim for passages on the Khedivial boats.

Political.

1. *Palestine Delegation.*—Further details have been received of the comparative failure of this delegation in its mission to the Hedjaz. The "Al-Mu'tammar Al-Islami" (see my previous report) was not formed, as King Hussein forbade it. King Hussein also forbade them to send telegrams to Afghanistan and other Moslem countries, and would not allow them to print pamphlets in the "Qibla" printing-press. They also asked King Hussein if, in the event of a revolution in Palestine, he would declare a "jihad," and the answer was in the negative. There seems no doubt that the delegation was disappointed. King Hussein's attitude seems to have been to treat them kindly, but at the same time to inhibit any direct action on their part.

2. *Nejd Pilgrimage.*—Emir Ali sent a friendly letter to Ibn Saud and also sent a verbal message by Musaad-bin-Suweilim to say that he would be pleased to meet Ibn Saud at any suitable place to discuss the question of boundaries between the two countries.

3. *Treaty between King Hussein and Idrissi.*—With reference to Aden letter of the 20th July with details of the treaty arranged by Amin Rihani between the Idrissi and the Hedjaz, I understand that King Hussein has not signed this treaty, and, further, that he has no intention of signing it.

4. M. van der Plas, the Dutch consul in Jeddah, hinted that King Hussein had signified his willingness to enter into treaty negotiations with the Dutch. He apparently realises that the presence of Javanese pilgrims is essential for the financial support of this country, and the Dutch consul, who was recently very angry at the treatment meted out to a Javanese pilgrim, threatened to expose everything in the Javanese press. I do not think anything will come of these negotiations, and the Dutch consul left Jeddah on the 22nd September for four months' leave of absence.

5. Abdur Rahman, the Arabic clerk at the French consulate, who is a Shereefian subject, was arrested on the 20th September and taken to Mecca without any reference to the French consul and without any explanation being given. His house was searched. I understand there is no evidence against the man, and it is suspected that the action of King Hussein is directed against the French as a reprisal for the arrest of Arif Darwish in Syria. This was followed by the transference of the local police attached to the French, Italian and Dutch consulates to Mecca. These have not been replaced.

(There are no local police at this agency, as their services were dispensed with some years ago.)

The French consul protested against the arrest of his Arabic clerk, and the King sent the Kaïmakam of Jeddah to present his compliments and to explain that the man was arrested because of an action against him in Mecca. A few hours later a boy of about 12 years of age, the son of a naturalised Indian who works at the French consulate, was also arrested and put in prison. The French consul still receives no official reply to his letters. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sent him a private letter to say that when Arif Darwish was liberated from prison in Syria he would receive a reply to his official communications.

6. On the 2nd September King Hussein received a telegram from the Central Khalifate Committee at Bombay, signed by Khatir, the secretary, saying that special prayers had been ordered at 9 P.M. on the 8th to give thanks for the victory of the Turks over the Greeks. They asked the King to order similar prayers in the Hedjaz. The King took no action and sent the telegram to me, as he said, to get rid of it.

7. There has been no confirmation here of the presence of a force of Wahhabis south-east of Akaba, reported in telegram No. 318 from his Excellency the High

Commissioner, Egypt. None of the reports received by King Hussein from Akaba and Maan since the 11th September make any mention of it, and King Hussein received a telegram on the 26th September from the Kaïmakam of Maan reporting everything quiet in the Maan and Akaba areas.

8. It is reported from Mecca that Ibn Saud has sent one of his sons with 1,000 camelmen and 50 cavalry to the Eastern Yemen, probably to attack Asir. Fighting is also reported between Shereefian outposts at Al-Ukhaidar and a party of Akhwan. The latter were defeated and retreated in two parties, one to Arrayeh and the other to Attarif. King Hussein, in a letter sent to me a few days ago, complains bitterly that, acting under our instructions, he sits with folded arms while the Wahhabis attack him.

General.

1. The anniversary of the King's accession took place on the 2nd September. A reception was held at the Government Buildings in the morning and at the Barracks in the evening. Emir Ali and Emir Zeid, who had arrived from Mecca, attended the latter ceremony.

2. Emir Zeid left on the steamship "Homayun" on the 3rd September, arrived at Aden on the 6th September, and Basra on the 16th. He sent me a telegram announcing his arrival. The total number of passengers, including the Emir, was seventeen.

3. Dr. Max Makousky, a Polish eye specialist, accompanied by Mr. Joseph Liebman, an American Jew, have arrived here from Egypt. The former was promised work by the Arab agent in Cairo, but this promise has not been fulfilled by the Hashimite Government. Both were devoid of funds, and Dr. Makousky has now started a private practice so as to enable him to make sufficient money to leave the country. The latter, whose card shows him to be a dealer in dry goods and general merchandise in Cradock, Va., United States of America, has been to Palestine and Egypt, and says he is also an optician. He also appears to be destitute, and is at present acting as interpreter and general assistant to Dr. Makousky.

4. The French consul informs me that he has heard from Mecca that General Gouraud has been nominated Military Governor of Paris, and that he will be replaced in Syria by M. Jonnard, now French Ambassador in Rome.

5. A small caravan of slaves recently arrived in Jeddah, having come from the Yemen by land.

6. King Hussein is increasing his unpopularity by insisting on fixing the rate of exchange of Turkish mejidis at seven to the £. Anyone found breaking this rule is heavily fined. Five moneychangers from Jeddah were sent to Mecca, and fined sums varying from 50L to 100L each. The King is finding it impossible to obtain spies in Jeddah, and is now sending spies from Mecca, in some cases disguised as pilgrims.

The leading merchants in Jeddah held a meeting to discuss the exchange, and they submitted a petition to the King, explaining that they could not accept mejidis at the rate of seven to the £, as there is no demand for mejidis in any of the countries from which goods are imported into the Hedjaz, and that trade in the Hedjaz will be seriously affected. Emir Ali, who was in Jeddah, agreed with the merchants, but King Hussein has taken no notice of the petition.

Press: "Al Qibla."

No. 613.—An appeal for mutual confidence between Arab and Jews, addressed by the "National Israelite Committee" of Palestine to Palestinians and Arabs the world over, is rejected by "Al Qibla" as insincere and subversive.

The controversy with "Al Ahram," of Cairo, over the quarantine measures imposed on pilgrims is continued.

The text of a law creating and defining the duties of a "Committee of Public Works" to deal with questions of rents, debts and business relationship is published.

No. 614.—Leading article on the Arab movement, the text being that action must take the place of words. Nowadays force alone gets recognition. A weak ally is treated, as the Arabs have been treated by their allies, worse than a strong enemy. All words, proofs of promises, evidence and argument have been of no avail to convince those who will not be convinced. Force is the watchword now, by whatever means employed. The Arabs must fight for their rights; responsibility for what may happen will not rest on them. The road to independence has been trodden by others before. Death on that road is life; life elsewhere is death, &c.

Bulletin of King Feisal's progress after his operation.

The "Foreign News" includes an article on "Allied Responsibility for War in the Near East" from the "Daily Herald."

No. 615.—Leading article inspired by the anniversary of the election of King Hussein as King of the Arabs, followed by a description of celebrations in Mecca, with two columns of appropriate verse. The poet, "A Youth of the Peninsula," apostrophises "the ally" as false to his word, intriguing, spreading poison among the Arabs like a serpent, fomenting strife, preferring Arab bloodshed to Arab friendship, &c. This definition is tempered by the reflection: "What else can be expected of a foreigner?" For Ibn Saud, who gets twenty lines of abuse, no such excuse is offered.

News from Asir.

A wireless message from the Kaïmakam of Kunfuda is reproduced, which reports that the Asir and Beni Shahr have advanced into the Shahr country, looting and burning. Ibn Musheit, of the Shahr, has been given a safe-conduct. Fahad-al-'Uqbeli, the Wahhabi leader, has been taken prisoner. Hassan Beljeish is at the headquarters of the Al Mashit.

No. 616.—Leading article on familiar lines, demanding Arabia within its natural boundaries for the Arabs. Arabs are exhorted to abandon their internecine feuds and to unite for the defence of their country against usurpers and colonisers, whose efforts, as manifested in Wahhabi advances on the Hedjaz, have been everywhere frustrated. Riots in Syria, the Emir Abdullah's ambitions for Palestine, and the Mesopotamian Government's differences with Sir Percy Cox are instanced as inevitable results of neglect by the Allies of King Hussein's advice.

Telegram from King Feisal announcing his convalescence.

Reproduction from the "Lisan-ul-Arab," of Jerusalem, of an article citing Koranic argument against Wahhabi methods; from the "Ahram" of a note on wireless telephony and broadcasting; and from the "Daily Herald" on "What is behind Politics?"

No. 617.—An editorial of the "Qibla" of the 8th August, 1917, is reproduced for the enlightenment of a correspondent of "Al Moqattam," who had written on the Indian attitude towards the Arab revolt. The article sets out to prove that this revolt was justified in Mahomedan law.

"Al Akhbar" and "Al Istiqal," of Cairo, are admonished for their expressions of opinion on the Arab question and King Hussein.

No. 619.—The leading article criticises those newspapers which publish reports of Wahhabi advances on the Hedjaz and on Transjordan, on the ground that such news is intended by the Wahhabis and by the "colonisers" to discourage the Arabs of Palestine by creating the impression that the Hedjaz is impotent to assist them. Time will show that Arab volunteers can defend their country bravely.

The action of the Wahhabis and of those who seek to replace Arabs in Palestine by Jews is contrary to Moslem religion. The Arabs, on the other hand, are known to be under the direct protection of God. None can harm them, and the acts of their lord and commander—King Hussein—are inevitably right.

The views of their lord and commander on the undesirability of Arab bloodshed in the usurpers' interest, and his invitation to the Wahhabi leader to come and take the Hedjaz without bloodshed, are once more presented to the public.

Account of a meeting at which the King appointed a general committee to make recommendations as regards the administration of 'Ain Zobeidah.

"A Reader in Mecca" contributes a résumé of recent Arab history, from which it appears that, when King Hussein made his Arab revolt in response to cries for help from Syria, the Hashimite army drove the Turks back to the Taurus Mountains, and could, had they willed, have swept the whole of Asia Minor. King Hussein never asked for Syria; Syria asked for King Hussein. As for the Allies, they made promises to induce King Hussein to enter the war, and they have broken these promises since, more shame to them. The brave little Hedjaz will continue its "jihad" to the bitter end, believing that life without liberty is death, &c.

King Hussein has but one aim—Arab union. None but Arabs have the right to discuss the future of Arabia. Arab administration is unmatched for justice and equity, as witnessed by the fact that Jews have been allowed to live in the Yemen for hundreds of years past.

Turning to Mr. Lloyd George's speech to the Free Church delegates, "A Reader in Mecca" dismisses as so much claptrap all references to the League of Nations and to the hoped-for disappearance of international jealousies, and attributes the continuance of international jealousies to such facts as the British annexation of the German

colonies and the ratification by a puppet League of Nations of the British mandates in Palestine and Mesopotamia.

The article is, of course, from King Hussein's pen.

The arrival of the Emir Zeid in Basra and Bagdad is reported.

No. 620.—With reference to an interview reported by "Al Moqattam" to have been given to the Syrian Lebanon delegation by a member of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, "Al Qibla" goes over the old ground again. The Arabs were promised independence; are Palestine, Syria and Irak Arab or not? The Allies are behaving tyrannously, and they are reaping and will continue to reap the fruits of their tyranny and shame. Disorder is rife in the whole peninsula, and we know there is more to come.

The tone of the article is throughout hopefully expectant of early trouble in Palestine, Syria and Irak.

The Governors of Akaba and of Maan have been made directly responsible to Mecca for all purposes of administration.

Rumours of the Emir Abdullah's departure for London are denied, and their publication is shown as proving the unreliability of the press.

A new Indian newspaper, "Al Istiqal," of Cawnpore, gets a preliminary puff. The attitude of "Al Qibla" towards the Indian press has hitherto been consistently unfriendly.

No. 621.—"Al Qibla" recommends Egyptians not to export their cotton, but to leave England and America without supplies, and, by opening cotton mills, &c., in Egypt, to stop the import of foreign goods.

Two years is time enough to build the necessary factories. The Egyptians, for whom the writer professes mingled admiration and affection, are not worse educated than those who now use their cotton. They will, if they adopt "Al Qibla's" plan, wax prosperous: unemployment will cease, and economic independence will bring political independence in its track.

All the profits of the Egyptian sugar-cane are at present going to foreigners. Egyptians are exhorted to take an interest in their national products.

The Hedjaz Government, in spite of natural and other obstacles, are doing their best to grow cotton over an area of 1,300 feddans between Mecca and Lith. They have no Nile and no Euphrates, but we hope for good results, "insha'lla."

(Except for a few dilapidated shrubs in the "School of Agriculture" in Mecca, the only cotton in the Hedjaz is the manufactured article.)

Arab agent in Egypt. Arrives on leave of absence in the Hedjaz. Welcome.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

APPENDIX.

SHIPPING Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims embarked.	Cargo discharged.
Ryperkerk	Dutch	Amsterdam	Durban	Aug. 31	Aug. 31	50	Packages.
Tawil	Hedjaz	..	Port Soudan	..	31	650	..
Massana	Italian	Massowa	Suez	Sept. 2	Sept. 2	..	146
Helenus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	..	3	593	..
Samarinda	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	..	3	1,532	..
Homayun	British	..	Basra	..	3
Tawil	Hedjaz	Port Soudan	Port Soudan	..	3	589	..
Agamemnon	British	Amsterdam	Batavia	..	3	807	..
Buitenzorg	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	..	3	1,651	..
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Soudan	..	5	..	165
Priam	British	Amsterdam	Batavia	..	5	503	..
Gandara	British	..	Aden	..	7
Borulos	British	Port Soudan	Suez	..	7	158	1,746
Kambangan	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	..	8	9	..
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	..	11	..	344
Polyphemus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	..	12	396	..
Tawil	Hedjaz	Port Soudan	Port Soudan	..	13	623	..

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims embarked.	Cargo discharged.
Shushtar ..	British ..	Bombay	Sept. 14	Packages. 9,385
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	" 15	Sept. 15	..	168
Massana ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massowa ..	" 16	" 16
Prometheus ..	British ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia ..	" 17	" 17	198	..
Dara ..	British ..	Bombay	" 20	1,624
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 21	" 22	..	1,610
Firoozi ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	" 21	" 24	..	4,431
Massana ..	Italian ..	Massowa ..	Suez ..	" 22	" 23
Rushdi ..	Hedjaz ..	Akaba ..	Yembo ..	" 23	" 23
Teucer ..	British ..	Liverpool ..	Singapore ..	" 23	" 23	154	..
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	" 25	" 25	..	295
Tawil ..	Hedjaz ..	Port Soudan ..	Yembo ..	" 25	" 27
Rushdi ..	Hedjaz ..	Yembo ..	Yembo ..	" 28	" 29
Koweit ..	British	Bombay	" 29	1,066	..
Tawil ..	Hedjaz ..	Yembo	" 30

[E 11187/248/91]

No. 16.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 811. Secret.)

My Lord,

Ramleh, October 7, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of an appreciation of the Wahabi movement by the French army of the Levant which I have received from the Intelligence Branch of Headquarters, British troops in Egypt.

Copies of this report have already been transmitted by headquarters to Bagdad and Jerusalem, and I have sent one to His Majesty's consul at Damascus for his information.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and Lebanon
and Commander-in-Chief Army of Levant.

Wahabism and its Neighbours (2).

(Continuation of Summary No. 1, July 12, 1922.)

(Translation.)

Aley, August 31, 1922.

Sources of Information.

French consul-general, Palestine.
" " Bagdad.
" " Jeddah.
Summary of reports, Damascus.
" " Aleppo.
English official reports.
Press.

General Situation.

Wahabism has made great territorial gains during the last few months, but there now seems to be a certain slackening in its progress, though its propagandist activities have in no way lessened.

Wahabite powers of expansion are probably reaching their limit, and their forces are certainly weaker owing to the necessity of occupying large areas where submission to Ibn Saud and the Wahabite doctrine has not been complete; in fact, there are already signs of reaction.

The Ibn Rashid tribes have not joined the Wahabis, though defeated by them.

The Egyptian press, on the strength of recent rumours, is again attacking Ibn Saud.

The Chammars, under Sheikh Ikab-ben-Akil, uncle of Ibn Rashid, are said to have been successful in recent fighting, and Hail (ex-capital of Ibn Rashid) is reported captured, but this rumour must be accepted with reserve.

Other reports are the capture of a large Wahabite caravan by the Hawaytates (Arabs east of El Djauf), and that Sultan El Fakir has defeated the Wahabis at Taima (300 kilom. south-south-east of Djauf).

These reports are probably exaggerated, but they all seem to indicate a reaction against Ibn Saud. In spite of this, Wahabite propaganda continues to make itself felt in Irak, Hedjaz and even Syria.

Assaf-ben-Hussein, the representative of Ibn Saud at Jauf, recently wrote a letter (attached) to the tribal chiefs of Damascus and Transjordan threatening all those who refused to be converted to Wahabism. These threats and the Wahabite progress have caused a certain amount of alarm among our Bedouin tribes.

Ibn Meslad, chief of the Anezes (Irak), is said to have become a supporter of Wahabism.

1. *Hedjaz.*

Wahabis have not advanced beyond Abu Naam (90 kilom. north-north-west of Medina).

King Hussein's position is still precarious, but the pilgrimage period is finishing without the advent of Ibn Saud and his troops to Mecca.

According to reports published by the Egyptian press, the English have conferred with Ibn Saud on the subject of peace in Arabia.

The Wahabis have agreed not to interfere with the Mecca pilgrimage, thus avoiding incidents damaging to the agreement about to be concluded between them and the Hedjaz Government. If these reports are confirmed, England has gained a fresh and important political success in the peninsula.

2. *Djauf and Transjordania.*

It is confirmed that Ibn Saud has occupied Djauf without incident. Thence the Wahabis have spread both to the north and west, subduing tribes which had not joined them, notably those of the Emir Noury Chaalan (the Roualeahs).

Sakaka (50 kilom. north-north-east of Djauf) has been occupied by Ibn Saud, and Ibn Assaf appointed Emir.

It is denied that the Wahabis have occupied El Azrak (east of Amman), but official British reports state that 1,000 Wahabis have attacked Tneib and Oum-el-Amad (some distance from Amman). After desperate fighting the inhabitants succeeded in driving them off with the help of neighbouring tribes.

3. *Irak.*

It appears that Ibn Saud has not yet ratified the treaty dealing with all the questions pending between Irak and Nejd.

Sir Percy Cox has asked for authority from the Colonial Office to meet Ibn Saud at one of the Persian Gulf ports. However, preliminary agreements, particularly with regard to the frontier, seem to have ensured peace on the Nejd-Irak border, no fresh incident being reported since June.

Ibn Saud has expressed the intention of setting up a customs office in Koweit to collect dues, in his name, on all goods entering Nejd and its dependencies.

A provisional agreement has been come to by him and the English concerning the limits of the Koweit hinterland.

4. *Ibn Saud and the Projected Railway between Irak and Nejd.*

As a result of his occupation of Djauf and Sakaka, Ibn Saud holds a large portion of the territory over which the English proposed to make a desert railway from Caifa to Basra. In what light will Ibn Saud view this project? It is a point of great importance to British interests. According to certain reports in the French zone, his attitude was, at first, hostile; this hostile attitude is well known in Egypt, where certain Francophobe papers falsely attribute his opposition to orders received from France. The English are now apparently adopting a conciliatory policy to obtain his support for their projects.

A conference was held at Djauf on the 14th May between Mr. Philby and representatives of the Emir Abdullah and Noury Chaaman. It was then arranged that Djauf should be attached to Transjordan, and that, in the event of the railway passing through Djauf, the Emir of Djauf should receive a grant for his share in the defence of that town.

The English Government has authorised the High Commissioner of Irak to write to the Sultan of Nejd explaining that Mr. Philby had no authority to make this agreement.

The British Government's intentions, which will probably harmonise with those of Ibn Saud, remain to be explained at the interview between Sir Percy Cox and the Sultan of Nejd.

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

Assaf-ben-Hussein-el-Mansour to Brother Rheidren Smeir.

In the name of God the Compassionate.

Greetings!

YOU are aware that the Sultan of all the Arabs, Al Imam Abdul Aziz-ben-Abdul Rahman-el-Faical, has ordered me to remain at Djauf.

He has, however, ordered me to write you this letter to inform you that you must let me know by a special messenger whether you are following the Moslem creed of Abdul Aziz. Safety is for those who understand.

You are asked this question by the Imam and all good Moslems. You have been warned. You have only yourselves to blame. That is all.

Greetings to all those dear to you. Our brothers greet you.

ASSAF-BEN-HUSSEIN.

28 Bil Kaade, 1340.

[E 11258/248/91]

No. 17.

Dr. Naji-el-Assil to Foreign Office.—(Received October 18.)

*Hyde Park Hotel, Knightsbridge,
London, October 18, 1922.*

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 16th instant, and, in accordance with your request, I have the honour to forward herewith the treaty signed by myself as authorised by His Hashimite Majesty King Hussein and ratified by him.

2. To avoid any unnecessary delay, I herewith also beg to transmit to you a translation of the treaty made by myself, and, though of course I do not take any responsibility with regard to this translation, you will, I believe, find it correct.

I have, &c.

NAJI-EL-ASSIL.

Enclosure in No. 17.

Draft Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and the Hedjaz.

(Translation.)

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty King Hussein, Leader of the Arab Revolt, Founder of the Arab Hashimite State and its King, Warden of the inviolate Precinct of the Sanctuary of God and of the city of his ancestor, Lord of the Divine Messengers, on behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, being inspired with the sincere desire of confirming and strengthening the good faith and friendly relations established between their respective countries during the war together waged against the Germanic Powers and Turkey, and with the further desire of consolidating their respective interests and ensuring permanent peace and harmony among the Arab peoples;

And His Britannic Majesty having named and appointed as his Plenipotentiary to conclude a treaty for these purposes with His Majesty King Hussein,

and His Hashimite Majesty having named and appointed Dr. El Seyyid Naji-el-Assil as his Plenipotentiary to conclude a treaty for these purposes with his Britannic Majesty;

The said and Dr. El Seyyid Naji-el-Assil have agreed upon and concluded the articles following:—

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty King Hussein, their heirs and successors. Each of the high contracting parties agrees and promises to use all the means which his laws provide to prevent his territory being used as a base for activities directed against the present or future interests of the other.

ARTICLE 2.

The High British Government undertake to restrain, by all peaceful and practicable means in their power, and in particular by the suspension of all manner of subsidy, any aggression (upon the territories of His Hashimite Majesty) by the rulers of the neighbouring States who are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty, either from their own frontiers or from the territories over which they have authority, as referred to in article 3.

ARTICLE 3.

His Hashimite Majesty undertakes to maintain the friendly relations which existed between himself and Seyyid Mohammed Ibn Ali-el-Idrisi, and between himself and Seyyid Abdul Asiz-bin-Abdur Rahman-bin-Feisal-es-Saud before the Arab revolt; to observe the pacts formerly existing (between himself and these two rulers) and to respect the frontier of the territories over which they have authority as they existed under the suzerainty of Turkey, provided that there is nothing in those pacts which is contrary to the spirit of the treaties existing between His Britannic Majesty and those rulers, and to do all in his power to forbid in his own territories, and in all parts over which he has authority, anything harmful to the material or moral interests of those States or their rulers.

ARTICLE 4.

Each high contracting party agrees and promises to receive and recognise the agent of the other. His Majesty King Hussein may appoint a Hashimite agent in London. His Britannic Majesty may appoint a British agent to reside at Jeddah or other seaport town of His Hashimite Majesty. Out of respect for the special character of Mecca and Medina, His Britannic Majesty will not appoint a British agent there.

His Majesty King Hussein shall also be entitled, if he so desires, to appoint a consular agent in England, Egypt and India, and His Britannic Majesty shall be entitled to appoint a consular agent at Jeddah and such additional seaports of His Hashimite Majesty as the High British Government may from time to time deem expedient.

These agents and consular agents shall enjoy the usual diplomatic and consular privileges.

ARTICLE 5.

His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the provisional quarantine arrangements set up by the High British Government in Kamaran to fulfil the medical provisions of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912 or of any other sanitary convention which is binding upon the said Government.

On their part, the High British Government agree to recognise such complementary measures as, in conformity with the medical provisions of the said convention or conventions, are to be taken at Jeddah and other ports of the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, in accordance with regulations to be published by His Majesty King Hussein.

ARTICLE 6.

Subject to the provisions of article 8, the High British Government undertake not to interfere in any way with the measures adopted by His Majesty King Hussein within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty for the care and comfort of pilgrims.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to assist any efforts made by Moslem British subjects, or persons or institutions enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, to contribute towards the welfare, health and food supply of pilgrims in the Hedjaz, as His Hashimite Majesty is doing in the case of Ain Zobeida.

ARTICLE 7.

The high contracting parties agree to fix a definite sum per pilgrim by way of dues, and to publish the amount thereof by the first day of the first Jamada in each year, for sanitary services respectively performed by them. These dues shall cover the cost of the total sanitary services up to the time of the landing of the pilgrims and shall be included in the price of the tickets issued by the various shipping companies.

His Majesty King Hussein shall retain dues charged for measures at ports of His Hashimite Majesty, and the High British Government shall similarly retain dues charged for measures at Kamaran.

ARTICLE 8.

The High British Government agree to recognise the Hashimite status of all subjects of His Majesty King Hussein who may at any time be within the territories of His Britannic Majesty, or within British-protected territory or territory under a British mandate, provided such Hashimite subjects are possessed of papers issued by His Majesty King Hussein showing the Hashimite status of the bearer.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein agrees to recognise the British status of all British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who may be at any time within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, provided such British subjects or British-protected persons are registered at a British consulate in the Hashimite territories.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply to British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty's Government who are habitually resident in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 9.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that the property of British subjects, or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who may die in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty shall be handed over to the British representative in the said territories, or to such authority as he may appoint for the purpose, to be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the case. The British representative in the said territories will see that any dues or taxes which are payable on such property under Hashimite laws are duly paid.

ARTICLE 10.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that in all cases which arise in Hashimite territories, and in which a British subject, or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, is plaintiff or defendant, a British consular representative shall attend the Hashimite courts during the hearing of the case, and, where the British agent wishes to make diplomatic representations on grounds of equity to His Hashimite Majesty concerning such case, judgment shall be adjourned and shall not be executed while such representations are being made; and in no case shall the execution of judgment proceed except after permission of His Hashimite Majesty.

The provisions of this article are not, however, to apply in the case of British subjects, or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 11.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that he will cause to be delivered over to the British consular authority British subjects, or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who have been arrested by the Hashimite authorities, if the British consular authority gives security for their appearance when required by the Hashimite authorities.

The provisions of this article are not, however, to apply in the case of British subjects, or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 12.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that cases between British subjects, or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, in which the interests of Hashimite subjects are not involved shall be tried by the British consular authority.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply when both parties to the case desire that it should be tried by the Hashimite Court, as provided in article 10.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply in the case of British subjects, or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 13.

His Britannic Majesty agrees to surrender within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty all privileges and immunities, otherwise than as provided for in this treaty, hitherto enjoyed by British subjects and persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty in virtue of the Capitulations between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire.

ARTICLE 14.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees to notify the British agent in all cases where he requires the deportation from the territories of His Hashimite Majesty of a British subject, or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, and the British agent shall be responsible for the deportation of the person indicated within a reasonable time.

ARTICLE 15.

The High British Government hereby confirm their recognition of the flag of His Hashimite Majesty; provided that when such flag is flown by vessels other than public ships of the Hashimite Government the vessel flying it shall be registered at Jeddah or Yenbo, or at one or other clearly specified seaports lying within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, and shall be possessed of papers, issued by His Majesty King Hussein, in general conformity with the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

On his part His Majesty King Hussein hereby confirms his recognition of the flags as flown by merchant ships belonging to any parts of His Britannic Majesty's dominions or to British protected territory, or to territories under a British mandate, provided that vessels flying such flags shall be possessed of the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

ARTICLE 16.

Each of the high contracting parties hereby declares that it will not, during the continuance of this treaty, enter into any treaty, agreement or understanding with a third party directed against the interests of the other high contracting party.

ARTICLE 17.

No clause contained in this treaty shall override any obligations which may have been incurred, or may in the future be incurred, by either of the high contracting parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations, or under any convention which may be adopted by the League of Nations and entered into by either of the two parties.

ARTICLE 18.

This treaty shall come into force on the date of its ratification by His Britannic Majesty and His Hashimite Majesty, and shall remain in force for seven years after such date. In case neither high contracting party shall have given notice to the other six months before the expiration of the said period of seven years of its intention to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force until the expiration of six months from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have given such notice.

The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. One copy of each will remain deposited in the archives of the Hashimite Government, and one copy of each in those of the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

Signed at London by the above-named plenipotentiaries on

NAJI-EL-ASSIL.

(Ratified by HUSSEIN.)

Note by Mr. H. Boyle.

This translation is admirably done, and it is with diffidence that I submit any amendments, except in one instance of omission. But I venture to think that in a few passages of minor importance a greater degree of verbal accuracy might be attained, if considered necessary.

Article 1, line 4.—"Laws provide"; more exactly, "permit."

Article 2, line 2.—For "practicable," better "active."

Article 2, line 5 et seq.—I should rather read the passage: "... with His Britannic Majesty as to their frontiers and sovereign authority, as stated in article 3."

Article 3, lines 6 and 9.—The term here rendered as "territories" is in the Arabic "spheres (literally zones) of influence."

Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 3.—If the term "agent" is to be used in this connection (in preference to representative, or Minister), the sense of the Arabic will not be exactly given unless "diplomatic" is prefixed.

Article 4, line 5.—The word "special" is very likely used here intentionally; otherwise "holy" or "sacred" would be nearer to the Arabic.

Article 7, line 1, paragraph 2.—The Arabic is here somewhat fuller. It runs: "for precautionary measures which may be taken at . . ."

Article 8.—There is a small omission at the end of the second paragraph of the translation. It should run: "... Hashimite territories. And, further, in order to obviate complications, such persons must have in their own possession documentary proof of their nationality, as is laid down in the case of Hashimite subjects."

Article 14, line 3.—"Of" inadvertently omitted.

Article 15.—In both paragraphs the Arabic has "official documents."

[E 11258/248/91]

No. 18.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 14, 1922.

WITH reference to my letter of the 16th February last, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before Viscount Peel, a copy of a letter which is being sent to the Colonial Office* on the subject of the treaty which has for the last year been under intermittent negotiation between His Majesty's Government and the King of the Hedjaz.

2. I am to request that any observations which Lord Peel may wish to offer may be furnished at an early date.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 11258/248/91]

No. 19.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 14, 1922.

WITH reference to my letter of the 26th September, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Duke of Devonshire, a copy of a letter from Dr. Naji-el-Assil, who purports to be the agent of the King of the Hedjaz in London, enclosing the original and a translation, of which a copy is annexed, of a "treaty" bearing the signature of himself as Hashimite plenipotentiary and countersigned by King Hussein by way of ratification.†

2. This document corresponds in the main to the treaty signed at Amman on the 18th December, 1921, by Mr. T. E. Lawrence and the Emir Abdullah, a copy of which is enclosed herein for reference. A comparison of these two versions reveals the following divergences:—

- (1.) The addition made by King Hussein to article 2 of the Lawrence-Abdullah Treaty, though cumbrous, is not otherwise objectionable.
- (2.) The new version substitutes a single article (No. 3) for articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Lawrence-Abdullah Treaty. This new article appears on the whole to

* See No. 19.

† See No. 17.

meet the requirements of His Majesty's Government, although it omits the clause relating to mediation between King Hussein and other Arabian rulers.

- (3.) Article 17 of the Lawrence-Abdullah Treaty is entirely omitted by King Hussein. This article recognised the special position of His Majesty's Government in Palestine and Irak.

3. In addition to the main points of difference mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a comparison of the Arabic text with Dr. Naji-el-Assil's translation has revealed certain minor discrepancies, as will be seen from the note by the translator, enclosed herein, but apart from the omission of article 17 of the Amman treaty, the version now produced by Dr. Naji is regarded as acceptable by this Department. I am, accordingly, to enquire whether the retention of the above article is considered essential by the Duke of Devonshire, and to request that any observations which his Grace may wish to offer may be furnished at an early date.

4. It will in any case be necessary, if the treaty is to be concluded in due form, that the document be drawn up in duplicate in English and Arabic at Jeddah for the signature of His Majesty's agent as British plenipotentiary, and of a Hashimite plenipotentiary on behalf of King Hussein, but if the version now under discussion is accepted by His Majesty's Government, it is unlikely that King Hussein will refuse to adopt such a procedure.

5. A copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 12822/248/91]

No. 20.

Emir Abdullah to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)

November 13, 1922.

My Lord,

I WAS hoping to avail myself of the opportunity of meeting you in order to give the necessary explanations on the Arab question, as you desired, at the luncheon on the 7th instant, but seeing that no meeting has taken place, and in view of the importance of the subject, I thought it necessary to submit the following memorandum for the consideration of your Lordship:—

The Arab revolt being, as it was, the embodiment and the outcome of the progressive national feeling of the huge majority of the Arab nation constituting the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the moment the Shereef of Mecca (His Majesty King Hussein) gave the signal for the revolt, it spread with lightning rapidity to every corner of the country, gathering under his banner every man worthy of his country.

The results and the achievements attained during the war are too well known to your Lordship to need mention. The fact that His Majesty King Hussein was backed and assisted in his great work by Great Britain to achieve the object in view was one of the important causes which inspired confidence in the hearts of those who looked forward to the salvation of their country from the oppressive government of the Committee of the Union and Progress, and also to the realisation of their national ideals, trusting in their belief in the great traditions of Great Britain.

Your Lordship knows that the Arab revolt began at a very critical time of the great war, and also at a time when the Government of the Union and Progress of Constantinople were exercising their full powers of oppression over the whole Empire. Under the circumstances, the leader (His Majesty King Hussein) did not find it possible to go into the details for a definite agreement or treaty with His Britannic Majesty's Government, accepting the official correspondence that passed between him and the High Commissioner in Egypt as basis for future negotiations. This exchange of letters was regarded at that time, and is still considered to-day, as solemn engagements binding both parties. The fundamental principles that were agreed upon by both parties at the time were for the establishment of a great Arab kingdom with full independence and sovereign rights. It was certainly based on these facts that King Hussein and those who stood by his side undertook the great task and responsibility of leading and continuing the revolt.

The war having ended with the great victory for the Allies, the Arabs naturally looked for the realisation of the objects of their revolt. What has followed since the

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armistice and the Peace Conference of Versailles is also known to your Lordship. The net result is that the Shereef of Mecca (His Majesty King Hussein), who was even before the war the virtual master and ruler of the Hedjaz, and who used to receive for his country and himself the material and moral support of the entire Moslem world, is placed in the difficult position to-day of carrying alone the whole burden of the responsibility of the revolt before his country and the rest of the Arabs, as he is unable to arrive at the goal for which Great Britain and himself were striving during the years of the war. In addition to this, the whole Moslem world, viewing with great apprehension the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire without the creation in its place of a strong and dignified Moslem Kingdom as was their natural expectation, have directed the sharpest of their criticism against the person of the King, which naturally aggravates the difficulties of the moment.

Taking all this into consideration, your Lordship would find ample causes to justify King Hussein's complaints to Great Britain, his great ally, who undertook with him before God and history the responsibility of the great revolt. In spite of all the difficulties of the moment, King Hussein is still trying hard to establish his Government and furnish the material means to ensure the public safety, which, according to the agreement passed, was to be supplied and furnished by Great Britain until the complete establishment of the Arab Government.

Having made this hurried review of the past, I consider it my duty to say that the whole question, in my opinion, could be satisfactorily solved, and that this solution lies in the hands of His Britannic Majesty's Government. I therefore submit the following points for your Lordship's consideration:—

1. To enter into a discussion with the object of enforcing the accepted principles of the Arab revolt, beginning by the three Arab countries, Irak, Transjordan and the Hedjaz, and to acknowledge the particular position of His Majesty King Hussein in these countries, and to investigate the Syrian question.
2. To put an immediate stop to all the regrettable incidents created by Seyyid-el-Idrisi and Seyyin-bin-Saud.
3. To relieve the financial difficulties of Hedjaz by giving the promised financial assistance.

I have no doubt that His Britannic Majesty's Government would rely on a strong Arab kingdom to ensure peace in the Near and in the Middle East.

Personally I would be very glad indeed to render any assistance that lies in my power to bring a friendly and a mutual understanding between the two nations.

With my respects, &c.

EMIR ABDULLAH.

[E 12993/248/91]

No. 21.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 80.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, October 30, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a private letter received to-day from Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib with regard to the imprisonment of the staff of the French consulate, a subject which has been fully dealt with in my report.

As I was a little uneasy as to what further steps the Hashimite Government might take, I spoke to His Majesty King Hussein on the telephone soon after receipt of this letter.

I pointed out to him that, while I did not wish to interfere with political discussions between the French and Hashimite Governments, I felt myself responsible for the personal safety of Captain Depui, who was a colleague, and that he must not forget that he was the representative of a great and powerful nation. King Hussein thanked me for my advice, gave me his word of honour that Captain Depui himself was in no danger, and that he did not forget that he was the representative of a great foreign Power. He said he was asking Captain Depui to deport two French Moorish subjects.

I cannot imagine that Captain Depui has been in any way associated with these explosions, but it is perhaps unfortunate that he visited Medina in the spring, and it shows one of the disadvantages of having a Moslem as the representative of a

Christian Power. His mode of life also cannot but arouse the suspicions of the Hashimite Government. He spends a lot of time in the market, sitting in the coffee-shops and talking to the townspeople, and it is said that he entertains, in his private house, people of doubtful reputation.

I am also informed by one of my staff that the French Moroccan subject who has been recently arrested was a man of bad character, a spy of Captain Depui's, and that, in his opinion, the Hashimite Government were right to arrest him.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib to Major Marshall.

Mecca, October 28, 1922.

Dear Major Marshall,

I TAKE the opportunity of writing these few lines to you very privately and confidentially. It was my intention to state it to you before, but no chance availed itself. Captain Ibrahim-el-Depui in Jeddah had enjoyed every assistance and facility by our Government despite all unfavourable circumstances. He rewarded us by all kinds of secret violence and resistance. Perhaps you remember the steps that were taken to explode the Government ammunition in Jeddah, which proved, thanks to God, to be a failure. Another incident of the sort took place in Medina before and caused great damages. Some days ago another explosion occurred in Medina with slight damages. Perhaps it will be astonishing to you to know that all these horrible incidents were planned by Captain Ibrahim and carried out by some of his subjects "El Magharibah." It is a fact, and the careful watch, I am sorry to say, has proved it to be true. I, therefore, have written to Captain Ibrahim to-day an official letter asking him to banish, in the earliest steamer available two men of the said party—Mohammed-el-Bengarti and Abdallah Meni—without stating any reason to him save that this request is based on sound facts known to the Government. I have written you these few lines as a personal friend, and for no other reason save your information. This secret is very little known to some circles in Mecca, who were going to take some bold steps to revenge for the several houses and families that were going to fall victims for these mean and, I dare say, savage plans. They were stopped and told that the situation is carefully watched. I hope to see you shortly, and close with best respects to you and to Mr. Graffey.

Very sincerely yours,

FUAD-EL-KHATIB.

[E 12994/656/91]

No. 22.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 81. Secret.)

Jeddah, October 31, 1922.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period from the 1st to 31st October, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi, Damascus and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

Jeddah Report, October 1-31, 1922.

(Secret.)

Political.

1. The persecution of the French consul, Captain Ibrahim Depui, continues. In my previous report I mentioned that the Arabic secretary and a boy had been arrested. Since then one Arab water-carrier and one French Moroccan subject, both attached to

the French consulate, have been imprisoned. The latter, who was arrested on the 24th October, has been employed in the French consulate for twelve years. The French consul was also asked to leave his private house, of which he had paid the rent for the current Arabic year.

On the evening of the 24th October, soon after the arrest of the French-Moroccan subject, Captain Depui came to see me. He was very much upset, said that he thought his own life was threatened, and that he had telegraphed to the French Government that he was informing me to this effect. I accordingly sent my telegram No. 50 to your Lordship and offered Captain Depui the sanctuary of this agency, which, however, he refused.

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived unexpectedly on the morning of the 25th. Probably owing to its timely arrival the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Mecca telephoned to Captain Depui to say that if he would be responsible for the French subject he would be released, that they had nothing against Captain Depui personally, but, on the contrary, respected him very much.

The promise to release the French subject has not been fulfilled. Instead, the man was removed from the prison in Jeddah to the prison in Mecca the same evening, so that the telephone message was probably a bluff to mislead the French consul while the transfer was being arranged. Captain Depui informs me that the persons previously arrested have been tortured in Mecca in the endeavour to extract information from them.

Personally, I did not think that the French consul himself was in danger, and this was confirmed in a conversation I had with the Commandant of the Troops, Jeddah, so H.M.S. "Clematis" left for the south on the 27th October. Up to the present the French Government have not replied to their consul's telegrams.

The reason for this persecution is threefold:—

- (1.) The continued imprisonment of Arif Darwish in Syria. The French Government have explained that Arif Darwish himself states that he is not a Hedjaz subject, but a subject of the Lebanon, and that if he had been a Hedjaz subject he would have been liberated. Some time ago I advised the French consul to ask King Hussein to detail someone on whom he could rely to interview Arif Darwish, who would state in writing that he was not a Hedjaz subject, and the matter would then be closed.
- (2.) That the French consul in Jeddah has been intriguing with Ibn Saud, and that he went to the pilgrimage to see the Nejd pilgrims. This is, in my opinion, quite unfounded, and we have no evidence here that the French consul has been engaged in any such intrigues.
- (3.) That French-Moorish subjects, acting under the orders of Captain Depui, were responsible for the attempted explosion in the ammunition stores at Jeddah on the 9th April (reported in Jeddah report of the 20th April, 1922) and in Medina, where a recent explosion in or near the railway station caused a good deal of damage. I cannot imagine that there is any foundation for this statement, but I am sending, under separate despatch, a copy of the private letter received from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

2. It is reported from Mecca that the Wahhabis, who were fighting against the Shereefian outposts at Al Ukhaidar, have retired. The Wahhabis camped at Muhaddetha, about 40 kilom. north of Al Ukhaidar, and Shereefian troops were sent against them from Al Ukhaidar and from Al Batha. The Wahhabis then retired in two parties, one, under Khalid, going to Khurma, the other, under sheikhs Abu Khusheim and El Zeitt, went towards the Nejd desert to Jebel Kath. During their retreat they killed six shepherds and captured 300 sheep.

3. There has been an explosion in the ammunition store near Medina. In the "Al Qibla" it is estimated that the damage done is about 1,500L., and that the guilt has been traced to French-Moorish subjects in Medina. The explosion must have been a serious one, because it was heard by people 14 miles from Medina.

The reports as to conditions in Medina are not reassuring. A dungeon similar to the "Gaboo" in Mecca has been made by the King's orders under the basement of the Emir's palace. A month ago Shereef Ahmed Mansur ordered eight of the merchants to pay different sums of from 200 to 700 rupees each. As usual the merchants refused to pay, and signified their willingness to go to prison, but after a short time of imprisonment in the "Gaboo" the payments were made in full. Shereef Shahat, who always

takes the part of the Medina inhabitants against the Hashimite authorities, did his best to stop this imprisonment, but was unable to do anything. He is now very popular with the Medina inhabitants. Shereef Ahmed Mansur, the acting Governor, sent his resignation to the King, and wanted to leave Medina at once, but the King told him to await the arrival of Emir Ali, who was expected to reach Medina within the next two months. A month ago the late Reis-ul-Baladih of Medina was shot by Bedouin. The Medina inhabitants were very angry, armed themselves, and went to Shereef Ahmed Mansur to inform him that, as the Government is unable to protect the Medina inhabitants from the hands of the Bedouin, they were going to take the matter into their own hands. Since Emir Ali has left Medina no train has run on the Hedjaz railway. There is no telegraphic communication between Medina and the northern stations, as any wire which is laid is always cut by the Bedouin. It is said that many of the Arabs round Medina have been converted to Wahhabism, but the tribes are not living peacefully with each other, and all feelings of unity, honour and trustworthiness, for which the Medina Arabs were formerly noted, have entirely disappeared. The Medina inhabitants now make very little money out of the pilgrims as the pilgrims, owing to the heavy camel hire and robberies *en route*, have very little money left when they reach Medina.

Pilgrimage.

1. The remaining Egyptian pilgrims, about 150 in number, were taken to Suez on the Shereefian steamer "Tawil," which was proceeding to Suez for overhaul. All who could not pay were taken free of charge.

2. Seven-hundred and thirty-eight destitute Indian pilgrims are now in Jeddah awaiting repatriation to India. The majority of these are Sindhis and then Punjabis, and in some cases it is not their first pilgrimage, and not their first repatriation. One-hundred and fifty-two of these have signified their willingness to refund the cost of their transport on their return to India. We had already repatriated from the funds of the Central Haj Committee 359 destitute pilgrims on the 30th August, so that the total number of Indian destitute pilgrims this year is over 1,000. There are also sixty destitute Bokharas and fifty-one destitute Afghans, all of whom came via Indian ports. The local committee for the repatriation of destitute Indians is in favour of repatriating these Bokharas and Afghans, and we have wired to the Central Haj Committee for approval.

3. One Indian pilgrim arrived in Jeddah with a gunshot wound of the thigh and pelvis received on the return journey from Medina. He died soon after his arrival. I at once sent to the mutawwif to get the pilgrim's name and address, but the mutawwif said he had been instructed by the local authorities to give no information to the British agent. Within a few hours, however, I obtained all particulars, and at once wrote to Mecca to ask what steps would be taken to punish those guilty of this murder. In their reply the Hashimite Government said they had received from the mutawwif of the Indian pilgrims a declaration that all the pilgrims had arrived safely, and that therefore the people detained as hostages had been released. They asked for the man's name and address, so that they might find out the mutawwif. I supplied these, and they then promised to look into the matter.

4. A Somali from Aden, called Jama Ali, who is a barrack sweeper, has submitted the following report of his experiences on the Medina pilgrimage:—

"Between Bir Darwish and Medina, near Bir Ali, three Bedouin, armed with rifles, captured me and three other Somalis from Italian Somaliland. They took us to their huts near by and they kept us there for about six weeks with irons on our feet. I had 14 dollars, my Aden permit and other papers, all of which they took from me. We eventually promised to stay with them as their slaves if they would release us from the irons, which they did. Shortly afterwards we escaped to Medina, fourteen hours' journey away, and we arrived here yesterday with a batch of sixty Takurna pilgrims from Medina. Between Bir-el-Sheikh and Masturah we found three dead Indians who had been shot. They were Indian pilgrims who had left Medina before our party. They had been robbed of all their money and papers, and had probably been shot because they refused to hand over their money.

"From what I understood when I was with the Bedouin, conditions among them are very bad. They have no food except the little barley they grow, and depend entirely on looting pilgrims. The Sheikh of the Bedouin who captured me was spoken of as Sheikh Abdullah (almost certainly Sheikh Abdullah Abu Rub of

the Masruh). I never saw him. The names of the men who captured me were Abdullah Hindi, Sheikh Saleh and another, and their huts were on Jebel Wirgan, not far from Bir Mohammed."

5. An Indian pilgrim, Abdul Qadir, who went to Medina independently via Yembo, reported to me that he had no trouble whatever throughout the journey. The Kaimakam of Yembo sent him with a caravan of Rahalah Bedouin, and he was never molested throughout the journey. At Medina also, where he visited Jebel Chod and other religious places near the town, he was never molested.

General.

1. It is said that the Hashimite Government are anxious to purchase another steamer, the "Syria," a small boat which has been engaged in carrying Syrian pilgrims from Jeddah to Beirut. The price asked is 18,000l.

2. A European dentist, M. Kankousky, a Czechoslovak, has arrived here from Asmara. He was without money and was financed by two Jews, who supplied the instruments and who were to take half profits. The contract was signed in Asmara. Difficulties arose soon after their arrival, so a few local Arab merchants have bought out the Jews, who have returned to Asmara, and the dentist remains. He is accompanied by his wife and son. It seems a pity that so many destitute Europeans are arriving in this country.

3. Mr. McDowell, an American, belonging to the Standard Oil Company, Bombay, spent a few days in Jeddah in the beginning of October. He stayed with the kaimakam.

4. It is said that the Government are going to abolish the Kaimakamiah of Rabegh, withdraw soldiers and officials and hand over the government of Rabegh to the local sheikh, Sheikh Ismail. It is also said that King Hussein intends to employ this form of government in other places and that many important sheikhs have been called to Mecca.

Press.

A summary of Nos. 622 to 630 of "Al Qibla" is enclosed herewith.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 22.

Summary of Nos. 622-630 of "Al Qibla."

No. 622. September 28.

Leading article: "You will not make the Deaf hear."

After discussing the tremendous effect which Mustapha Kemal's victory must have throughout the East, and the obvious need for a revision of Western opinion on the Eastern question, reference is made to the difficulties of the Allies, and their mutual differences, with quotations from Colonel Repington.

Readers are informed that King Hussein, who is a great man and not like others, always protested steadily, officially and ineffectually against the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, and in his Royal wisdom foresaw all the consequences of the Allies' mistake.

Under the heading "Obscenity," God's forgiveness is implored for "Al Kashkol," a satirical paper of Cairo, which has gone so far as to jest at Hedjaz affairs.

No. 623. October 2.

Leading article: "He fled from Death and into Death he fell."

The Colonial Office communiqué regarding Ibn Saud's *démenti* of his rumoured anti-British negotiations is analysed in a hostile spirit, more especially the reference to his loyalty to existing agreements between himself and His Majesty's Government:—

"What agreements can these be?" asks "Al Qibla." "They must be part of Great Britain's plan for fighting the Bolsheviks, for we cannot, we dare not, credit England with evil intentions against the Arabs in their individual, national and economic life. Just now, of all times, too, when England is being accused of hostility to Islam. . . .! England has achieved her aim by the Irak mandate. She controls the whole Persian Gulf, with no rivalry of Turks or Germans or

Bagdad Railways. What object can she have in making agreements with Ibn Saud? King Hussein's letter of the 21st Zil Qa'da, 1336, is quoted. Surely Ibn Saud, who professes the essentials of religion, cannot have become a tool in British hands?

"But how can Ibn Saud say anything so false as that he is loyal to his agreements with the British? Is this why he attacks Irak, leaving Syria and the French in peace? Is this why he attacks the Hedjaz, leaving Syria and the French in peace?"

"Ibn Saud's aim in attacking Irak and the Hedjaz is obvious: he endeavours to distract the minds of the inhabitants from Arab Nationalist preoccupations. A single glance at the way things are developing in the peninsula reveals the truth to any interested observer."

The article continues by lamenting at length that the policy of nations like England and France should be based upon the reports, despatches and impressions of inexperienced young men, and ends by drawing attention again to the quarrels of the Allies over the question of the Straits.

No. 624. October 5.

Leading article: "Let the Speaker speak."

Imagining a critic who may, on the facts of the Arab revolt against Turkey and the Caliphate, question the right of "Al Qibla" to speak on behalf of Islam, the writer defends the revolt as being justified by the Koranic malediction on those who, like the Turkish Government before the war, select only what suits them in the Holy Book, and are not wholly guided by its inspiration, e.g., in enforcing the ordained punishments for theft, murder, &c. The Caliphate, at the moment of the revolt, was an Enver-Talaat-Djemal-Djavid Caliphate, and could not command the respect of Islam. King Hussein and his people, impelled both by religious duty and by the cries of their tortured fellows, rose against it; their alliance with Great Britain was hedged about with guarantees for the integrity of Moslem and Arab national rights, and the Arab forces, whose behaviour throughout was admirable, penetrated no further into Turkish territory than was required for the liberation of Arab elements.

The Arabs rose against what their allies recognised as being "the common foe," and now who is regarded as "the common foe" of the Allies? The Arabs themselves.

Telegrams are reproduced reporting the departure for London of the Emir Abdullah. Other newspapers, whose prediction of this journey was scouted as groundless in a recent number of "Al Qibla," are advised to await such official confirmation of their correspondents' lucubrations before guessing again.

Syrian Press Bureau insinuations against public security arrangements in the Hedjaz and against the Hashimite Government's methods of confiscating medjidieh dollars are denied as wanton falsehood.

The abdication of Sultan Wahid-ed-Din is announced without comment.

No. 625. October 9.

An article entitled "Russia's Hour" is reproduced from No. 13857 of "Al Ahram," of Cairo, supplemented by a reprint of "Al Qibla's" comments on Bolshevik ambitions in the direction of Constantinople and Palestine, from No. 498 of the 30th June, 1921. The "Morning Post" is asked to admire the coincidence of "Al Qibla's" apprehensions of that date with those of the "Morning Post" to-day.

Many Arab newspapers have reached Mecca containing articles deploring the danger to which El Kerak and Transjordan as a whole are exposed from the Wahhabis. "Nothing," says "Al Qibla," "could be farther from the truth."

No. 626. October 12.

Official Communiqué.—"News has reached us of the Emir Abdullah's arrival at Trieste en route for London. The Hashimite Government know neither the reasons nor the object of this journey, but they think it expedient to declare that they will never swerve a hair's breadth from their fundamental policy: the complete independence and unity of all Arab countries, choice of the general centre of administration being left to the Arab peoples themselves.

"The Emir Abdullah, one of the first propounders of this policy, is not the man to relinquish one jot of it."

Leading article: "The Arabs and the Present Situation."

[9941]

Extracts from M. Berton's speech in the French Chamber on the influence of Moscow welding Turkey, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Turkestan, Fars, &c., to a common aim are followed by extracts from Mr. Crane's interview by the "Times," and an expression of the pious hope that "Al Qibla," whose prognostications rarely fail of fulfilment, may rank as one of the few authoritative journals of the world.

Mr. Crane's article in the American review "Our World," on the capabilities of Eastern peoples, also provides matter for quotation.

No. 627. October 16.

The American review "Our World," of New York, has translated "Al Qibla's" articles of the 1st and 4th May last on Syrian affairs with a testimony from Mr. Crane to the effect that "Al Qibla," though a small and by no means wealthy journal, is unique for the veracity of its account of his visit to Damascus, and of its Arabian news generally.

"Al Qibla" thanks Mr. Crane for the moral support he has given to the Arab cause, and calls down blessings upon the head of the noble American nation.

Reciprocating the kind remarks of leading Kemalists about Arab independence, "Al Qibla" remarks that the Arabs respect the independence of all peoples within their own national boundaries, and states that when, during the war, Arab troops reached the Taurus Mountains, which form the historical limit of Arab territory, a "Hashimite order" forbade them to penetrate further, though the armistice with Turkey was not at the time signed. The Arabs will always respect the rights of other elements within Arab dominions, those of the Turks included, "because of our past and theirs."

A paper, "Al Hadaf," of Hama, having joined the lying press which writes of public insecurity between Mecca and Medina and of the confiscation of medjidieh dollars by the Hashimite Government, "Al Qibla" denies categorically that any incident occurred to mar the pleasure of the pilgrims' journey to Medina, and publishes the official notices about the 50 per cent. tax on medjidiehs.

No. 628. October 19.

The exact position of affairs at Constantinople is too vague for "Al Qibla" to summarise more succinctly than: "Saida is afraid of the rabbit, and the rabbit is afraid of Saida." What is, however, clear to the editor is the justice of the German descriptions of treaties as "scraps of paper."

The trouble in political circles to-day is shortness of memory. The French invaded Syria on the pretext that Feisal was preventing them from doing their duty in crushing the Angora movement and from protecting the Armenians in Cilicia, by forbidding their transport passage along the Rayak-Aleppo road. The Kemalists to-day seem as forgetful of the service Feisal was thus rendering them as the French themselves are of the Armenians in Cilicia and of their duty towards Angora.

"Al Qibla" would like to see from four to ten representative notables of any country convicted of breaking its promises sacrificed by international obligation, in an unspecified manner. This may sound savage, but we must choose the lesser evil. Is it less savage to plunge whole countrysides into bloodshed?

The British sowed trouble when they had the Arab flag in Beirut pulled down to please the French, and reaped it when the French pulled down their own flag at Chanak.

A long declaration by the "Society of the Palestinian Nahda," of New York, and an appeal by a Moslem worthy in Chicago for financial help in building a mosque in Damascus, figure under the heading "Arab Voices from beyond the Seas."

No. 629. October 23.

The formation of a Cabinet by Mr. Bonar Law is announced, with extracts from his letter to the "Times" of the 9th October. Other extracts from the "Times," dealing with the Bolshevik factor in the Angora question, are reproduced from "Al Ahram," of Cairo.

Beyond the usual polemics with the Egyptian press, there is nothing else of interest.

No. 630. October 26.

Leading article: "Russia's Policy."

Reproduces from "Al Ahram," of Cairo (No. 13863), an interview, in which M. Chicherin expresses himself on the freedom of the Straits, the rôle of Enver Pasha and the Pan-Islamic movement. As to the latter, he is reported as saying that

movements to-day are national, not religious, and that the Pan-Islamic movement was only fostered for political reasons by Sultan Abdul Hamid.

"Al Qibla" hangs upon this peg a long treatise on the Caliphate. The circumstances attending the nomination of the first (Orthodox) Caliphs are recalled in an historical survey, and emphasis laid on the facts that father-to-son succession was not the rule, and that each nomination was made conditional upon strict maintenance of the Word of God and of His Prophet and a promise to act in accordance therewith. The need for Moslem unity is endorsed by quotations from "Al Koran," and all that is apparently needed now is a man known for his strict observance of the Holy Law. The Kemalists are said to be seeking a reversal of the fetwa issued against them by the Sheikh-ul-Islam for interested reasons of their own.

Failing a Caliphate, all Moslem States should work for the common good in a brotherly federation.

A not unskillful article.

The explosion in the Medina arsenal is reported and ascribed with regretful assurance to "our Moorish brothers."

Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From.	To.	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1922.	1922.		Packages.
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massowa	Oct. 1	Oct. 1	...	216
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 1	" 2	...	2,077
Tawil	Hedjaz	...	Yembo	...	" 2
Rushdi	Hedjaz	Yembo	Akaba	" 4	" 9
Dakahlieh	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 5	" 5	...	485
Achilles	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 6	" 6	78	...
Tawil	Hedjaz	Yembo	Suez	" 7	" 9	222	...
Dara	British	...	Bombay	...	" 7	1,433	...
Bahrein	British	Suakin	Bombay	" 9	" 11	530	...
Dakahlieh	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 11	" 12	...	1,565
Asmara	Italian	Massowa	Suez	" 13	" 13	...	1,081
Massawa	Italian	Suez	Massowa	" 13	" 13	...	583
Kenah	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15	" 15	...	264
Massawa	Italian	Massowa	Suez	" 19	" 19	...	2,697
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massowa	" 21	" 21	...	417
Kenah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 21	" 22	...	1,432
Syria	French	Suez	Beyrout	" 22	" 23	220	234
Dakahlieh	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 25	" 25	...	1,394
Rushdi	Hedjaz	Akaba	Akaba	" 25	" 31	...	52
Dakahlieh	British	Port Soudan	...	" 31	2,500

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on October 25 and left on October 27, 1922.

[E 13168/248/91]

No. 23.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 24.)

Sir,

India Office, November 24, 1922.

IN reply to your letter dated the 14th November, 1922, on the subject of the treaty now under negotiation between His Majesty's Government and the King of the Hedjaz, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that he has no observations to offer upon the letter despatched by your Department to the Colonial Office on the 14th November, 1922.

I am, &c.

L. D. WAKELY.

[E 13379/248/91]

No. 24.

Mr. Simpson to Mr. G. P. Churchill.

My dear Churchill,

India Office, November 28, 1922.

I MUST apologise for addressing this letter to you. It is meant for the Department that deals with Hedjaz affairs, but I as don't know anybody there to whom to write d.o., I transgress on your kindness so far as to ask you to hand this letter to the proper quarter.

We have just sent a formal official letter of concurrence in reply to a Foreign Office letter dated the 14th November. The letter deals with a revised version of the Hedjaz treaty which Dr. Naji-el-Assil has now produced. A point which has puzzled me, but which was not adverted to in the official letter is this:

Dr. Naji-el-Assil speaks of a translation of the treaty made by himself, and this statement is apparently accepted by the Foreign Office, who speak of "enclosing the original and a translation" and "a comparison of the Arabic text with Dr. Naji-el-Assil's translation," while their Arabic expert, in his note, says "This translation is admirably done."

But it is not a translation. A comparison with the text of the treaty signed at Amman between Lawrence and Abdullah shows that what Dr. Naji-el-Assil calls his translation is the original English text hammered out by the Foreign Office and Lawrence, with the exception, of course, of the one or two places where the Amman treaty has been modified. This, of course, entirely alters the view point from which the Arabic expert's notes should be regarded. What he regards as English variations from the Arabic text are really Arabic variations from the English text!

What I have written above may of course be quite wrong, but I must confess I see no other explanation of the situation revealed by a comparison with the Amman text.

Yours sincerely,

J. A. SIMPSON.

[E 14075/248/91]

No. 25.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 15.)

Sir,

Downing Street, December 14, 1922.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to refer to the letter from this Department of the 29th November, 1922, transmitting a copy of a telegram (enclosed herewith) which was addressed to the High Commissioner for Irak, on the subject of the draft treaty with King Hussein, a copy of which accompanied your letter of the 14th November, 1922, and to forward herewith, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of the telegraphic reply which has now been received from Sir Percy Cox.

His Grace considers it desirable, in view of the representations made by Sir Percy Cox, that the reference in article 2 of the draft treaty produced by Dr. Naji-el-Assil to the suspension of "all manner of subsidy" should be eliminated from the treaty, and he concurs also in the proposal to omit the words "as they existed under the suzerainty of Turkey" in article 3, which embodies articles 4 and 5 of the Lawrence-Abdullah Treaty, article 3 of the Lawrence-Abdullah Treaty appearing as article 2 in the present draft. His Grace sees no objection to the omission from the draft of the clauses relating to mediation between King Hussein and other Arab rulers, and desires to invite his Lordship's attention to the letter from this Department of the 7th April, in which his Grace's predecessor acquiesced in this omission.

His Grace attaches considerable importance to the inclusion in any treaty with King Hussein of the first part of article 17 of the Lawrence-Abdullah Treaty, and would be grateful if, subject to his Lordship's concurrence, representations might be made through the proper channel with a view to securing the agreement of King Hussein to the amendments above suggested.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 25.

*Sir P. Cox to the Duke of Devonshire.**December 4, 1922.*

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram regarding draft treaty Hussein.

Any mention of suspension of subsidy would be most undesirable and would arouse strongest resentment in Ibn Saud.

I have consulted Ibn Saud regarding article 3. The inclusion of the words "as they existed under the suzerainty of Turkey" and the interpretation which you attach to them might be most injurious to Ibn Saud, and he would not accept them, as far as he is concerned. His contention is that no settled frontier between Hedjaz, Nejd and Idriisi existed in Turkish time any more than there did between Irak and Nejd or Koweit and Nejd. In the eyes of the Turks it was all one country, and in distant possession [? still further] they left their vassals to settle their own intertribal affairs and frontiers, which were constantly changing in accordance to individual ruler at time. It is suggested in this case best course would be simply to say "Hussein undertakes to [? respect] the position of Ibn Saud and Idriisi," and no more. Then, just as has been done in the case of Irak and Nejd, representative parties should meet in a friendly conference, with British officer as president, to discuss and come to agreement as to the frontier.

Enclosure 2 in No. 25.

The Duke of Devonshire to Sir P. Cox.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, November 28, 1922.

FOLLOWING two points are raised in draft treaty with King Hussein, which Foreign Office have referred to me for observations:—

Article 3 requires Hussein to respect frontiers of Idriisi and Ibn Saud "as they existed under suzerainty of Turkey," by which he presumably means date of outbreak of war. This might lead to trouble over Khurma and other disputed places.

Article 2 provides for restraint of neighbouring rulers by His Majesty's Government, and specifically mentions suspension of subsidy as possible form of pressure. Reference to subsidy seems unnecessary and likely to give offence to Ibn Saud, and I am inclined to press for its omission.

Please telegraph your views.

[E 14182/656/91]

No. 26.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 88.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, November 30, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 1st November to the 30th November, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi, Damascus and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 26.

(Secret.)

Jeddah Report, November 1 to 30, 1922.

Political.

THE French question has been settled by the release and deportation of the French-Moroccan subject. The French sloop "Liévin" arrived here on the 4th November, and the French consul then demanded the release of the French subject.

The King agreed on condition that the man left the country, so he, with his family, were put on board the "Liévin," which left for Jibuti on the 8th. I saw the man on board the "Liévin." He showed no signs of bad treatment, and I understand that Captain Depui's story, that his arrested employees had been tortured, is without foundation.

M. Léon Krajewsky, the French consul-general, returned here on the 15th November, and has taken over charge of the French consulate. He was well received by the Arab Government, and the relations between the Arab and French Governments have considerably improved.

2. The commander of the "Liévin" informed me that, on arrival at Jibuti, he expected to find orders instructing him to co-operate with the British Red Sea patrol in the suppression of the slave traffic.

There has been recently a recrudescence of this traffic. A dhow-load of thirty-three slaves arrived here from Midi on the 15th, and it was reported that two more dhow-loads were expected. H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived here on the 18th and left to try to intercept them. The commander selected a spot north of Kunfuda, but the slaves were landed at Kunfuda and came overland from there, arriving in Jeddah on the 22nd. They came in two dhows from Midi to Birk in four days, and then from Birk to Kunfuda in two days. The number of slaves in this convoy was from forty to fifty.

It is reported that there are still many slaves at Midi, but they are now being brought there from the African coast in small numbers at frequent intervals instead of in large convoys.

3. It is said that the present relations between King Hussein and Emir Ali are not good, and that Mohammed Tawil, the Director of the Jeddah Customs, who went to see the King at Mecca, was sent on to Taif to try to settle their differences. Two reasons are given for these strained relations. One is that Emir Ali does not approve of his father's policy towards Ibn Saud and the Idrissi and his general foreign policy, as, by his constantly aggressive attitude, he is isolating himself from the rest of the world. The second reason given is that the King will not supply the money which Emir Ali asks for Medina. It is certain that Emir Ali prefers Taif to Mecca, and on his recent visit to Jeddah (*vide infra*) he came from Taif and returned there.

The King has recently levied 15,000*l.* from the Mecca merchants, and he is becoming more and more unpopular. The people are becoming more and more outspoken against him, and there are rumours of a revolt, but I should think these are without foundation. It is said that Shereef Mohsin-bin-Mansur, who has left Mecca for Wadi Fatmah, and who sides with Emir Ali in his political differences with the King, will be the leader.

4. It is difficult to gauge the opinion of the local inhabitants on recent happenings in Turkey. The general opinion among the local Arabs, who are looking forward to a return of the Turkish régime, is that Mustapha Kemal can do no wrong, and that the Sultan, by asking the protection of the British, has committed a grave error. The consensus of local Indian opinion, on the other hand, is against the action of the Kemalists.

King Hussein published a special edition of the "Qibla" on the 9th, in which he said that the Sultan had asked for British protection, and King Hussein had therefore sent a telegram to the Sultan inviting him to come to the Holy Land of Islam, where he was assured of a warm welcome. A similar telegram was sent to the Sheikh-ul-Islam and other Turkish Ministers who had arrived in Egypt, and it is believed that these will accept the invitation and will come to Mecca.

Pilgrimage.

The last pilgrim boat for the season, the steamship "Zayani," left on the 22nd November with 1,110 pilgrims. The large majority of these were Indians, and 695 were destitute. The total number of destitutes repatriated this year at the cost of the Central Haj Committee of India is therefore 1,054. The Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company again carried these destitutes at the reduced rate of 25 rupees a head, so that the cost of the repatriation of these pilgrims, with food for the voyage and other minor expenses, has been approximately 30,000 rupees, or 2*l.* per pilgrim. There has been a dearth of Indian pilgrim steamers at the end of this year's pilgrimage. The steamship "Dara" left on the 7th October, the steamship "Babrein," which is not a pilgrim ship, but to which I issued a certificate on the 11th October, and the steamship "Zayani" on the 22nd November. There are still twenty-five Indian pilgrims in Jeddah and about sixty Bokharans and Afghans.

This delay in the return of Indian pilgrims is another point in favour of compulsory return tickets. The shipping companies, who are under no obligation to single-ticket holders, know that a large number of the Indian pilgrims at the end of the pilgrimage are destitute and are unable to pay the full fare, and that, therefore, it will not pay them to send a steamer unless a steamer is bringing cargo to Jeddah. Were return tickets compulsory, the companies would already have received the fare and would be bound to send steamers until all the pilgrims had returned. The steamship companies—Blue Funnel and Dutch—who carry the Singapore and Javanese pilgrims, always send a boat for stragglers, and will send a boat even for such a small number as twenty pilgrims.

General.

1. Emir Abdullah was expected to arrive here on the 25th November, and all preparations were made for his reception. Emir Ali and Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, came to meet him, and a guard of honour was drawn up on the quay. Emir Abdullah, however, did not arrive, and it appears that no telegram was sent to Mecca announcing a change in his plans. He is now expected to arrive on the 5th December. Emir Ali left for Taif on the following morning. He told me that at present everything is quiet in the neighbourhood of Taif.

2. Arif Numani, a wealthy Syrian from Alexandria, has been to Mecca to try to obtain concessions—railway, mineral and other concessions—from King Hussein. Constantine Yanni has asked the Hashimite Government to accept his resignation so that he may act as Numani's agent in Jeddah.

3. Sir Afsur-el-Mulk, K.C.I.E., M.V.O., Commander-in-chief of the army of the Nazim of Hyderabad, arrived here on the 15th November. He is a Royal guest, and was received with a guard of honour. He left for Mecca on the 18th, and will proceed to Medina on the 12th December.

4. Particulars have now been received of the explosion at Medina, reported in the Jeddah report of the 31st October. It appears the ammunition was stored in some of the railway buildings, and that fire broke out there in the middle of the night, resulting in a serious explosion, which caused great damage to the local buildings. There was no loss of life.

It is said that the military officers, who have not been receiving their pay, have been selling the ammunition to the Bedouin east of Medina, and that Shereef Shahat has been helping them and acting as broker in these transactions. In order that the deficiencies in the ammunition, which were considerable, should not be discovered, one of the soldiers was bribed to set fire to the magazine. The French-Moorish subjects who were arrested in connection with the affair are believed to be innocent, but as some of them have been receiving monthly pensions from the French Government, and as one of them, with his son, is employed in the military dépôt, they have been suspected.

5. A large caravan has arrived in Medina from Kasim. It brought sheep, semen (native butter) and clothes. In consequence, the price of semen in Medina has fallen from 50 to 30 piastres an oke, and meat from 20 to 10 piastres an oke. It is said that Ibn Saud has given orders to his followers to keep the caravan routes open, and to keep the peace with the tribes around Medina. This is the first large caravan which has arrived in Medina from Nejd since the war.

There is no evidence, however, of any improvement in the public security in and around Medina. It is said that the Government has intimated that they cannot be responsible for the lives and properties of those living outside the walls, so that people are compelled to leave the houses—of which there are a large number—outside the town and lease houses within the walls. People have been robbed just outside the walls and at the gates of the town.

6. It is rumoured that Idrissian forces have occupied several villages and mountains in Shereefian territory in Asir, and that they are approaching Kunfuda, which was said to be deserted. King Hussein has sent troops to Kunfuda, and they have arrived there safely.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

APPENDIX I.

Press Summary.—"Al Qibla."

No. 631, October 30, 1922.

"The policy of the Arab Hashimite Government."

The protest addressed by the executive committee of the fifth Arab-Palestinian Conference to the Emir Abdullah, against his Highness's statement that the mandate in Palestine, so far from being a new idea, is what the people themselves once demanded, is reproduced from the Bethlehem paper "Saut-esh-Sha'ab," and is followed by "Al Moqattam's" account of an interview with the Emir Abdullah in London. The brethren in Palestine are admonished not to jump to conclusions, and not to criticise Abdullah, who is too devoutly religious a man not to know his duty towards his parent, and too famous a patriot to be suspected of deviation from the Arab policy recently enunciated in No. 626 of "Al Qibla."

It is stated that his Highness the Emir Abdullah has had a long interview with His Majesty the King in London.

Egyptian pilgrims have written to the "Moqattam" about their sufferings by robbery and attack between Medina and Yembo. This is false. All these pilgrims telegraphed and wrote to King Hussein on their arrival at Yembo praising the Government's public security arrangements. King Hussein sent them from Yembo to Suez at his own expense.

The "Young Lebanon" Society of Egypt publishes a call for help in securing the representation of Lebanese Nationalists at the Near Eastern Conference which is to follow Mudania.

No. 632, November 2, 1922.

Official notice: Owing to the present high prices of foodstuffs, due in large part to the rate of exchange of Turkish nickel coin, the Government have decided to open stores in Mecca for the sale of rice, flour, lentils, paraffin and other articles of common necessity, to supply bakers with flour, and to accept nickel currency in payment.

An article on the festival of the Prophet's birthday in Mecca.

No. 633, November 6, 1922.

"They will learn, they will learn."

Telegrams relative to the Angora Government's decision to divest the Caliph of his temporal authority are published with no comment other than an expression of interest as to what a certain section of the Egyptian press will find to say.

A correspondent telegraphs to "Al Ahram" from Bagdad that the ulema and others are obtaining a "fetwa" declaring that Feisal has forfeited his throne; that the elections will be strictly boycotted; that disorders may break out at any moment, &c.

"Al Qibla" takes this calmly and refers the world to King Hussein's famous declaration of disinterested Hashimite aims—"We do not seek any sovereignty either in Syria or in Irak," &c.

"We learn that the Idrisi contemplates an armed invasion of our southern borders, accompanied by his Wahhabi allies; and that the Hashimite Government have taken precautions to reinforce their detachments there. What can justify strife, the only issue to which is ruin and bloodshed?"

An account of the unsuccessful attempt of the French to capture Sultan Pasha-al-Atrash in October is copied from "Al Moqattam" of Cairo.

No. 634, November 9, 1922.

"We learn that the Emir Abdullah leaves London on the 14th of this month.

"Many Egyptian pilgrims have written thanking the Hashimite Government for their free passage from Yembo to Suez on the 'Tawil.' The performance of a duty calls for no gratitude."

No. 635, November 13, 1922.

News from Egypt that the Kemalists have occupied Gallipoli, and that ships may only enter the Straits with their permission. Further, that the Sultan of Turkey has asked for the sanctuary of the British Embassy.

King Hussein has telegraphed offering the Sultan the hospitality of the Hedjaz.

(The above was published as a special supplement on the 12th November.)

Account of a ceremony at the Woking Mosque, attended by the Emir Abdullah, with speech by Lord Headley.

The new Italian Government. Signor Mussolini's views, expressed in May, on the Palestine and Syrian mandates.

No. 636, November 16, 1922.

Distinguished arrivals:

Sir Afsur-ul-Mulk, Commander-in-chief of Nizam of Hyderabad, and M. Krajewski, French consul-general in Jeddah, have arrived in the Hedjaz.

Egyptian press comments on the Caliphate question and on recent developments in Turkey.

No. 637, November 20, 1922.

The Arab agent in Cairo has telegraphed that when the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey and other Ministers arrived in Alexandria from Constantinople they were pelted with filth.

The Arab agent has been instructed by the Hashimite Government to invite these notables to this holy country seat, and, if they accept, to meet their travelling expenses.

Important news: Reports the departure of the Sultan on a British vessel for Malta, and adds that it is believed (in Egypt) that he will accept King Hussein's invitation to Mecca.

(The above was published as a special supplement on the 19th November.)

Syrian affairs: Riots and unrest are universal.

No. 638, November 23, 1922.

His Highness the Emir Ali has arrived at Mecca from Taif, *en route* for Jeddah, where he will meet his brother, the Emir Abdullah, who arrives very shortly from Egypt.

The Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey and the Ministers with him have gratefully accepted King Hussein's offer of hospitality.

The National Assembly of Angora has elected Abdul Medjid to the Caliphate.

"Al Qibla" cannot reconcile such election with previous declarations of the Angora Government on the subject of the Caliphate, and asks God's help for the faithful in these dark and troublous times.

No. 639, November 27, 1922.

In reply to King Hussein's invitation, the Sultan of Turkey has explained that, while he and his family will reside only in a Moslem country, it has not yet been decided which country this will be, and he cannot give a definite answer to the invitation, for which he expresses sincere gratitude.

King Hussein has telegraphed hoping that the honour may even yet be his and his people's.

The Egyptian press is reproved for the coarse tone of its comments. The reproof is probably inspired by an article from "Al Lewa-al-Masri," printed in the same number, which, after giving the names of the distinguished Turkish refugees, speaks of the Sheikh-ul-Islam as being ill, "perhaps because he has lost 6,000L.," and of the party as having "arranged a conference in Mecca under the hospitality of the King of the Hedjaz."

Nos. 634, *et seq.*, contain long instalments of a chronicle of the early days of Islam, which, without actual allusion to recent events, are probably intended to be read as a commentary on history, both as it is now being made and as some would like to see it re-made.

APPENDIX II.

Shipping Intelligence, November 1 to 30, 1922.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1922.	1922.		Packages.
Dakahlieh	British	..	Suez	Nov. 1	Nov. 1
Mansourah	British	..	Port Soudan	Nov. 5	Nov. 5	..	1,987
Massana	Italian	..	Suez	" 9	" 9	..	2,695
Asmara	Italian	..	Massana	" 11	" 11	..	370
Mansourah	British	..	Port Soudan	" 11	" 12	..	451
Firozi..	British	..	Bombay	" 12	" 17	..	29,857
G. 38	Italian	..	Massana	" 14	" 30
Zayani..	British	..	Basra	" 14	" 22	1,110	35,022
Dakahlieh	British	..	Suez	" 15	" 16	..	2,539
Dakahlieh	British	..	Port Soudan	" 21	" 22	..	1,336
Rushdi..	Hedjaz	..	Akaba	" 21	"
Massana	Italian	..	Massana	" 23	" 23	..	546
Mansourah	British	..	Suez	" 25	" 25	..	627
Asmara	Italian	..	Suez	" 25	" 25	..	286

The French sloop "Liévin" arrived on November 4 and left on November 8.
H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on November 18 and left on November 21.

[E 14254/248/91]

No. 27.

Papers forwarded by the Peace Delegation at Lausanne for the Information of the Foreign Office.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 46.)

(1.)

Dr. Naji-el-Assil to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

My Lord,

Arab Hashimite Delegation, December 7, 1922.

FOLLOWING the instructions of His Majesty King Hussein, I have the honour to convey to your Lordship the salutations and compliments of His Hashimite Majesty, who has commanded me to come to Lausanne and to call your Lordship's attention to a cable sent to His Majesty by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, on behalf of the British Government and all the Allies during the war, which states fully what the Allies have undertaken to the Arabs to carry out on their behalf at the time of the rising and while fighting by the side of the Allies.

The following is a translation of the original cable in Arabic as presented by the British diplomatic agent at Jeddah to His Majesty King Hussein:—

"The perfect frankness that your Majesty has shown in sending to the High Commissioner the written proposals of the Turkish Commander-in-chief in Syria made to the Emirs Feisal and Abdullah, proposing a separate peace by the recognition of the Arab independence and freedom guaranteed by the Emperor of Germany has produced the very best effect on His Britannic Majesty's Government.

"Your Majesty's action and warning in this connection is not a mere symbol of your Majesty's friendship, but is a witness to the solidarity existing between your Majesty's Government and Great Britain.

"It is not necessary to prove that the policy of Turkey is to create doubt and suspicion between the Allies and the Arabs, who, under your Majesty's command and advice, have done wonderful deeds to reconquer their past freedom.

"Turkish diplomacy will try to sow suspicion by misleading the Arabs to think that the Allies are aiming to acquire the Arab lands. At the same time, they try to induce the Allies to think of the possibility that the Arabs may give up their declared objects. But the words of the intriguers will have no effect.

Great Britain and their Allies abide by their declaration to help every rising that leads to the freedom of oppressed nations.

"His Britannic Majesty's Government are decided to stand by the side of the Arabs in their sacred war to build up an Arab Empire (entity), where law and Shariat shall rule instead of the Ottoman tyranny, and the British Government hereby repeat their previous promise to free the Arab nations. They have followed this policy of liberation with the Arabs, and they intend to continue it in the most straightforward and effective way, in order to keep the Arabs, who have been rendered free, from falling into the depths of destruction, and to assist those who are still suffering under the tyranny of the oppressor to become free."

Having now handed, in accordance with the orders of the King, this despatch to you, I wish to express, on behalf of His Hashimite Majesty, the hope that the promises made in this cable will be duly observed during the negotiations at Lausanne, and one of the reasons why he has instructed me to submit this despatch at the present moment to your Lordship is that, as there are so many different objects being discussed, some of which may, no doubt have considerable interest for the Arabs, the submission of this document at the present moment has the purpose of receiving from His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Allied Governments the renewed assurance that the promises made in this cable will be duly carried out and will not be weakened by any arrangements which might be discussed at the Lausanne Conference.

I hope I shall have the honour to see you and to receive a favourable reply to the King's request for the purpose of sending to His Majesty, who is very anxious to receive this assurance as soon as possible.

I am, &c.

NAJI-EL-ASSIL,

Minister Plenipotentiary.

(2.)

British Delegation to Dr. Naji-el-Assil.

Sir,

Lausanne, December 17, 1922.

IN reply to your letter of the 7th December, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to request that you will thank His Majesty King Hussein for his message, and assure him that His Majesty's Government are using their best endeavours to secure the continued freedom of the Arab peoples from Turkish rule.

I am, &c.

W. TYRRELL.

[E 14075/1248/91]

No. 28.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).

(No. 165.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 29, 1922.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 67 of the 1st September last, on the subject of Dr. Naji-el-Assil, I transmit to you herewith copies of a letter dated the 18th October* from him and of subsequent correspondence between this Department and the Colonial and India Offices regarding the proposed treaty between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein.

2. You will note that the document communicated by Dr. Naji-el-Assil corresponds in the main with the treaty signed at Amman on the 18th December, 1921, by Colonel Lawrence and the Emir Abdullah, but that there are certain material differences between the two versions, namely, an addition to article 2, an alteration in article 3, and the omission of article 17 of the Amman Treaty.

3. Apart from the more important differences referred to in the preceding paragraph and fully described in the letter of the 14th November to the Colonial Office, you will notice certain discrepancies—to which attention is drawn by Mr. Simpson of the India Office in his letter enclosed herein, between the Arabic and

[9941]

1 2

English texts of the Amman Treaty. His observations should be borne in mind by you, and before the conclusion of a formal treaty it will be necessary to make it clear to King Hussein that in the event of any doubt arising as to its interpretation the English text must prevail.

4. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to accept the version of the treaty communicated by Dr. Naji-el-Assil, provided that it was amended in accordance with the suggestions contained in the Colonial Office letter of the 14th instant. The treaty would then take the form of the text marked "A" enclosed herewith, and I shall be glad to learn whether, in your opinion, the moment is opportune for you to approach King Hussein with a view to his appointing a plenipotentiary to negotiate with you on behalf of His Majesty's Government a treaty on the above terms.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

* See No. 17.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE AND SYRIA.

[E 6517/78/65]

No. 29.

Cabinet Offices to the Foreign Office.—(Received July 1.)

THE Secretary to the Cabinet presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and encloses herein the copy of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations regarding the Palestine mandate.

*Offices of the Cabinet, 2, Whitehall Gardens,
July 1, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 29.

Cabinet Offices to League of Nations.

THE Secretary to the Cabinet presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, and, with reference to the letter addressed to the League of Nations by the Cardinal Secretary of State on the 15th May regarding the Palestine mandate, transmits herewith the following papers for the information of the Council of the League of Nations:—

*1. A note in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter to the League of Nations of the 15th May. Annexed to this note are:—

- (a.) A new draft of article 14 of the Palestine mandate;
- (b.) Correspondence between His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Zionist Organisation; and
- (c.) A draft Order in Council providing for the Constitution of Palestine. The draft is still liable to revision.

†2. The revised final draft of the Palestine mandate.

With regard to enclosure (2), attention is drawn to the following verbal alterations in the draft of the mandate published by His Majesty's Government in August last:—

Preamble.—In the first sentence, "renounces" for "renounce."

Article 1.—"This mandate" for "the present mandate."

Article 4.—"Affect" for "effect."

Article 12.—In second sentence, "he" for "it."

Article 21.—Concluding words now read, "to the nationals of all members of the League of Nations."

Article 27.—"This mandate" for "the present mandate."

Article 28.—Concluding words now read, "members of the League" instead of "Powers signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey."

In addition to these verbal alterations article 8 of the mandate now reads:—

"The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandate régime, unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree, or have agreed, by treaty to their suspension or modification."

Article 14 has been revised as shown in annex (a) to enclosure No. 1 in this letter.

Article 25.—The words "with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations" have been inserted between the words "shall be entitled" and "to postpone."

Article 27.—The words after "mandate" have now been omitted.

His Majesty's Government confidently hope that in the light of the modifications now made in the mandate and the explanations furnished in these papers, the Council of the League of Nations will formally approve the terms of the mandate at their forthcoming session.

July 1, 1922.

* See Part X, enclosure 1 in No. 280.

† See Part X, enclosure in No. 283.

[E 6601/78/65]

No. 30.

*The Earl of Balfour to M. Merry del Val.**

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 3, 1922.

IN continuation of my note of the 30th ultimo on the subject of the Palestine mandate, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for the information of your Excellency's Government, copies of—

(a.) The white paper published to-day enumerating the amendments in the text of the Palestine mandate and containing the note which His Majesty's Government have addressed to the League of Nations in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's memorandum of the 15th May.†

(b.) The draft of the Palestine mandate in its final form.‡

2. His Majesty's Government are anxious that the Council of the League of Nations shall formally approve the terms of the Palestine mandate at their forthcoming session, and I confidently hope that in this object they will receive the support of the Spanish representative on that body.

I have, &c.

BALFOUR.

[E 6601/78/65]

No. 31.

The Earl of Balfour to Baron Moncheur.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 3, 1922.

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 23rd ultimo requesting information regarding the action which has been taken by His Majesty's Government in connection with the criticisms of the Palestine mandate which have emanated from the Holy See, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith for your information copies of:—

(a.) The White Paper published to-day enumerating the amendments in the text of the Palestine mandate, and containing the note which His Majesty's Government have addressed to the League of Nations in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's memorandum of the 15th May.†

(b.) The draft of the Palestine mandate in its final form.‡

2. I regret that my note of the 30th ultimo, the text of which had already been prepared at the time when your note now under reply was received, contained no reference to the latter document.

3. His Majesty's Government are anxious that the Council of the League of Nations shall formally approve the terms of the Palestine mandate at their forthcoming session, and I confidently hope that in this object they will receive the support of the Belgian representative on that body.

I have, &c.

BALFOUR.

[E 6601/78/65]

No. 32.

The Earl of Balfour to Baron Hayashi.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 3, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of the 27th ultimo, and now transmit herewith, for the further information of your Excellency's Government:—

(a.) The white paper published to-day enumerating the amendments in the text of the Palestine mandate, and containing the note which His Majesty's Government have addressed to the League of Nations in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's memorandum of the 15th May.†

(b.) The draft of the Palestine mandate in its final form.‡

* Also to the Brazilian Ambassador and the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, *mutatis mutandis*.
† Cmd. 1708. ‡ See Part X, enclosure in No. 283.

2. I shall be grateful if, as in the case of my note of the 20th ultimo, your Excellency will arrange for a copy of this note to be communicated to the Japanese Ambassador in Paris.

I have, &c.

BALFOUR.

[E 6601/78/65]

No. 33.

*The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Chilton (Washington).**

(No. 1064.)

Foreign Office, July 3, 1922.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1033 of the 30th ultimo, I transmit to you herewith copies of:—

(a.) The white paper published to-day enumerating the amendments in the text of the Palestine mandate, and containing the note which His Majesty's Government have addressed to the League of Nations in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's memorandum of the 15th May.†

(b.) The draft of the Palestine mandate in its final form.‡

1 only.

2. I shall be glad if you will communicate a copy of each of these papers to the Department of State.

I am, &c.

BALFOUR.

[E 6624/65/65]

No. 34.

Sir J. Tilley to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 94.)

Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1922.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 90 of 29th June: Palestine mandate.

Wilenski now hears that French rather than Vatican influence is being used here. I have dissuaded him from trying to see President so far.

[E 6625/78/65]

No. 35.

Count de Salis to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 27.)

Vatican Mission, July 3, 1922.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR despatch No. 148 of 29th June: Palestine mandate.

At interview this morning Cardinal Secretary of State expressed his thanks for communication made to him in accordance with your instructions. In particular, draft article 14 respecting Holy Places appeared quite satisfactory to his wishes.

He referred again to attempt of the French to introduce question of honours, to which His Majesty's Government have not, as I repeated, given their consent.

High Commissioner of Palestine will arrive to-morrow and will stay a few days. He will go to Vatican.

[E 5788/78/65]

No. 36.

The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Chilton (Washington).

(No. 225.)

Foreign Office, July 4, 1922.

(Telegraphic.)

SIR A. GEDDES' telegram No. 261 of 7th June: Syrian mandate.

What progress has been made in Franco-American negotiations regarding Syrian mandate?

* Also to Count de Salis (Vatican), No. 152, *mutatis mutandis*.

† Cmd. 1708.

‡ See Part X, enclosure in No. 283.

[E 6653/6453/65]

No. 37.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 5.)

Sir,

Downing Street, July 4, 1922.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to inform you that, in accordance with the procedure agreed upon with the Earl of Balfour, representatives of the Colonial Office held informal discussions by Mr. Churchill's direction, on the 28th and 29th June, with representatives of the Italian Government, on the subject of the demands made by that Government in connection with Palestine and Irak, and embodied in a note presented by Signor Schanzer to the Foreign Office, of which a copy was communicated to this Department by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

2. I am to transmit herewith for Lord Balfour's information, a copy of the record of these discussions, of which the original has been initialled by Signor Guariglia on behalf of the Italian representatives. Mr. Churchill trusts that this record will provide adequate material for an official reply to be given to Signor Schanzer on the points raised in his note.

3. I am to add that Mr. Churchill has reason to believe that the Italian representatives will ask for a more favourable assurance on the question of participation of Italian enterprise in public works in Palestine than that suggested in the record of the discussions. Mr. Churchill would deprecate the Italian Government being given any assurance in this respect of a nature to lay His Majesty's Government open to the charge of discriminating between States members of the League of Nations. The need for equal treatment of such States may necessitate assurances on the lines of those indicated in the enclosed record being given to such other members of the League as may desire to receive them; but Mr. Churchill leaves it to Lord Balfour to decide whether His Majesty's Government should take the first step in this direction *vis-à-vis* any specified Government or the League of Nations itself. In this connection I am to invite reference to Foreign Office letter of the 1st May, 1922, on the subject of the opening of new schools in Palestine. Lord Balfour will, no doubt, consider whether any communication should now be made to the French Government in regard to the second clause of article 9 of the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

4. With regard to the concession proposed in section 7 of the record of discussion, I am to point out that the language adopted follows closely with that of Lord Curzon's despatch to Lord Hardinge, No. 969, of the 6th April, 1921, dealing with the cognate question of the privileges to be accorded to French religious institutions, &c., in Palestine and Irak. It might be desirable to point out both to the Italian and French Governments that these privileges must be regarded as strictly confined to *bonâ fide* transactions on the part of the institutions concerned, and that any attempt to use them as a cloak for transactions of a different nature would constitute a breach of agreement which might lead in certain circumstances to the withdrawal of the concession.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 37.

*Notes of Informal Discussion with Representatives of the Italian Government
held at the Colonial Office on June 28 and 29, 1922.*

Present:

Marquis Visconti-Venosta (on June 28
only).
Signor G. Cora.
Signor R. Guariglia.

Sir J. Shuckburgh.
Major Young.

THE Colonial Office representatives explained that, while the Secretary of State for the Colonies was anxious to do all in his power to meet the Italian point of view as set forth in Signor Schanzer's note, a copy of which had been communicated to him by the Foreign Office, they could not do more than represent the departmental point of view of the Colonial Office on the matters under discussion. The Italian representatives said that they were in a similar position, since they had only been authorised to discuss

informally with a view to making recommendations to Signor Schanzer. Signor Schanzer's note would, they understood, be answered by the Foreign Office. Taking the points raised by Signor Schanzer in order:—

*Palestine.*1. *Article 6 of the Tripartite Agreement.*

The Colonial Office saw no objection to the Italian Government being officially informed that article 18 of the Palestine mandate applied to Italy, notwithstanding the provisions of article 6 of the Tripartite Agreement.

2. *Participation of Italian Enterprise in Public Works.*

The Colonial Office saw no objection to the Italian Government being informed that article 11 of the mandate was not intended to preclude the participation of Italian enterprise in public works services and utilities and in the development of the natural resources of the country so far as these matters were not directly undertaken by the Administration. They also agreed that, in the event of such participation, they would be prepared to recommend a special arrangement being made with the Italian Government to regulate the conditions of such Italian labour as might consequently be admitted into Palestine. The Italian representatives asked for a formal assurance to the above effect.

3. *Nationality Law.*

The Colonial Office communicated unofficially to the Italian representatives a draft of the proposed nationality law for Palestine, and the Italian representatives agreed to recommend to Signor Schanzer that, in view of its provisions, the request that article 7 of the mandate should be redrafted might be withdrawn.

4. *Judicial System.*

The Colonial Office saw no objection to the Italian Government being officially informed that adequate courts had already been established in Palestine, and that, under the constitutional proposals that were now under consideration for that country, His Majesty's Government had included provisions in virtue of which foreign nationals, including of course Italian citizens, should have the right to be tried by a court with a majority of British judges, except in trivial cases, in which these provisions would lead to administrative inconvenience, and that in these cases foreign nationals would have the special right to appeal to a court composed with a majority of British judges. They communicated unofficially a copy of the draft Constitution for Palestine to the Italian representatives, who agreed to recommend to Signor Schanzer that its provisions in this respect, coupled with an assurance on the above lines, might be taken as a satisfactory reply to the points raised in his note.

5. *Education.*

The Colonial Office saw no objection to the Italian Government being officially informed that the use of the word "maintain" in article 15 of the draft mandate was not intended to restrict the opening of new Italian schools or to restrict the right of such schools to admit pupils of another community. The Italian representatives expressed themselves satisfied with this assurance.

6. *Supervision over Religious Bodies.*

The Colonial Office explained that the second clause of article 16 of the draft mandate was intended to show that the supervision of the mandatory was to be strictly limited to that required for the maintenance of public order and good government. They added that there was no intention of permitting any arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of any religious community. They saw no objection to the Italian Government being so informed. The Italian representatives expressed themselves satisfied with this explanation.

7. *Customs Agreements.*

A copy of the "Palestine Gazette" containing the text of the Palestine-Syria Customs Agreement was communicated to the Italian representatives, and it was pointed out to them that this was merely a local arrangement covering the use of a

common railway line by two contiguous territories. In reply to the suggestion that a similar arrangement should be entered into with the Italian Government in respect of those Aegean Islands which would remain Italian, and, if and when possible, to the Italian zone of economic priority in Asia Minor, the Colonial Office representatives replied that they saw no direct analogy between the two cases. At the same time, they saw no objection to the Italian Government being informed that in the event of their economic zone in Asia Minor materialising, and in the event of any customs arrangement being concluded with the French Government in respect of sea-borne commerce between Palestine and Syria, His Majesty's Government would give favourable consideration to any proposals for a similar arrangement to be entered into with the Italian Government in respect of sea-borne traffic between Palestine on the one hand, and the Italian economic zone and the Aegean Islands on the other. The Italian representatives agreed to recommend to Signor Schanzer that this reply might be considered satisfactory.

8. Assurances as to Civil and Religious Rights.

The Colonial Office saw no objection whatever to an assurance on the lines suggested by Signor Schanzer being officially given to the Italian Government.

9. Financial Privileges of Religious Missions, Schools, &c.

The Colonial Office explained that it was impracticable for rights derived from the capitulatory régime, or from the Treaty of Mitylene which arose out of that régime, to be granted after the confirmation of the mandate by the Council of the League of Nations. At the same time, they recognised that in the special circumstances of Palestine certain privileges might well be given to religious institutions. They saw no objection to the Italian Government being informed that consignments imported for the use of Italian schools, orphanages, asylums, hospitals and dispensaries should be admitted free of duty. Consignments addressed to other institutions, such as hospices, wine industries, printing presses, book binding establishments, &c., would, however, be chargeable with full import duties. Consignments intended for the use of places of worship, monastic orders (not engaged in any form of trade, profession or commerce) would be admitted free of duty. Goods intended for the personal use of all members of any ecclesiastical institution would be admitted free only up to a limited sum. The Italian representatives considered that this concession would fully meet Italian requirements.

Irak.

With regard to Irak, the Italian representatives agreed that in view of the fact that the Irak mandate was not at present under discussion, and that the political conditions in Irak and Palestine were not exactly similar, they would recommend to Signor Schanzer that the Italian Government might be satisfied with a general assurance that so far as the different conditions of Irak permitted, His Majesty's Government would ensure that Italian interests in Irak were safeguarded on similar lines to those now suggested for Palestine.

At the conclusion of the discussion the Italian representatives expressed themselves as personally satisfied with the assurances given by the Colonial Office representatives, and agreed to recommend that, subject to the official reply to Signor Schanzer's note following the lines agreed upon between them and the Colonial Office representatives, any Italian suggestion that the actual text of the draft mandate for Palestine should be altered might be withdrawn, so far as the points under discussion were concerned. This did not apply to article 14 of the draft mandate, which was not discussed with the Colonial Office.

The Colonial Office representatives pointed out that the official reply to the Italian Government would, of course, be made through the usual diplomatic channels, and that the discussion must not be taken as more than an informal method of arriving at a provisional agreement for recommendations to be made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by the Italian representatives to Signor Schanzer.

[E 6744/78/65]

No. 38.

The Earl of Balfour to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 185.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 5, 1922.

FOLLOWING from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Jerusalem, 5th July, personally repeated to you for information of Sir H. Samuel through Count de Salis:—

"I stated in House of Commons, 4th July, that vote on motion criticising Palestine mandate and Rutenberg concession would be regarded as one of confidence, and that it was specially important owing to recent adverse vote in House of Lords. Result was that House of Commons directly traversed House of Lords resolution by rejecting motion by overwhelming majority of 292 to 35. Policy will therefore be pursued vigorously, as it is clear that the country supports His Majesty's Government in their Palestine policy. Every effort will be made to get terms of mandate approved at forthcoming session of League of Nations.

"As result of conversations with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs now here, we have every hope of obtaining Italian support of mandate.

"Copy of revised draft of article 14 sent to you by mail 22nd June. This has been communicated to the Vatican, and we anticipate that as the result their opposition will be withdrawn."

[E 5788/78/65]

No. 39.

Mr. Chilton to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 283.)

(Telegraphic.)

Washington, July 5, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 225, of 4th July: Syrian mandate.

French Government communicated their proposals through United States Embassy, Paris, on 1st July, and State Department are now considering telegraphic summary. They hope to be able to return a reply within a week.

[E 6766/78/65]

No. 40.

Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 1582.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 7, 1922.

THIS morning, when I saw the President of the Council, I told him that the Cardinal Secretary of State at Rome had expressed his thanks for the communication which your Lordship had made to him of the text of the Palestine mandate, and that he had in particular stated that the draft article 14, respecting the Holy Places, appeared, in his opinion, to be in accordance with the views that he had laid down. At the same time I expressed to M. Poincaré the confident hope of His Majesty's Government that they would receive French support in connection with this question at the forthcoming session of the Council of the League of Nations. I enquired at the same time how the negotiations with the United States, in connection with the Syrian mandate, were progressing.

In reply M. Poincaré stated that the negotiations with the United States were making satisfactory progress, but he understood that the question of the Palestine mandate was associated with that of the mandate for Irak. I at once corrected him, and told him that this was not the case, as the mandate for Irak was not yet ready. He remarked that he understood that all three mandates were inter-connected, which I denied, and again expressed the hope of support from the French Government in connection with the Palestine mandate.

I impressed upon him that the Vatican, who had raised objections to the terms of the mandate, were now satisfied with the modifications which had been introduced.

M. Poincaré, in reply, stated that the French Government had also traditional interests in connection with the Holy Places, and it would be impossible for him to promise us his support until the question had been thoroughly examined. I assured him there was no question involved of honours to the French representative which had

[9941]

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been settled elsewhere. He expressed, however, ignorance of the terms of the mandate, and in particular of article 14, and stated that he must refrain from making any promise until he had had time to look thoroughly into the matter.

Unfortunately I had not with me the text of the draft mandate enclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 257, but I am sending him privately a copy to-day.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[E 6797/78/65]

No. 41.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 8.)

Sir,

Downing Street, July 8, 1922.

IN continuation of my letter of the 4th July I am directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to inform you that, in accordance with the procedure agreed upon with the Earl of Balfour and Signor Schanzer at the conference held at the Foreign Office on the 3rd July, representatives of the Colonial Office held further informal discussions, by Mr. Churchill's direction, on the following day with the same representatives of the Italian Government on the subject of article 14 of the draft mandate for Palestine.

2. The object of these discussions was to evolve a formula by means of which the Italian Government might be assured that Italian and Catholic interests would be fully safeguarded on the commission (which it was proposed to set up under that article), and also that there was no intention that existing well-established rights should necessarily be discussed by the commission provided that no conflicting claim was put forward by any other parties.

3. I am to transmit herewith, for Lord Balfour's information, a copy of the record of these further discussions,* of which the original has been initialled, as before, by Signor Guariglia on behalf of the Italian representatives. Mr. Churchill suggests that an official reply based on these recommendations should be added to the annex, which, he understands, is being appended to the proposed note to the Italian Government, now under consideration in the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Note of Informal Discussion with Representatives of the Italian Government held at the Colonial Office on July 4, 1922.

Present :

Marquis Visconti-Venosta.
Signor G. Cora.
Signor R. Guariglia.

Sir J. Shuckburgh.
Major Young.

THE Colonial Office saw no objection to the Italian Government being formally assured that the intention of the fresh draft of article 14 of the mandate, as amplified by the explanations given to the Council of the League of Nations in the note in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter of the 15th May, 1922, was to ensure that the well-known Catholic interests in the Holy Places of Palestine, as, indeed, the interests of all confessions, should be completely guaranteed and adequately safeguarded in perpetuity. The Italian representatives agreed to recommend to Signor Schanzer the acceptance of this formula.

The Colonial Office had no objection to the Italian Government being informed that the use of the words "determine existing rights" in article 14 does not imply that in cases where these rights are clearly established, and there are no conflicting claims, more is required than that such rights should be registered by the commission and included in their report to the mandatory. The Italian representatives agreed to recommend to Signor Schanzer that this should also be accepted.

* Not printed.

[E 6840/78/65]

No. 42.

Count de Salis to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 100.)

My Lord,

Palazzo Borghese, Rome, July 6, 1922.

AS already reported to your Lordship, I lost no time in carrying out the instructions conveyed to me in London in your despatch No. 148 of the 29th June last with regard to the draft mandate which is to be considered for approval by the League of Nations at the meeting which takes place at Geneva on the 15th of this month.

At first I communicated to the Cardinal Secretary of State the new text of article 14 of the mandate, the article which deals with the Holy Places. The Cardinal expressed his lively appreciation of the proposals of His Majesty's Government for dealing with a matter which was of the deepest concern to the Holy See. The purpose on which the article was founded of setting up an independent and impartial authority to deal with the Holy Places was satisfactory and in accordance with their wishes; in one or two particulars the drafting of the article appeared a little vague, but he would study it. On this I took the opportunity of drawing attention to those paragraphs of the "note in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter of the 15th May" which deal with the composition of the commission for the Holy Places and the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject; the Cardinal followed closely and expressed satisfaction at the line of policy thus traced.

We then ran through the other paragraphs of the "note in reply" which, as I explained, was being communicated in advance and unofficially, and also dealt with the note on "British policy in Palestine." The Cardinal spoke of the great value of these declarations, which he would bring forthwith to the notice of the Pope.

Sir Herbert Samuel arrived here in the course of the 4th July and arrangements were at once made for him to have an audience with the Pope at 10 o'clock on the 6th. I accompanied Sir Herbert Samuel to the ante-rooms in order to lay stress on the high position occupied by him as His Majesty's High Commissioner, but I did not take part in the audience. We then went down to the apartments of the Cardinal Secretary of State, and on their invitation I was present at the conversation which took place between Sir Herbert and Cardinal Gasparri. After some remarks on the subject of article 14, the Cardinal repeating the language already held to me as mentioned above, Sir Herbert Samuel spoke at some length on the policy which was being pursued in Palestine. Autonomous government was the object in view, and as the Jews were not, and were not likely to become, a majority in the country, the fears expressed respecting a Jewish domination over the rest of the inhabitants should be groundless. There was to be a Legislative Assembly, composed largely of elective members. The Cardinal asked who would be responsible for the good administration of the country. Sir Herbert replied that the British Government were responsible, but the distinction between the British Government and the Administration of Palestine, to which attention had been drawn, was necessary; it was an essential part of the mandatory system, which did not contemplate annexation but the gradual development of autonomy, but that under the responsibility of the British Government; the Zionist Organisation had no share in the government. The Cardinal thought it would be very desirable if these facts were more generally known.

There was also some conversation respecting the economic development of the country, the Cardinal expressing fears, which Sir Herbert Samuel considered groundless, that the Jews in these matters would be unduly favoured.

I understand that Sir Herbert Samuel was well satisfied at his reception by the Pope.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

[E 6837/78/65]

No. 43.

Baron Moncheur to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 10.)

*Ambassade de Belgique, Londres,
le 8 juillet 1922.*

Milord,

J'AI porté à la connaissance de mon Gouvernement, dès leur réception, les communications que, sous les dates des 30 juin et 3 juillet, votre Seigneurie a bien voulu m'adresser au sujet des dernières modifications apportées au projet du mandat

britannique en Palestine qui sera soumis à l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations lors de sa prochaine réunion.

Je reçois de M. le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Belgique un télégramme me priant de faire savoir à votre Seigneurie que les nouvelles propositions britanniques sont examinées par le Gouvernement belge. Celui-ci compte bien en tout cas que la Belgique sera représentée dans la commission prévue par l'article 14 du projet de mandat, quelle que soit la formule qui sera définitivement adoptée à ce propos.

Je saisis, &c.

Bn. MONCHEUR.

[E 6886/78/65]

No. 44.

Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 1609.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 11, 1922.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 1582 of the 7th July, to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a communication which I have received from M. Poincaré in regard to the Palestine mandate.

His Excellency, while declaring his readiness to support His Majesty's Government in securing the acceptance of the articles previously agreed upon with the French Government, expresses himself unable to accept the new text of article 14, which does not in his view take sufficient account of the "moral interests" of France in the Holy Places. He adds the somewhat surprising statement that Cardinal Gasparri has informed the French Ambassador at the Vatican that the Pope, after hearing details of the proposal from Sir Herbert Samuel, does not approve of it. It appears from M. Poincaré's note that a counter-proposal is to be submitted to your Lordship by the French Ambassador in London.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure in No. 44.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

LE Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a étudié avec une attention amicale les documents ("white papers") sur le mandat palestinien, qui lui ont été transmis par l'Ambassade de la République à Londres, et auxquels Lord Hardinge of Penshurst fait allusion dans son communiqué verbal du 6 de ce mois.

En ce qui concerne les articles du mandat, préparés antérieurement, d'accord avec le Gouvernement français, M. Poincaré peut assurer que le représentant de la France prêterait son appui au représentant du Gouvernement britannique au Conseil de la Société des Nations, de même que le représentant du Gouvernement britannique appuiera certainement le projet de mandat français pour la Syrie et le Liban.

En ce qui concerne la nouvelle rédaction de l'article 14, préparée par le Gouvernement britannique à la suite des protestations du Saint-Siège, le Gouvernement français regrette de ne pouvoir lui donner son agrément. M. Poincaré, désireux d'ailleurs d'arriver à une entente sur ce point, a envoyé à M. de Saint-Aulaire pour la soumettre au Gouvernement britannique une contre-proposition de nature, pense-t-il, à concilier tous les intérêts en présence. En effet, outre que le projet britannique ne tient pas compte suffisant des intérêts moraux de la France dans les Lieux-Saints, il apparaît des déclarations récentes faites à l'Ambassadeur de la République près le Saint-Siège par le Cardinal Gasparri, que ce projet, exposé en détail par Sir Herbert Samuel, n'a pas rencontré l'approbation du Saint-Père.

Paris, le 10 juillet 1922.

[E 6837/78/65]

No. 45.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 12, 1922.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 4th July, I am directed by the Earl of Balfour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a note from the Belgian Ambassador regarding the Holy Places Commission.*

* See No. 43.

2. Lord Balfour assumes that the Belgian Government desire an assurance that Belgium will be represented on the commission and that Mr. Secretary Churchill would not desire to give the Belgian Government the assurance already given to the United States, French and Italian Governments that His Majesty's Government regard them as "Great Powers interested in Palestine" who should not be without representation on the commission.

3. On this assumption two courses appear open to His Majesty's Government: either to refer the Belgian Minister, in reply, to paragraph 13 of the note addressed to the League of Nations in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's note of the 15th May, and to call attention to the fact that Belgium's interests are thereby fully safeguarded; or to leave the note unanswered, unless and until a reply is pressed for by Baron Moncheur and at any rate until after the meeting of the Council of the League on the 17th July.

4. Subject to Mr. Churchill's concurrence, Lord Balfour proposes to adopt the second alternative course.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 6919/78/65]

No. 46.

Sir E. Howard to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 12.)

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, July 11, 1922.

AS instructed, I requested Minister for Foreign Affairs in an unofficial manner yesterday to support in Council of League of Nations revised draft of mandate for Palestine, informing him that Cardinal Secretary of State had agreed to article 14. He took note of this, and said he would look into it, as he obviously had very little information on the subject.

[E 6984/78/65]

No. 47.

Sir E. Howard to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 13.)

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, July 13, 1922.

MY telegram of 11th July: Palestine mandate.

The Nuncio, who had evidently been consulted by Minister for Foreign Affairs, asked me this morning whether it was true that Cardinal Secretary of State was in agreement with article 14. I told him I received a telegram from your Lordship stating that his Eminence had so informed Count de Salis. Nuncio expressed himself as highly gratified at this.

[E 6996/78/65]

No. 48.

Mr. Chilton to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 296.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Washington, July 13, 1922.

YOUR despatch No. 987.

I have received from Secretary of State memorandum embodying reply of State Department to note which I communicated to them on 5th July respecting Palestine mandate. Text of this memorandum and enclosure has been telegraphed *in extenso* to American Ambassador in London with instructions to discuss matter with your Lordship, so it seems unnecessary for me to telegraph substance. Copy by bag to-morrow.

No reply has been yet received to note which I addressed to Secretary of State on receipt of your despatch No. 1033 respecting article 14.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 14.)

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 13 juillet 1922.*

M. le Comte,

MON Gouvernement, après avoir étudié avec attention le texte de l'article 14 du mandat sur la Palestine, ainsi que les explications contenues dans la lettre adressée par le Foreign Office à cette Ambassade le 30 juin dernier, me charge de présenter à votre Excellence les observations suivantes :

Le Gouvernement français estime que le statut prévu par l'article 14 du mandat sur la Palestine ne tient pas compte du régime traditionnel des Lieux-Saints, ni des droits acquis.

Le procès-verbal de la séance tenue par le Conseil des Quatre le 22 mai 1919, à 11 heures, Rue Nitot, consigne ce qui suit :

" M. Clemenceau croit nécessaire de rappeler que Mr. Lloyd George lui a également parlé à Londres de la Palestine, qui, conformément au Traité de Londres, devait être soumise à une sorte de régime international. Mr. Lloyd George avait demandé un régime anglais avec des arrangements pour les Lieux-Saints ('with arrangements for the Holy Places'). Lui, M. Clemenceau, avait répondu qu'il n'avait pas d'objection à ce régime, pourvu que les Lieux-Saints fussent protégés."

Ce sont donc ces arrangements qu'il s'agit de réaliser aujourd'hui.

Il semble que dans la pensée du Gouvernement britannique ces arrangements doivent se fonder (1) sur la renonciation de la France au protectorat des catholiques en Palestine lors de la Conférence de San-Remo; (2) sur l'article 95 du Traité de Sèvres.

A San-Remo, par suite de renonciations antérieures, il a été admis que le protectorat des catholiques avait cessé d'exister en Palestine, c'est-à-dire, comme M. Poincaré l'a écrit à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Paris le 11 février dernier, qu'il avait été mis fin au droit de défendre les intérêts des individus ou communautés catholiques à l'égard de la Puissance occupante. Et il est vrai aussi que la commission spéciale prévue par l'article 95 du Traité de Sèvres "pour étudier toute question et toute réclamation concernant les différentes communautés religieuses et en établir le règlement" est destinée à régler certaines questions qui relevaient auparavant de l'autorité du consul de France. Mais il n'est dit nulle part que cette commission doive faire table rase de tout le régime traditionnel des Lieux-Saints.

Au reste, il importe de ne pas confondre sous ce terme unique de Lieux-Saints tous les sanctuaires auxquels s'attache la vénération d'un ou de plusieurs groupements religieux; certains d'entre eux ont un statut juridique défini qui ne prête à aucune contestation. Tel est le cas, par exemple :

1. Des sanctuaires musulmans qui sont en la possession de la communauté musulmane et sous la garde des cheikhs des mosquées. Leur administration relève des wakfs;
2. Des Lieux-Saints juifs: tombeau de Rachel, sur la route de Bethléem, dont la clef est aux mains de la municipalité ou du Gouverneur de Bethléem; tombeau de David au Cénacle, dont la clef est aux mains des musulmans du Neby-Daoud;
3. Des sanctuaires chrétiens qui sont la propriété particulière d'un État, d'une Église, d'une association ou communauté religieuse, ou d'une personne privée.

Ces trois premières catégories de Lieux-Saints ne sont l'objet d'aucun conflit et échappent, par conséquent, à la compétence de la commission projetée.

Il n'y a de contestation possible qu'en ce qui concerne les sanctuaires mixtes, tels que le Saint-Sépulcre et ses dépendances et la Basilique et la Grotte de la Nativité à Bethléem, où les ministres de plusieurs confessions chrétiennes sont admis à célébrer leur culte. Ces sanctuaires ont ce caractère particulier qu'ils sont extraterritoriaux et anationaux. Ils sont en Palestine, mais ils ne sont pas proprement palestiniens. Aussi, leur statut traditionnel ne peut-il être modifié que du consentement de tous les intéressés, et l'on pourrait soutenir qu'ils ne tombent pas directement sous l'article 95 du Traité de Sèvres, lequel concerne les personnes et non les choses, les communautés religieuses et non pas les Lieux-Saints.

Si l'on veut maintenant déterminer qui sont les intéressés, l'on constate (1) que la garde des Lieux-Saints est confiée, sous le contrôle du Gouvernement français, aux Franciscains de la Custodie de Terre-Sainte, agents du Saint-Siège, le Custode étant italien, le Vicaire custodial français, le Procureur custodial espagnol; (2) que certains droits sont reconnus, en outre, aux orthodoxes, protégés officiellement par la Grèce, et officieusement autrefois par le Tsar de Russie; aux Arméniens, aux Coptes et aux Abyssins. Les intéressés sont donc (1) la France et le Saint-Siège d'abord, et, secondairement, l'Italie et l'Espagne, pour la custodie; (2) la Grande-Bretagne, d'une part, en tant que Puissance mandataire; d'autre part, en tant que protectrice des Arméniens et Coptes résidant en Palestine; (3) la Grèce, en tant que protectrice des orthodoxes; (4) enfin, l'Abyssinie.

Si donc on estime—ce que n'impliquent en aucune façon ni la renonciation de la France au protectorat des catholiques en Palestine, ni l'article 95 du Traité de Sèvres—que la question des Lieux-Saints doit être soumise à la commission prévue par ce traité, le Gouvernement français estime :

- (1.) Que la commission devra avoir une composition telle que le caractère extraterritorial des sanctuaires mixtes soit pleinement mis en lumière;
- (2.) Qu'elle aura à jouer le rôle de conciliateur et d'arbitre entre les rites et confessions intéressés;
- (3.) Qu'elle aura à sauvegarder et à interpréter au besoin les coutumes et traditions dont l'ensemble forme ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler le *statu quo*;
- (4.) Que, en conséquence, et pour mener à bonne fin ces diverses missions, elle devra être permanente et devra se réunir chaque année, à l'époque des grandes fêtes chrétiennes, à l'occasion desquelles des ajustements de réclamations sont toujours à prévoir.

Le Gouvernement français reconnaît d'ailleurs qu'il y a lieu surtout en pays d'Orient, de ménager le prestige et l'autorité de la Puissance mandataire en lui reconnaissant le droit de nommer les membres de la commission sur la présentation des Gouvernements intéressés. Le président seul, pour affirmer le caractère extraterritorial des Lieux-Saints, étant nommé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, sur la présentation du Gouvernement français, qui agirait naturellement après entente préalable avec le Gouvernement britannique, tant à raison de leurs relations cordiales qu'à raison de leurs intérêts communs dans le Proche-Orient.

En résumé: la commission pourrait être composée de six membres et d'un président. Le président serait nommé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations comme il vient d'être dit.

Deux membres seraient nommés par la Puissance mandataire sur la présentation du Gouvernement italien et du Gouvernement espagnol.

Deux membres seraient nommés par la Puissance mandataire sur la présentation des Gouvernements grec et abyssin.

Deux membres seraient choisis par la Puissance mandataire, qui assumerait ainsi la représentation des autres rites et religions qui ont des intérêts dans les sanctuaires mixtes et qui n'ont pu dans le passé invoquer la protection d'aucune Puissance autre que la Turquie.

Il apparaît au Gouvernement de la République qu'une commission, ainsi constituée, donnerait toutes garanties aux confessions et religions dont les fidèles ont pour ces sanctuaires une vénération particulière, qu'elle aiderait sérieusement par son autorité impartiale les fonctionnaires de la Puissance mandataire à faire régner l'harmonie entre les usagers des Lieux-Saints et enfin qu'elle conserverait à la France quelques vestiges de la situation particulière qu'elle occupait aux Lieux-Saints, situation spécialement chère à la grande masse des catholiques français.

Quant aux frais de la commission, le Gouvernement de la République reconnaît qu'étant donné le caractère universel des Lieux-Saints, il y aurait en effet avantage à les comprendre dans le budget de la Société des Nations, si celle-ci n'y fait pas d'objections.

Comme il l'a fait savoir à Lord Hardinge, dans une communication du 10 de ce mois, M. Poincaré pense que les contre-propositions ci-dessus sont de nature à concilier les intérêts en présence.

Je serais reconnaissant à votre Seigneurie si elle voulait bien me faire connaître aussitôt que elle le pourra le sentiment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à cet égard.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

SAINT-AULAIRE.

[E 6797/78/65]

No. 50.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 14, 1922.

WITH reference to your letters of the 4th and 8th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Balfour to state that the suggestions contained therein regarding the assurances to be given to the Italian Government in connection with Palestine and Irak were adopted in the preparation of the final British counter-draft presented to the Italian delegation in reply to the memorandum which had been received from Signor Schanzer. A copy of this document is enclosed for convenience of reference.

2. This counter-draft was not accepted by Signor Schanzer, and Lord Balfour decided that it was not desirable at this stage to endeavour to obtain any explicit promise of Italian support on the council by embodying the said assurances in an exchange of notes. For the rest, in view of the postponement of further negotiations with the Italians and the consequently inconclusive nature of the assurances given to the Italian Government regarding the mandates, Lord Balfour does not propose at the present stage to make any communication to the League of Nations or to the French Government regarding the assurances offered to the Italian Government.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 7032/78/65]

No. 51.

Sir J. Tilley to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rio de Janeiro, July 14, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 97 of 5th July: Palestine mandate.

Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he has sent satisfactory instructions to Brazilian representative.

[E 7042/78/65]

No. 52.

Baron Hayashi to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 17.)

My Lord,

Japanese Embassy, London, July 15, 1922.

WITH reference to your notes of the 28th June and 30th June setting forth the proposals of your Government in the draft mandate for Palestine, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Viscount Ishii has been instructed by my Government to support those proposals of your Government at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

(In the absence of the Ambassador),

I. M. TOKUGAWA.

[E 7055/78/65]

No. 53.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 17.)

Sir,

Downing Street, July 17, 1922.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 13th July on the subject of article 14 of the mandate for Palestine, and to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Balfour, copy of a memorandum in reply to the note from the French Ambassador on this subject.

2. Mr. Churchill suggests that, if the French representative on the Council of the League of Nations objects to article 14 of the draft mandate on the grounds put forward in the French note, a reply should be made on the lines of the memorandum. If it proves impossible to secure French assent by these means, an alternative might be to suggest that the mandate should be provisionally approved so far as all articles

other than article 14 are concerned, and that the question of the Holy Places Commission alone should be reserved for further discussion by the council. Lord Balfour will no doubt realise that Mr. Churchill could only contemplate this alternative being adopted in the very last resort.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Memorandum on French Note of July 13, which submits Counter-Proposals for Article 14 of the Palestine Mandate.

THE French Government make a distinction between the protectorate over Catholics in the Near East, which they themselves admit was definitely renounced at San Remo, and their traditional connection with the régime of certain Holy Places, about which they state that there is no dispute. A similar contention was put forward by them in a note transmitted to the Foreign Office with Lord Hardinge's despatch No. 372 of the 12th February. The reply to this despatch (No. 940 of the 1st April) contains the following passages:—

"The French Government make a distinction between the political privileges and the ceremonial and liturgical privileges which follow from the protectorate. Such a distinction seems to His Majesty's Government to be inadmissible and misleading. A ceremonial privilege inevitably denotes in Eastern minds a political privilege. His Majesty's Government therefore hold the French recognition of the cessation of their protectorate over Roman Catholics in Palestine and elsewhere to be absolute and complete and to cover all rights and privileges connected with it, and they cannot recognise the right of France to retain a ceremonial or liturgical precedence or other privilege of any kind in the East since the date of France's renunciation of her protectorate at San Remo. His Majesty's Government merely desire that the changed situation in the Turkey of to-day and in those territories conquered from Turkey in the recent war should be clearly recognised, and that the explicit renunciation by France of that monopoly and of these privileges, which the French Prime Minister admitted at San Remo as having had their day ('ont vécu'), should be implemented throughout the East in the spirit and the letter."

To this communication the French Government have never replied. It is true that they did not answer the contention now made, but it is clear that the view of His Majesty's Government has always been that by renouncing their protectorate the French Government renounced all claim to any official connection whatever with Catholic interests in Palestine and elsewhere in the Near East.

2. Article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres provides as follows: "The mandatory undertakes to appoint, as soon as possible, a special commission to study and regulate all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities." The French Government admit that this article consigns to the commission the duty of regulating "certain questions formerly entrusted to the authority of the French consul," but they contend that there is no idea of the commission annulling the whole of the traditional régime of the Holy Places. The view of His Majesty's Government is that the "traditional régime of the Holy Places," so far as this concerns the French Government as such, has already been annulled by their renunciation of the protectorate. So far as the rights in the Holy Places are concerned, article 13 of the mandate, to which no exception is taken, clearly entrusts their preservation to the mandatory. By this article, all responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights, is assumed by the mandatory, who will be responsible solely to the League of Nations on all matters connected therewith.

3. The only question, therefore, that arises is what are the existing rights which the mandatory has to preserve and protect. The definition of these rights is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the function of the commission referred to above. Disputes and claims can, in fact, only arise in connection with the rights, &c., in Holy Places, religious buildings and sites. Once these rights are finally determined, it is the duty of the mandatory to preserve them. Nothing in article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres indicates any intention that the commission should be a permanent body.

The new draft of article 14 does, however, provide for its reassembly in the event of the mandatory being charged with any failure to carry out the original report.

4. The French Government state that certain Holy Places have a definite juridical status, about which there can be no conflict of opinion. These places, they say, do not therefore come within the scope of the proposed commission, either in consequence of their own renunciation of their protectorate or in consequence of article 95 of the Treaty of Sévres. His Majesty's Government do not accept that there is any Holy Place in which the existing rights should not in the first place be defined by the commission. They are, however, quite prepared to give an assurance, as they did to the Italian delegation when they visited London, to the effect that the use of the words "determine existing rights" in article 14 does not imply that, in cases where these rights are fully established, and there are no conflicting claims, more is required than that the rights should be registered by the commission and included in their report to the mandatory.

5. The French Government endeavour in this note to assume in advance the functions of the commission to the extent that they give a list of examples of the Holy Places about which they say there can be no conflict. One of these examples is the Cenaculum, which is referred to as a Jewish Holy Place, of which the key is in the hands of Moslems. This site is also claimed by the Italians and by the Custodia. Even if this were not so, it is difficult to see how it can be contended that a Holy Place of one confession, of which the keys are in the hands of the representatives of another, is a site about which there can be no conflict of opinion. It is clear that no *ex parte* statement of what are disputed and what are undisputed rights can be accepted by the mandatory. Only a commission on the lines proposed by His Majesty's Government can secure an impartial decision.

6. The fresh draft of article 14 provides that the report of the commission may contain recommendations for assuring that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites are entrusted to the permanent control of suitable bodies representing the adherents of the religions concerned, this control being guaranteed by the League of Nations. His Majesty's Government cannot admit that the control even of such Holy Places as may be entrusted by the report of the commission to suitable religious bodies is the concern of any Power other than the mandatory, which is itself responsible to the League. The alleged French control over the Custodia, even if it were admitted, clearly falls, with the liturgical honours referred to above, within the category of rights arising out of the French protectorate, which has now been renounced.

7. His Majesty's Government have stated their reasons for objecting to members of the Holy Places Commission being nominated on the recommendation of the Powers or confessions concerned in their reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter of the 15th May, 1922. The relevant passage will be found in paragraph 13 of this reply. Apart from the general question of principle, the proposal that the president should be selected for nomination by the French Government could only be justified as an outcome of the renounced protectorates.

8. His Majesty's Government, in their reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter, stated that they would invite the Council of the League to appoint one of the members of the commission as its first chairman by whatever procedure commended itself to the Council. They regard this as a more satisfactory method of nomination than that proposed by the French Government, who will be able to present their own point of view when the question comes up for consideration by the council.

[E 7091/78/65]

No. 54.

M. Merry del Val to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 17.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Spanish Embassy, London, July 17, 1922.

BY your notes of the 30th June last and the 3rd instant, your Excellency was good enough to consult, through me, the Government of His Majesty the King my august Sovereign as to the text of the draft mandate for Great Britain in Palestine, with special reference to article 14 of the same.

I have transmitted to the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain the contents of both these communications and their enclosures, and have just received instructions to inform your Excellency that your projected modification of the above-mentioned article has been most sympathetically received in Madrid, but the wish to

support it encounters a difficulty in the fact of the impossibility to discover in its wording any guarantee that a Spanish member should form part of the commission, as from the last part of the first of the two notes just referred to it is easy to conclude that the representation of Governments on the commission is reserved for Great Britain, France and Italy only.

Without wishing to provoke any difficulty for an agreement, the Government of His Majesty the King my august Sovereign considers that Spain possesses a special right to obtain a representative on the projected commission in virtue of her important and century-long contributions to the upkeep of the Holy Places, by generous subsidies, which still continue to be remitted, by the privileges which in past times she has repeatedly solicited and secured from different Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, and in general by the active and beneficent interest which she has shown traditionally from time immemorial in the Holy Land and the defence of Christians in that country.

They do not, therefore, doubt that His Britannic Majesty's Government, recognising the justification of their demand, will consent to satisfy their aspirations by including a representative of Spain in the commission.

I avail, &c.

ALFONSO MERRY DEL VAL.

[E 7079/78/65]

No. 55.

Count de Salis to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 103.)

My Lord,

Palazzo Borghese, Rome, July 10, 1922.

HIS Majesty's High Commissioner in Palestine has kindly forwarded to me copy of the despatch which he has addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies respecting his audience with the Pope and his interview with Cardinal Gasparri, the Cardinal Secretary of State. I have the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship a copy of this despatch, with reference to my despatch No. 100 of the 6th July.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 55.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Churchill.

Rome, July 6, 1922.

Sir,

COUNT DE SALIS having been good enough to make the necessary arrangements, I was received this morning by His Holiness the Pope, with whom I had a lengthy conversation. His Holiness maintained a very friendly attitude, and said that he had no doubt that the known impartiality and well-tryed powers of administration of the British Government and its representatives would overcome any difficulties that might exist in Palestine and succeed in establishing peace and concord there. His Holiness had read the reply of His Majesty's Government to the League of Nations in answer to Cardinal Gasparri's despatch and regarded it as satisfactory on the whole. There were some details still to be discussed, but he considered the reply to be "tranquillisant." He expressed his gratification that such careful attention had been paid to the Cardinal's representations.

In the course of the conversation the Pope said that he well understood the special interest which the Jewish people took in Palestine. When he had lived in Milan he had studied Hebrew, and for that purpose had been in close touch with the Grand Rabbi there, for whom he had much regard. But he did not think it at all probable that the Jews would become the majority of the population of Palestine. In any case it was essential that no section of the inhabitants should receive privileges to the detriment of others.

I replied that that was far from the intention of His Majesty's Government, as had been clearly stated in the declaration of policy which had recently been published. With respect to the Holy Places, there was no point at which Christian interests and Jewish interests conflicted. The only thing that the Jews desired with respect to the Christian Holy Places was not to be concerned with any of the questions relating to them. The Palestine Administration recognised, of course, the profound interest which the whole Christian world took in the sacred sites; it fully respected that interest, and would maintain an attitude of absolute impartiality and justice with

regard to all such matters. Its impartiality had, indeed, been recognised by the representatives of all the various communities, with the unfortunate exception of Mgr. Barlassina, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. I feared that the information given to the Holy See by the Patriarch was not always correct. The Pope asked me for an instance, and I mentioned an address recently given by the Patriarch in Rome in which he made a number of general complaints against the Government of Palestine, unsupported by facts. He had been reported as having stated in particular that Catholics had been deprived of recourse to their ecclesiastical tribunals. This was not so. There had been no change whatever in that respect. I believe that there had been one particular instance in which the Patriarch held a different view from the civil legal authorities as to whether a certain stage of procedure, affecting an individual case, ought to be taken before the Civil Court of the Patriarchal Court. I was not acquainted with the technical details, and I had heard of no other points of difference. But there had been no amendment at all of the previous practice with regard to ecclesiastical tribunals generally. I believed that the Custode della Terra Santa, Father Diotallevi, did not take by any means the same attitude with regard to the administration of Palestine as had been adopted by Mgr. Barlassina.

The Pope said that he had heard of the speech to which I referred. The Patriarch had explained that what he had said had been misunderstood. The Pope would, however, be seeing him very soon and would take up the point.

I assured the Pope that the Government of Palestine would very readily examine and endeavour to remedy any grievance of which the Catholic Church might complain, and would be grateful if any such grievance were brought to its attention. His Holiness said that the Vatican would not fail to act in that sense, and again expressed his confidence that the impartiality of a British Administration would ensure peace in Palestine, which he himself was most anxious to promote.

On my leaving, the Pope presented me with a medal with his effigy. In expressing my thanks I mentioned that the Prime Minister had told me how much he had appreciated the action of the Pope in sending him his personal medal. The Pope made some very friendly observations with respect to the Prime Minister and also recalled with pleasure his acquaintance with Lord Curzon.

I subsequently went to see the Cardinal Secretary of State. Count de Salis was present at the interview.

Cardinal Gasparri was also gratified at the general sense of the British reply to his note to the League of Nations, and particularly at the recognition that article 14 in the draft mandate could not stand in its original form. On the general question of Palestine, he thought it of great importance that it should be made clear that responsibility for good administration rested with the British Government. He did not understand why the mandate referred in various places to the Palestine Administration as something separate from the mandatory, and empowered the Administration to act in certain matters apparently independently, but subject to the approval of the mandatory. I answered that this distinction was due to the very principle of the mandatory system itself, which was not equivalent to annexation, but which contemplated a gradual progress towards autonomy. The constitution of Palestine would comprise a Legislative Assembly, mainly elective, and would unite together the representatives of the mandatory Power and of the people of Palestine. The various sections of the population would be represented in the Assembly in proportion to their numbers. The Zionists had no share in the administration, and this had been made quite clear in the declaration recently published. Cardinal Gasparri agreed that that was so, but repeated that he thought it of first importance that this should be made known to all the world.

He thought that the new form of article 14 was a great improvement on the old, but that it was obscure in some particulars. Count de Salis will no doubt report to the Foreign Office if the Cardinal Secretary of State has any specific amendments to suggest. So far the terms of the British reply have not been officially communicated to the Vatican by the League of Nations.

Neither the Pope nor Cardinal Gasparri mentioned the question of the Cenacolo in the course of these conversations.

I am sending to Count de Salis a copy of this despatch.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

[E 7111/78/65]

No. 56.

Mr. Harvey to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 18.)

My dear Lord Balfour,

United States Embassy, London, July 14, 1922.

SUPPLEMENTARY to our conversation the other day, I beg to send the text of a memorandum handed by the State Department to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Washington under date of the 12th July concerning the mandate for Palestine, and an accompanying draft convention which incorporates the suggestions which my Government has made. I am sending this to your hand by means of this note, as I am loath, in the multiplicity of your labours, to ask you to grant me more of your valuable time than is absolutely necessary.

May I call to your attention in particular the proposal with respect to the maintenance of American educational institutions in Palestine? A provision of this kind in the convention respecting the mandate of Syria is extremely important, and the Secretary of State does not feel that he can well press for its incorporation into that convention unless it is also inserted in the mandate for Palestine.

I would also call attention to the use of the word "consents" in article 1 of the convention. As has been pointed out, while my Government desires to have that word used in the other conventions, it seems particularly appropriate that it should be used in the convention with respect to the mandate for Palestine, in view of the fact that my Government was not at war with Turkey, but is interested in the disposition of former Ottoman territories because of its participation in the war against Germany, which contributed to her defeat and the defeat of her allies.

I am, &c.

GEORGE HARVEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 56.

Text of Memorandum handed by the State Department to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington on July 12, 1922.

THE Department of State has received the British Chargé d'Affaires' note of the 5th July respecting the mandate for Palestine, and an accompanying draft of a proposed convention between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States regarding the Palestine mandate, which it is stated has been drawn up in consultation with the French Government.

In a memorandum of the 8th July the Department of State, in replying to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy in regard to the proposed mandates for territories in Africa, outlined the views of the Government of the United States concerning the form which it was desired that the convention should take. Certain of the considerations presented in the memorandum are also pertinent to the subject of mandates over former Turkish territory, and it is deemed to be advisable that, in so far as it is practicable, the Convention for Palestine should follow closely the form of other similar conventions respecting mandates.

Certain variations, however, are essential on account of the differences between former Turkish territory and former German territory in Africa, and because of the fact that the United States was not a signatory Power of the unratified Treaty of Sèvres.

With respect to the preamble of the draft convention, the following suggestions are submitted:—

The third paragraph should be omitted. The paragraph does not appear to be explanatory of the reasons underlying the negotiations of the proposed convention, and therefore seems to be unessential.

It is suggested that, as in the other conventions, merely the articles of the mandate and not the preamble should be recited.

A slight verbal change is suggested in the second paragraph of the preamble following the recital of the mandate.

As a substitute for the next two paragraphs, a recital similar to that suggested with reference to the purpose of the other conventions is proposed.

With regard to the articles of the draft convention, the following suggestions are submitted:—

It is considered to be advisable that articles 1 and 2 should follow the general form of the same numbered articles in the draft convention accompanying the

memorandum of the 8th July delivered to the Embassy with respect to mandates for territories in Africa.

Having in mind the importance of American educational interests in Syria and in Palestine, it is deemed to be desirable that the conventions relating to mandates for each of these territories should include a provision with regard to the maintenance of American educational philanthropic and religious institutions. A proposal is being made respecting the insertion of such a provision in a convention to be concluded with respect to the mandate for Syria. And it is presumed that the British Government will not find objectionable a provision of this character in the convention under consideration, in view of the assurances contained in His Majesty's Government's note of the 29th December last with regard to the religious and educational activities of American citizens in Palestine. The following article is proposed:—

Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals the nationals of the United States will be permitted freely to establish and maintain educational philanthropic and religious institutions in the mandate territory to receive voluntary applicants and to teach in the English language.

It is evidently intended that the last sentence of article 6 of the draft convention should deal with a contingency in which the convention shall have taken effect before the mandate has been issued. It is, of course, assumed that the mandate would not be effective before its issuance, and that the convention relating to the mandate would not sanction any action under the mandate prior to the issuance of the mandate. However, it being assumed that the British provisional administration, which is now in effect, shall continue, it is suggested that instead of the concluding sentence of article 6 a provision might be substituted with regard to the protection of American interests under such administration prior to the issuance of the mandate. Such a provision might read in substance as follows: His Britannic Majesty agrees that, in the conduct of any provisional administration of Palestine pending the formal issuance of the mandate, the rights and privileges of nationals of the United States as defined by the present convention shall be fully respected. There shall be no suspension of capitulatory rights prior to the issuance of the mandate.

Touching the mandate, reference is made to an addition to article 8 regarding the suspension of capitulatory rights in Palestine proposed in the British Government's note of the 15th May, which reads as follows: "The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection formally enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandate régime unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree or have agreed by treaty to their suspension or modification."

The provision is not free from ambiguity, and with a view to remedying it as regards matters of form solely, the following substitute is proposed:—

The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such privileges and immunities shall have previously agreed to their abandonment or to their suspension for a further period, such privileges and immunities shall immediately, upon the termination of the mandate régime, be revived, either in full or subject to such modifications, if any, as may have been agreed upon by the Powers concerned.

A copy of a draft convention embodying the suggestions submitted in the memorandum is herewith enclosed.

Enclosure 2 in No. 56.

Draft Convention between the United States of America and Great Britain regarding the Mandate for Palestine.

WHEREAS by the Treaty of Peace concluded with the Allied Powers Turkey renounces all her rights and titles over Palestine; and

Whereas article 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles provides that in the case of certain territories which, as a consequence of the late war, ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed

them, mandates should be issued, and that the terms of the mandate should be explicitly defined in each case by the Council of the League; and

Whereas the principal Allied Powers have agreed to entrust the mandate for Palestine to His Britannic Majesty; and

Whereas the terms of the same mandate have been defined by the Council of the League of Nations as follows:—

[Terms of mandate without the preamble]

And whereas the mandate in the above terms will be issued on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey; and

Whereas the United States of America by participating in the war against Germany contributed to her defeat and the defeat of her allies and to the renunciation of the rights and titles of her allies in the territory transferred by them, but has not ratified the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in the Treaty of Versailles; and

Whereas the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain desire to reach a definite understanding with regard to the rights of the two Governments and their respective nationals in Palestine:

His Britannic Majesty and the President of the United States of America have decided to conclude a convention to this effect, and have nominated as their plenipotentiaries:, who have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

Subject to the provisions of the present convention the United States consents to the administration by His Britannic Majesty, pursuant to the aforesaid mandate, of Palestine, including the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined.

ARTICLE 2.

The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 3.

Vested American property rights in the mandated territory shall be respected and in no way impaired.

ARTICLE 4.

A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the mandatory under article 24 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.

ARTICLE 5.

Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals the nationals of the United States will be permitted freely to establish and maintain educational philanthropic and religious institutions in the mandate territory to receive voluntary applicants and to teach in the English language.

ARTICLE 6.

Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate, as recited above, unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.

ARTICLE 7.

The present convention shall be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties. The ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as practicable. It shall take effect on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

His Britannic Majesty's Government agree that in the conduct of any provisional administration of Palestine pending the formal issue of the mandate the rights and privileges of American citizens, as defined by this convention, shall be fully respected. There shall be no suspension of capitulatory rights prior to the issue of the mandate.

In witness whereof

Done in duplicate at

this day of .

[E 7125/78/65]

No. 57.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 18.)

Sir,

Downing Street, July 18, 1922.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th July, 1922, transmitting a copy of a note from the Belgian Ambassador relating to the Holy Places Commission, and to state, for the information of the Earl of Balfour, that Mr. Churchill concurs in the second alternative course of action therein proposed.

I am, &c.
J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 7189/78/65]

No. 58.

The Earl of Balfour to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 199.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 19, 1922.

MY telegram No. 198 of 19th July.

The Italian attitude was doubtless partly due to the fact that we have promised them to embody in an exchange of notes, as soon as the mandate is passed by the council, the explanations and assurances regarding the Palestine and Irak mandates contained in the British counter-draft for an agreement of the 5th July.

You should immediately urge Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to authorise Italian representative on the council to withdraw Italian veto on lines suggested by Japanese representative, pointing out that his attitude is indirectly obstructing passage of Palestine mandate, which Italian Government have agreed not to oppose.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 243.)

[E 7189/78/65]

No. 59.

The Earl of Balfour to Sir M. Cheetham (Paris).

(No. 242.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 19, 1922.

MY telegram No. 241.

Please urge upon French Government as soon as possible that, in return for our support of French request that both mandates should be passed simultaneously, French Government should use their best endeavour to meet Italian objections, whether on lines suggested by Baron Ishii or otherwise.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 200.)

[E 7189/78/65]

No. 60.

*The Earl of Balfour to Sir M. Cheetham (Paris).**

(No. 241.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 19, 1922.

AT the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, 19th July, the Italian representative refused to agree to a discussion of the terms of the French mandate for Syria until his Government had obtained satisfactory assurances from the French regarding certain Italian interests as affected by the mandate.

The result was to prevent also discussion of the Palestine mandate, the treatment of which we have agreed with the French to link with that of the Syrian mandate for the purpose of the present meeting.

French representative strongly opposed the Italian proposal, pointing out that the main provisions of the draft mandate for Syria had been before the League for more than a year, and even the final text had been communicated to the Italians in June. It was only at the eleventh hour that assurances and safeguards for Italian interests were demanded. I strongly supported French representative, pointing out the long delays which had occurred in the treatment of the mandates by the council, and which

* Also to Rome, No. 198.

had already aroused protest at the Assembly. I emphasised the bad effect which the Italian attitude and the reasons for it would have on public opinion when the matter was argued at a public session of the council upon which I should certainly have to insist if further discussions of the Syrian and Palestine mandates were to be postponed from the present session. All the other members of the Council supported French representative and myself, and Japanese representative suggested that the Italian Government might follow the precedent set by Japan when similar difficulty occurred between British and Japanese Governments in connection with "C" mandates and agree to withdraw their veto, provided it was agreed that points at issue between French and Italian Governments should be settled independently by direct negotiation as soon as possible.

Finally, the Italian representative undertook to telegraph to his Government at once the views expressed by the other members of the council and enquire whether his Government could not modify their attitude sufficiently to permit the discussion and approval of both mandates at the present session.

[E 7201/78/65]

No. 61.

Sir M. Cheetham to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 385.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Paris, July 20, 1922.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 241 and 242: Italian objections to Syrian mandate.

French Ambassador in London telegraphed this morning that your Lordship and Italian Ambassador had agreed that benefits of article 18 of Palestine mandate should be guaranteed to Italy in spite of provisions of article 6 of Tripartite Agreement.

French Government have, in reply, instructed their Ambassador to make similar agreement with Italian Ambassador in London, latter having given assurances that on this condition no further objection to French mandate would be made by Marquis Imperiali.

French Government accordingly consider matter is already settled. They are, nevertheless, making fresh representations here and in London in the sense desired.

[E 7189/78/65]

No. 62.

The Earl of Balfour to M. Viviani.

(Confidential.)

Dear M. Viviani,

Foreign Office, July 22, 1922.

YOU will remember that at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on Wednesday the Marquis Imperiali made the consent of his Government to a discussion of the terms of the Syrian mandate conditional on the French Government giving the Italian Government certain assurances regarding Italian interests in Syria, and he seemed to infer that these assurances were to be on similar lines to those which the British Government were prepared to give Italy in the case of Palestine.

It may therefore be of use to you and your Government to have a draft of the memorandum which we have agreed to send to the Italian Ambassador here as soon as the terms of the Palestine mandate are approved by the council. Doubtless your Government would find little difficulty in giving analogous assurances to Italy, in so far as the difference between the terms of the Syrian and Palestine mandates permits.

I have great pleasure in accordingly sending you the enclosed copy, which I would ask you to treat as strictly confidential. I need hardly add that His Majesty's Government are prepared to give the French Government similar assurances to those which they are giving to the Italian Government, subject to reciprocity as regards article 6 of the tripartite agreement.

I avail, &c.
BALFOUR.

Enclosure in No. 62.

Draft of Memorandum for Communication to Italian Ambassador respecting Palestine.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that nothing will be done in establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine which might prejudice the civil or religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

2. Article 11 of the draft mandate for Palestine is not intended to preclude the participation of Italian enterprise in public works, services and utilities and in the development of the national resources of the country so far as those matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. In the event of such participation, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared favourably to consider a special arrangement being negotiated with the Italian Government to regulate the conditions of such Italian labour as might consequently be admitted into Palestine.

3. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that, under the constitutional proposals that are now under consideration for Palestine, His Britannic Majesty's Government have included provisions in virtue of which foreign nationals, including, of course, Italian citizens, should have the right to be tried by a court with a majority of British judges, except in trivial cases in which these provisions would lead to administrative inconvenience, and that in this case foreign nationals would have the special right to appeal to a court composed with a majority of British judges.

4. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that the use of the word "maintain" in article 15 of the draft mandate was not intended to restrict the opening of new Italian schools or to restrict the right of such schools to admit pupils of another community.

5. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that the second clause of article 16 of the draft mandate is intended to show that the supervision of the mandatory will be strictly limited to that required for the maintenance of public order and good government. They add that there is no intention of permitting any arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of any religious community.

6. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that in the event of the Italian economical zone in Asia Minor materialising, and in the event of any customs arrangement being concluded with the French Government in respect of sea-borne commerce between Palestine and Syria, His Britannic Majesty's Government would give a favourable consideration to any proposals for a similar arrangement to be entered into with the Italian Government in respect of sea-borne traffic between Palestine, on the one hand, and the Italian economic zone and Rhodes on the other.

7. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that consignments imported for the use of Italian schools, orphanages, asylums, hospitals and dispensaries in Palestine should be admitted free of duty. Consignments addressed to other institutions, such as hospices, wine industries, printing-presses, book-binding establishments, &c., would, however, be chargeable with full import duties. Consignments intended for the use of places of worship, monastic orders (not engaged in any form of trade, profession or commerce) would be admitted free of duty. Goods intended for the personal use of all members of any ecclesiastical institutions would be admitted free only up to a limited sum. It is clearly understood that these privileges are only accorded so far as and so long as their terms are strictly adhered to in the letter and in the spirit.

8. The intention of the new draft of article 14 of the mandate for Palestine, as amplified by the explanations given to the Council of the League of Nations in the note sent by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the council on the 1st July in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter of the 15th May, 1922, is to ensure that the well-known Catholic interests in the Holy Places of Palestine, as indeed the interests of all confessions, should be completely guaranteed and adequately safeguarded in perpetuity.

In the view of His Britannic Majesty's Government, the use of the words "determine existing rights" in the new draft of article 14 does not imply that in cases where these rights are clearly established and there are no conflicting claims more is required than that such rights should be registered by the commission and included in their report to the mandatory.

9. His Britannic Majesty's Government agree that article 18 of the Palestine mandate shall be regarded as applying to Italy, notwithstanding the provisions of article 6 of the tripartite agreement of the 10th August, 1920.

Irak.

In view of the fact that the Irak mandate is not at the present under discussion, and that the political conditions in Irak and Palestine are not exactly similar, His Britannic Majesty's Government give to the Italian Government the general assurances that, so far as the different conditions of Irak will permit, His Britannic Majesty's Government will ensure that Italian interests in Irak will be safeguarded on similar lines to those now suggested for Palestine.

Foreign Office, July 19, 1922.

[E 7343/78/65]

No. 63.

Sir R. Graham to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 674.)

My Lord,

Rome, July 21, 1922.

OWING to the Ministerial crisis I was unable to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday in order to make representations to him in the terms of your Lordship's telegrams Nos. 198 and 199 on the subject of the Syrian and Palestine mandates. But I wrote an urgent letter to him pressing him to send instructions to the Italian representative at the Council of the League of Nations in the sense desired by your Lordship, and this morning his Excellency was good enough to receive me.

Signor Schanzer said that it would be grossly unfair to accuse the Italian Government of holding up the mandates. All that they had asked from the French was a recognition of Italian interests in Syria on exactly the same lines that we had already accepted for Palestine. This the French might, without any difficulty, have conceded at once.

I said that I understood that the Italian Government had had the draft mandate for Syria before them for a year, and that the final text had been communicated to them in June. They might, therefore, have put forward their proposals at an earlier date and not have waited till the moment of the actual discussion at the meeting of the Council of the League. Signor Schanzer assured me that the final text of the Syria mandate had only been communicated to the Italian Government three days before the meeting of the council. He was bound, in Italian interests, to formulate certain reserves.

As it was, in deference to our wishes, he had sent immediate instructions to the Italian representative on the council either to obtain the French agreement to the Italian proposals or, failing that, to withdraw his veto, provided that the French gave an assurance that they would negotiate later on the points on which the Italian Government formulated reserves. His Excellency repeated again that absolutely all that the Italians asked for were the same privileges that we had granted in Palestine.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

[E 7459/78/65]

No. 64.

*Provisional Minutes, Thirteenth Meeting (Public), held at 3 o'clock on July 24, 1922.
—(Communicated by Cabinet Offices; received July 26.)*

(All the representatives of the members of the Council and the Secretary-General were present.)

(C.P. 4125. Confidential.)

737. The Mandates for Syria and Palestine.

M. Viviani thanked the British Government for its welcome, and paid a tribute to Lord Balfour for the way in which he had, in a moral sense, directed their discussions. He said he wished, in addressing the representatives of the press of the world, to remove a misunderstanding. It was a mistake to reproach the council on the ground that it withdrew from the publicity which was necessary. It was in practice essential to distinguish between the secret diplomacy which was a crime, and the discretion which was necessary in diplomatic procedure. The members of the council were not

always in agreement, as was only natural in representatives of free peoples. Prudence was therefore necessary; and it was not dangerous, as sooner or later the council had to give an account of its proceedings.

It was a great day for the League of Nations on which, after having already accomplished such great tasks, it completed the application in practice of the principle of the mandates. When the war came to an end the Great Powers had not wished, as in the past, violently to annex territories and to oppress their inhabitants. The mandatory would take the inhabitants under its protection; it would administer the territories in the interests of all; and it would be responsible to the council and the assembly until these young peoples were able to conduct their affairs without further assistance.

France had considered, and Great Britain agreed, that the mandates for Syria and Palestine should be taken together. Negotiations concerning the Syrian mandate were proceeding between the Italian and French Governments similar to those which had taken place between the Italian and British Governments for Palestine. The political crisis in Italy which had just occurred might delay the negotiations, but it might be taken for granted that an agreement would be reached before long.

The League of Nations had made in less than three years considerable progress. Its committees were at work, the Brussels Conference had enunciated useful economic and financial principles, the Court of Justice had been set up, the question of Upper Silesia had been peacefully settled. All this work had been accomplished in a situation which was without precedent in history.

Lord Balfour wished to endorse what M. Viviani had said concerning the work of the League. The League had been in existence for only a short while, but it had already done a great work, which he found was too often ignored by the public.

Passing to the particular business for which the present Council of the League had been called, Lord Balfour said that the mandate for Palestine was settled so far as the League of Nations was concerned. It had been agreed that the mandate for Palestine and the mandate for Syria should go together. The solidarity of the two mandates, which had been urged by the French Government at a previous meeting of the council in Paris, was recognised by the British Government. He did not think there was likely to be any disagreement or difficulty between the French and Italian Governments in settling the points which were under discussion between them with regard to the Syrian mandate. In any event the difficulty and delay which had arisen in connection with the Syrian mandate owing to the political crisis in Italy would have no effect on the policy or application of the mandates as a whole. So far as the Council of the League of Nations was concerned, the long period of delay in defining and approving the mandates was now at an end, and neither the council nor the assembly would again be required to consider them.

There were two parts to the Palestine mandate. One was concerned with Palestine and its inhabitants, the other was concerned with the Holy Places. Concerning the Holy Places there would be further discussion. Long historical controversies were involved in the consideration of this part of the mandate which necessarily required careful and jealous consideration. Article 14, as contained in the mandate, gives security that the policy favoured by the British Government would be fully carried out. The British Government only desired to administer historic justice as between the communities concerned. There was no desire to deprive any community of its ancient rights or to ignore any of the religious interests involved.

There had also been controversies with regard to the part of the mandate which concerned Palestine itself, and these controversies had been encouraged by the long delay in settling the mandates. It had been represented that the interests of the Arabs were not sufficiently safeguarded, but the most anxious attention had been paid to the position and interests of the Arab populations by the British Government, and there was no wish or intention that the provision of a Jewish home in Palestine should in any way injure the best interests of the Arabs. Every precaution had been taken that the provision of a Jewish home should not encroach upon the interests or susceptibilities of any section of the population. The material prosperity and moral interests of all the people concerned could not fail to be advanced by the course which the British Government intended to pursue. He would address an earnest appeal to all parties. Discussion and dispute had been inevitable and legitimate while the scheme was under construction, but now that the mandate was settled it would be a great crime for any one in any way to attempt to feed animosities in Palestine and all over the world by emphasising the racial, religious and historical divergencies which had been revealed in the course of the negotiations.

The British Government, as the mandatory Power, would firmly pursue the policy which it had publicly advocated.

Lord Balfour, in conclusion, thanked M. Viviani for his references to the hospitality of the British Government. The British people were proud to have the Council of the League in their midst, and he felt that on this occasion it could be claimed for the council that it had not fallen behind a tradition which, though short, was one of permanent and fruitful achievement.

The Marquis Imperiali thought it his duty to define the point of view of the Italian Government in order to avoid misunderstanding. The Italian Government had always thought that the "A" mandates should be based on the Treaty of Sèvres, out of which they had arisen. This also had been the opinion of the second assembly. For some time nothing has been done in this matter, as it was necessary to leave the Governments time to negotiate with the United States. In May 1922 the Italian Government had asked the British Government for certain assurances with regard to the mandate for Palestine. The same request had just been addressed to the French Government with regard to the Syrian mandate. This request was at the present moment the subject of negotiation. It might be taken for granted that a satisfactory agreement would soon be reached, which would allow the mandate for Syria to enter automatically into force.

As the representative of a Catholic country he attached the greatest importance to a settlement of the questions relating to the Holy Places mentioned in article 14 of the mandate for Palestine. It was essential that an agreement should be reached between the members of the council before the next session of the assembly. In conclusion, he desired to pay a tribute to Lord Balfour and to congratulate him in the name of the council on his 75th birthday.

The President read the following declaration:—

"In view of the declarations which have just been made, and of the agreement reached by all the members of the council, the articles of the mandates for Palestine and Syria are approved. The mandates will enter into force, automatically and at the same time, as soon as the Governments of France and Italy have notified the President of the Council of the League of Nations that they have reached an agreement on certain particular points in regard to the latter of these mandates.

"The present negotiations will be resumed at Geneva on the 30th August, before the meeting of the next assembly, expressly to solve the questions submitted for its decision under article 14 of the mandate for Palestine."

The council approved this declaration.

738. Close of the Session.

The President emphasised the importance of the work accomplished during the present session. He joined his colleagues in the tribute and in the congratulations which had been addressed to Lord Balfour.

He reminded the council that in principle it should, as far as possible, hold its meetings at Geneva, but useful exceptions might be made to this rule. Meetings held occasionally elsewhere than at Geneva enabled the council to come into direct contact with public opinion and with the press.

[E 7356/178/65]

No. 65.

The Earl of Balfour to Count de Salis (Vatican Mission).

(No. 160.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 26, 1922.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 105 of the 17th July regarding article 14 of the Palestine mandate, I have to inform you that at the meetings of the Council of the League of Nations the question of article 14 of the Palestine mandate was the subject of considerable discussion.

2. M. Viviani, the French representative, pressed for a permanent commission with apparently wider functions than His Majesty's Government had suggested, and in which more explicit provision should be made for the representation of Catholic interests. He also dwelt on the traditional connection of France with the Christian Holy Places

without actually raising the question of the French chairmanship. I explained the British attitude and intentions with regard to the commission as already set forth in the article itself and in paragraphs 11 and 13 of His Majesty's Government's note to the Council of the League of the 1st July in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter of the 15th May to the council. It was not, however, possible to secure agreement in view of the French attitude, and, in order to avoid a further suspension of the council's approval of the whole mandate, it became necessary to substitute a shorter draft of article 14, a copy of which is enclosed, whereby the method of nomination, the composition and the functions of commission are to be submitted to the Council of the League for approval, and the commission is not to enter upon its functions until such approval has been given.

3. I am anxious to avoid giving the Vatican the impression that in finding themselves forced to agree to adopt this procedure His Majesty's Government had any intention of going back on the general policy regarding the commission which is set forth in paragraphs 11 and 13 of the above-mentioned note of His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League, and I therefore instructed you in my telegram No. 15 of the 25th July to reassure Cardinal Gasparri on this point.

4. As regards the composition of the commission and the name of M. Van den Heuvel suggested by the Cardinal Secretary of State, His Majesty's Government can hardly express an opinion until the Council of the League have decided the method of nomination of the commission and the main lines of its composition.

I am, &c.

BALFOUR.

Enclosure in No. 65.

PALESTINE.

New Article 14 of Mandate as approved by the Council of the League on July 22, 1922.

A SPECIAL commission shall be appointed by the mandatory to study and define the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions until approved by the council.

[E 7343/78/65]

No. 66.

The Earl of Balfour to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 208.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 28, 1922.

YOUR despatch No. 674 of 21st July: Italy and Syrian mandate.

French Ambassador here complains that assurances demanded by Italian Ambassador in Paris exceed in scope those which we are willing to give Italy as regards Palestine. For example, from information given by M. Grout, Italy apparently asks (a) for trial of Italians in Syria by bench wholly composed of French judges, whereas our analogous assurance referred only to majority of British judges, (b) for some more explicit promise as regards concessions for public works, &c., and immigration of Italian labour, and (c) for wider assurance as regards position of Italian nationals.

Since Italian veto was not withdrawn, as apparently promised by Signor Schanzer, and since it is clearly indefensible further to delay entry into force of mandates, you should press Italian Foreign Office to confine their demands at Paris to those made to us (see your despatch No. 674, paragraphs 2 and 4), and to conclude their negotiations as soon as possible.

[E 7314/78/65]

No. 67.

The Earl of Balfour to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 247.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1922.

MY despatch No. 1890 of 21st June: "A" mandates.

Negotiations are still continuing with the United States Government regarding the conventions according United States nationals the same rights as are given by the Palestine and "B" mandates to States members of the League of Nations and their nationals. Agreement has practically been reached as regards operative clauses of these conventions except on one important point, and except as regards preambles, where United States proposals still differ considerably from ours.

As you are aware, we have hitherto co-operated with the French Government in the drafting of these conventions, and, on the assumption that they reciprocate our wish to continue such co-operation; point has been reached where it would be desirable to have a joint consultation before negotiations with United States Government are carried further. Please ascertain therefore whether French Government share our view, and, if so, whether and when M. Fromageot could conveniently come over here for a discussion with Sir C. Hurst.

[E 7568/78/65]

No. 68.

Mr. Chilton to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 859.)

My Lord,

Washington, July 18, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 840 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the memorandum addressed by the State Department to the French Ambassador on the subject of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon.

I have, &c.

H. G. CHILTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 68.

Memorandum respecting the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon.

THE Department of State has received from the American Ambassador at Paris a note of the 29th June, addressed to him by the French Government with respect to the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, with an accompanying draft convention between the United States and France regarding that mandate.

In a memorandum of the 8th July respecting the French mandates for Togoland and the Cameroons, the Department of State outlined the views of the Government of the United States concerning the form which it was desirable that conventions relative to these mandates should take. Certain of the considerations presented in the memorandum are also pertinent to the subject of mandates over former Turkish territory, and it is deemed to be advisable that in so far as it is practicable, the convention for Syria and the Lebanon should follow closely the form of the other similar conventions respecting mandates.

Certain variations, however, are essential on account of the differences between former Turkish territory and former German territory in Africa and because of the fact that the United States was not a signatory Power of the unratified Treaty of Sèvres.

With respect to the preamble of the draft convention submitted by the French Government, it is suggested that, as in the other conventions, merely the articles of the mandate and not the preamble should be recited.

In the second paragraph following the recital of the preamble the word "encore" should be eliminated.

As a substitute for the next two paragraphs, a recital similar to that suggested with reference to the purpose of the other conventions discussed in the memorandum of the 8th July is proposed.

[9941]

With regard to the articles of the draft convention, the following suggestions are submitted:—

It is considered to be advisable that articles 1 and 2 should follow the general form of the same numbered articles in the draft convention discussed in the memorandum of the 8th July, delivered to the Embassy with respect to mandates for territories in Africa.

Having in mind the importance of American educational interests in Syria and in Palestine, it is deemed to be desirable that the conventions relating to mandates for each of these territories should include a provision with regard to the maintenance of American educational, philanthropic and religious institutions. A proposal is being made respecting the insertion of such a provision in a convention to be concluded with respect to the mandate for Palestine. And it is presumed that the French Government will not find objectionable a provision of this character in the convention under consideration. The following article is proposed:—

"Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the nationals of the United States will be permitted freely to establish and maintain educational, philanthropic and religious institutions in the mandate territory, to receive voluntary applicants, and to teach in the English language."

It is evidently intended that the last sentence of article 6 of the draft convention should deal with a contingency in which the convention shall have taken effect before the mandate has been issued. It is, of course, assumed that the mandate would not be effective before its issuance, and that the convention relating to the mandate would not sanction any action under the mandate prior to the issuance of the mandate. However, it being assumed that the French provisional administration which is now in effect shall continue, it is suggested that, instead of the concluding sentence of article 6, a provision might be substituted with regard to the protection of American interests under such administration, prior to the issuance of the mandate. Such a provision might read in substance as follows:—

"The Government of the French Republic agrees that in the conduct of any provisional administration of Syria and the Lebanon pending the formal issuance of the mandate, the rights and privileges of nationals of the United States as defined by the present convention shall be fully respected. There shall be no suspension of capitulatory rights prior to the issuance of the mandate."

With respect to the mandate it may be pointed out that the communication of the 29th June to the American Ambassador at Paris affords the Government of the United States the first opportunity it has had of learning the views of the French Government with regard to the suggestions contained in the memorandum presented to the French Foreign Office in August last relating to the provisions of certain mandates, including the proposed mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. The following suggestions respecting the terms of the mandate are offered:—

The first sentence of article 5 and the second paragraph of article 18 relate to the suspension of capitulatory rights in Syria and the Lebanon. As a substitute for these, the adoption of the following provisions, which the Government of the United States, after an exchange of views with the British Government, has proposed with respect to the mandate for Palestine, is suggested:—

"The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but, unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such privileges and immunities shall have previously agreed to their abandonment or to their suspension for a further period, such privileges and immunities shall, immediately upon the termination of the mandate régime, be revived either in full or subject to such modification, if any, as may have been agreed upon by the Powers concerned."

The second sentence of article 5 of the mandate, which relates to the maintenance of consular courts pending the reorganisation of the judicial system in Syria and the Lebanon, should be retained.

In view of the fact that the Governments of the United States, France and Great Britain have in mind similar purposes with respect to the subject of the suspension and revival of capitulatory rights, it would seem that there should be no difficulty in

reaching an agreement with regard to the revisions suggested above, which, it is believed, clearly express the common purpose.

The consent of this Government to the suspension of capitulatory rights in Palestine was given upon the receipt of assurances from the British Government that appropriate provisions would be embodied in the constitution of Palestine regarding the establishment of adequate courts, and that American citizens would have the right to be tried by a court with a majority of British judges, except in trivial cases, in which such a procedure would lead to administrative inconvenience. In such cases nationals of the United States will have the special right to appeal to a court composed of a majority of British judges. It is presumed that the French Government will not object to giving assurances that American citizens in Syria and the Lebanon will be accorded privileges corresponding to those granted by the British Government in Palestine.

Certain alterations have been made in article 11 of the draft mandate which the Government of the United States previously received from the French Government. In order that the provision of this article respecting monopolies and concessions should conform to stipulations already agreed upon in the case of mandates for African territory, it is suggested that the following statement be inserted to replace the two concluding sentences in the above-mentioned article:—

"Concessions having the character of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This provision does not affect the right of the mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory under mandate and in order to provide the territory with fiscal resources which seem best suited to the local requirements; or, in certain cases, to carry out the development of natural resources, either directly by the State or by a controlled agency, provided that there shall result therefrom no monopoly of the natural resources for the benefit of the mandatory or its nationals, directly or indirectly, or any preferential advantage which shall be inconsistent with the economic, commercial and industrial equality hereinbefore guaranteed."

Finally, it is suggested that the mandate should contain a provision, *mutatis mutandis*, similar to that of article 28 of the mandate for Palestine, in so far as the article relates to the honouring of financial obligations in the event of the termination of the mandate.

A copy of the draft convention embodying suggestions submitted in this memorandum is herewith enclosed.

Enclosure 2 in No. 68.

Draft Convention between the United States of America and France regarding the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon.

WHEREAS by the treaty of peace concluded with the Allied Powers, Turkey renounces all her rights and titles over Syria and the Lebanon; and

Whereas article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles provides that in the case of certain territories which as consequence of the late war ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, mandates should be issued and that the terms of the mandate should be explicitly defined in each case by the Council of the League; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed to entrust the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon to France; and

Whereas the terms of the said mandate have been defined by the Council of the League of Nations as follows:—

(Terms of mandate without the preamble), and

Whereas the mandate in the above terms will be issued on the coming into force of the treaty of peace with Turkey; and

Whereas the United States of America by participating in the war against Germany contributed to her defeat and the defeat of her allies and to the renunciation of the rights and titles of her allies in the territory transferred by them, but has not ratified the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in the Treaty of Versailles; and

Whereas the Government of the United States and the Government of France desire to reach a definite understanding with regard to the rights of the two Governments and their respective nationals in Syria and the Lebanon:

The President of the French Republic and the President of the United States of America have decided to conclude a convention to this effect, and have nominated as their plenipotentiaries—

who have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

Subject to the provisions of the present convention, the United States consents to the administration by the French Republic, pursuant to the aforesaid mandate, of Syria and the Lebanon.

ARTICLE 2.

The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 3.

Vested American property rights in the mandated territory shall be respected and in no way impaired.

ARTICLE 4.

A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the mandatory under article 17 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.

ARTICLE 5.

Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the nationals of the United States will be permitted freely to establish and maintain educational, philanthropic and religious institutions in the mandated territory, to receive voluntary applicants, and to teach in the English language.

ARTICLE 6.

Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate as recited above, unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.

ARTICLE 7.

The present convention shall be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Paris as soon as practicable. It shall take effect on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

The Government of the French Republic agree that in the conduct of any provisional administration of Syria and the Lebanon pending the formal issue of the mandate, the rights and privileges of American citizens, as defined by this convention, shall be fully respected. There shall be no suspension of capitulatory rights prior to the issue of the mandate.

In witness whereof

Done in duplicate at _____, this _____ day of _____

[E 7675/78/65]

No. 69.

Sir R. Graham to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 242.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 208.

Rome, August 1, 1922.

Lengthy and detailed reply to my representations (translation by post) states that Italian Government has not asked and does not intend to ask of French Government any more than His Majesty's Government have accepted for Palestine; that, being ready to withdraw its veto as soon as French Government concedes its demands, it

cannot properly be taxed with delaying mandate; that French Government have informed Italian Ambassador at Paris that they intend to consider their assurances to Italian Government about Syria only applicable if similar assurances are given to Italy by His Majesty's Government about Mesopotamia; that Italian Government does not see how French Government can justify this condition in respect of Mesopotamia mandate, which is still awaiting discussion; and that French proposal, being unreasonable and unacceptable to Italian Government, must delay Syrian and Palestine mandates. Italian Government asked His Majesty's Government to consider whether it would not be desirable to point out to French Government prejudice which must ensue to common interests if latter insist on this unjustifiable condition, which Italian Government would be obliged to absolutely refuse.

[E 7111/78/65]

No. 70.

The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Harvey.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, August 2, 1922.

WITH reference to your note of the 14th July, I have the honour to inform you that the memorandum of the State Department of the 12th July regarding the convention between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government on the subject of the Palestine mandate is being carefully examined by the departments concerned, and I hope shortly to be in a position to submit to your Excellency a counterdraft of the convention based on the State Department's draft.

2. It seems, however, to His Majesty's Government important that the analogous conventions which the French Government are negotiating with your Government regarding the French mandated territories should be, as far as possible, identical in form and substance with the Anglo-American conventions, and I am therefore anxious, in the first instance, to consult the French Government on certain points.

3. Meanwhile the final and formal approval of the terms of the Syrian and Palestine mandates by the Council of the League at their last session renders it desirable that I should offer at once the following explanation regarding article 8 of the Palestine mandate: In the State Department's memorandum, an alternative text to that given in my note of the 15th May is suggested in order to make clearer the precise intention of this article. During the recent discussions at the Council of the League, His Majesty's Government learnt that the relevant sentences of the corresponding article (No. 5) in the Syrian mandate had been carefully prepared by the French Government to meet the wishes of the United States Government, who had agreed to accept it; and that the wording of these sentences was identical with the alternative text now suggested by the State Department for article 8 of the Palestine mandate, except for the substitution of the words "shall not be applicable" for the words "are suspended." In pursuance, therefore, of their consistent policy of keeping the texts of the "A" mandates as far as possible identical, His Majesty's Government invited the Council of the League to adopt for article 5 of the Palestine mandate the wording of the corresponding sentences of article 5 of the Syrian mandate. A copy of article 5 of the Palestine mandate as finally approved by the council is enclosed herein.

I have, &c.

BALFOUR.

[E 7675/78/65]

No. 71.

The Earl of Balfour to Sir M. Cheetham (Paris).

(No. 257.)

(Telegraphic.)

[By Bag.]

Foreign Office, August 4, 1922.

SIR R. GRAHAM'S telegram No. 242 of 1st August: Palestine and Syria mandates.

Please ascertain present position from French Government. If the French Government are really refusing to give these assurances to Italy until we give Italy similar ones as regards Irak, you should point out that we have already offered the Italians a general assurance in a sense satisfactory to them that, "so far as the different conditions of Irak will permit, His Majesty's Government will ensure that Italian interests in Irak will be safeguarded on similar lines to those now suggested for Palestine" (see

my despatch No. 2341 of 26th July). This general assurance is to be elaborated in an exchange of notes before the Irak mandate comes before the council, and the notes are to be exchanged as soon as the council shall have approved the mandate. Such elaboration cannot take place at present while precise terms of Irak mandate are undetermined. French Government may therefore rest assured that Irak mandate cannot be passed until Italy has received assurances on similar lines as regards Irak. Such assurances would, of course, be extended to France as in the case of Palestine.

You should, at the same time, remind French Government that it was jointly agreed that Palestine and Syria mandates should be dealt with together at the council, and independently of the Irak mandate, negotiations with United States making it impossible to proceed at present with the latter.

In the circumstances, I am unable to believe that French Government will now link question of Irak mandate with Palestine and Syria mandates, and thereby further delay the entry into force of the latter mandates of which, by their joint efforts, His Majesty's Government and the French Government have just obtained the approval of the Council of the League.

[E 7055/78/65]

No. 72.

The Earl of Balfour to Count de Saint-Aulaire

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, August 5, 1922.

HIS Majesty's Government have carefully considered the note which you addressed to me on the 14th July regarding article 14 of the Palestine mandate.

2. Since its receipt, however, the Council of the League of Nations has, as your Excellency is aware, examined the text of this article as proposed by His Majesty's Government, and has heard the statements of the points of view of the French and British representatives on the council on this subject. As a result, a new text was substituted in the mandate, prior to the final definition of the terms of the latter by the council, and this text provides that the method of nomination, the composition and the functions of the Commission for the Holy Places are to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval, and that the commission shall not enter on its functions until that approval has been given.

3. Without desiring, therefore, to prejudice in any way the discussions on this subject which will in due course be renewed by the Council of the League and the eventual decisions to be taken as a result of such discussions, I desire briefly to re-state the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this matter as defined in the two texts of article 14 of the mandate, suggested by them, and in paragraphs 10 to 14 of their note to the Council of the League of the 10th July in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter to the council of the 15th May. At the same time, I wish to dispel certain misapprehensions regarding their attitude, the existence of which seems apparent from your note under reply.

4. The view of His Majesty's Government was and is that, in accordance with article 13 of the mandate, they are alone responsible for preserving and protecting existing rights in connection with the Holy Places and sites in Palestine, as well as for maintaining public order and decorum.

5. For this purpose it is essential that disputes and claims relating to the existing rights should in the first instance be settled by some impartial tribunal. Such a tribunal was provided for in article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres. His Majesty's Government were aware that this article described the main functions of the commission as the settlement of "all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities," but such questions and claims would, in fact, only arise in connection with the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites. In these circumstances the first draft of article 14 of the mandate, as submitted to the Council of the League in December 1920, and informally accepted by the French Government before such submission, in substance reproduced article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres. At the same time it imposed on the commission the duty of ensuring that certain Holy Places, religious buildings and sites, regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion, should be entrusted to the control of the adherents of the religion concerned. His Majesty's Government never intended that the commission suggested in the original draft of article 14 should be permanent, and there was nothing in article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres which indicated a permanent commission.

6. When the draft mandate came to be considered by the Council of the League, criticism was raised by the Vatican and in certain other quarters of the want of pre-

cision shown in the article as to the functions of the commission and its relation to the mandatory and to the Council of the League. Article 14 was, therefore, recast by His Majesty's Government in such a way as clearly to lay down that the main function of the commission was the definition of the existing rights which the mandatory was to preserve and protect. This definition, when approved by the Council of the League, was to be binding on the mandatory. While in one sense the commission was not to be permanent, provision was made for its reassembly should any community in Palestine feel that the mandatory was not carrying out the original report of the commission as approved by the council. There was, however, never any intention on the part of His Majesty's Government of changing the *status quo* in the case of any established rights, still less in the case of established rights, which no one disputes. In the view of His Majesty's Government, the commission would in its report merely register such rights. At the same time a discretionary power, instead of a duty as in the original article 14, was left to the commission to recommend that the control of certain shrines should be entrusted to the adherents of certain religions.

7. The question of the chairmanship of the commission was also the subject of controversy. Article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres and the original article 14 of the mandate provided for the appointment of the chairman of the commission by the Council of the League. It became clear, however, to His Majesty's Government that the proposed permanent tenure of the chairmanship by one individual was giving rise to jealousy and friction, which it was essential to avoid. Without, therefore, departing from the principle of appointment by the Council of the League, His Majesty's Government suggested in the final text of article 14, and in paragraph 11 of their letter of the 1st July to the council, that the chairmanship should be held in rotation by the members of the commission, the first chairman being appointed by the council under whatever arrangements seem best to that body.

8. It will thus be seen that in substance the final text of article 14 of the mandate was consistent with, and involved no departure from, the terms of the original draft of article 14 accepted by the French Government or of article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres. The later text was simply adopted to remove the misapprehensions entertained in certain quarters as to the scope and purpose of the earlier text as understood by His Majesty's Government.

9. Lastly, criticism was raised with regard to His Majesty's Government's proposals for constituting the commission. His Majesty's Government had at first considered the appointment of a judicial commission composed of experts in the ecclesiastical law of the three great religions, which would have been the most competent to decide on the legal merits of each case what were the existing rights, and this plan has undoubtedly much to recommend it. Article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres had indicated, however, that the religious interests concerned were to be taken into account in forming the commission, a view also entertained by those most concerned in the question. These considerations, and the assumption by the commission of the function of recommending at their discretion the permanent control of certain shrines by suitable religious bodies, seemed to call for a commission, constituted rather differently from a judicial body, a commission upon which not only the great Powers interested in Palestine, but especially the three great religions concerned, should not be without representation.

10. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government not only provided in the later text of article 14 for the approval by the Council of the League of all appointments to membership of the commission, although article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres had left such appointments solely to the mandatory, but they also offered suggestions for selecting by international machinery the members of the commission with a view to secure impartiality while avoiding the direct intervention of the Governments and communities concerned. These suggestions were set forth in paragraphs Nos. 11 and 13 of His Majesty's Government's above-mentioned note of the 1st July to the council.

11. The commission proposed by the French Government differs widely from that suggested by His Majesty's Government as regards its functions, and consequently as regards its membership. If His Majesty's Government rightly understand the French proposals, certain sanctuaries, held in veneration by one or more religious groups, should not be confused with the "Holy Places," and should be regarded in advance as outside the competence of the commission, as being the subject of no dispute. On the other hand, the three Christian Holy Places, the Church of the Sepulchre and its dependencies, the Grotto of the Nativity at Bethlehem and the Basilica, as being "mixed sanctuaries," in which several of the

Christian confessions worship, and where disputes as to their rights arise, should alone be regarded as falling properly within the purview of the commission. Further, these sanctuaries are extra-territorial, and their traditional status should only be modified by the consent of all those concerned. The commission should therefore be permanent, and composed in such a way as to represent all the interested parties and to mark the international character of the Holy Places. Its task would be to conciliate and arbitrate between the various rites and confessions and to safeguard and interpret the customs and traditions representing the *status quo*. Its president would be nominated by the mandatory on the presentation of the French Government, and various other Governments would present the names of the other members of the commission for nomination by the mandatory.

12. I would point out, in the first place, that His Majesty's Government have never regarded the term "Holy Places, religious buildings and sites" in article 13 of the mandate as synonymous with the three Christian Holy Places, and they are unable to accept any *ex parte* statement as to which of these places, buildings and sites is the subject of no dispute. They note, for instance, that the French list in itself includes as a Jewish Holy Place the tomb of David at the Cœnaculum, the key of which is in the hands of the Moslems of Nebi Daud. Quite apart from the well-known claim of the King of Italy and of the Custodia to the site of the Cœnaculum, it is difficult to see how it can be contended that the Holy Place of one confession, of which the keys are in the hands of the representatives of another, is a site about which there can be no conflict of opinion. In the view of His Majesty's Government, existing rights should, if not disputed, be merely registered by the commission, but it will be for the commission itself to decide what are or are not disputed rights.

13. It will thus be for the commission to define the rights of worship, &c., existing in connection with the three great Christian Holy Places cited in your note, in the same way as they would define the rights in any other Holy Place, religious building or site in Palestine, whether Christian, Moslem or Jew. After such definition has been approved by the Council of the League, it will be for the mandatory to enforce their award and for the commission to reassemble if it be felt that their award is not being enforced or if new subjects of controversy should arise. Doubtless the commission will find that the status of the Custodia with regard to the supervision of the three Christian shrines is not disputed.

14. The French Government's position with regard to the Custodia and these Holy Places is, however, on a different footing. His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot recognise the claims of the French Government or their representative in Palestine either to continue to protect the Custodia or to receive honours or a ceremonial or liturgical precedence as part of such protection. Such claims, in the view of His Majesty's Government, fall with the renunciation by the French Government at San Remo in April 1920 of the protectorate over Roman Catholics in the East, and this renunciation must be regarded as having definitely modified the traditional régime of the three Christian Holy Places so far as such a régime involved the position of the French Government and its consular representative in Palestine. The reasons for this view have been already fully explained to the French Government in Lord Hardinge's note to M. Poincaré of the 5th April last. It equally follows that His Majesty's Government could not recognise the French Government's suggestion that a French national should obtain the permanent presidency of the commission.

15. For the rest, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to admit that these three Christian Holy Places are extra-territorial and not subject to the general control and protection of His Majesty's Government as mandatory of the country. They would remind the French Government that, even under the Turkish régime, Turkish troops were responsible for the actual maintenance of order in the precincts of the Holy Places, and such foreign intervention as the Turkish Government admitted derived from the capitulatory régime, its customs and its privileges, which, under article 8 of the mandate, and apart from the French Government's renunciation at San Remo, are no longer applicable in Palestine. In any case, under article 13 of the mandate His Majesty's Government as mandatory assumes a responsibility for the preservation of existing rights and the maintenance of order which they could not transfer to the representatives of any foreign Government or any international commission.

I have, &c.
BALFOUR.

[E 7900/78/65]

No. 73.

Sir M. Cheetham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 1865.)

SIR MILNE CHEETHAM presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the Palestine and Syrian mandates.

Paris, August 8, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 73.

M. Poincaré to Sir M. Cheetham.

EN réponse à la démarche verbale effectuée cette après-midi par l'Ambassade britannique au Ministère des Affaires étrangères, pour connaître le point de vue du Gouvernement français relatif au parallélisme qui doit, dans son opinion, exister entre les avantages consentis à l'Italie en Syrie et en Mésopotamie, M. Poincaré a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Sir Milne Cheetham les indications suivantes :

Ainsi que le rappelle le dernier paragraphe de l'arrangement intervenu entre les Gouvernements italien et britannique, la situation politique de la Palestine n'est pas de tous points semblable à celle de la Mésopotamie. Les mêmes différences existent entre la Palestine et la Syrie. Il n'y a réellement similitude qu'entre la situation de ce dernier pays et celle de la Mésopotamie. Par suite, le Gouvernement français estime que les assurances qu'il donnerait au Gouvernement italien en ce qui concerne les pays confiés à son mandat ne seraient applicables que dans la mesure où des assurances correspondantes seraient données au Gouvernement italien par le Gouvernement britannique en ce qui concerne la Mésopotamie.

Il ne saurait entrer dans la pensée du Gouvernement français que cette condition puisse retarder la mise en vigueur des mandats syrien et palestinien.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 7 août 1922.

[E 8012/8012/89]

No. 74.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 276.)

(Telegraphic.)

Ramleh, August 11, 1922.

MY telegram No. 386 of 5th June, 1921.

Following information may be of interest :—

Captain de Cardes, who is General Gouraud's representative in Egypt and attached to the French Legation, has stated to Spanish Chargé d'Affaires that after receiving latest news from Syria from General Gouraud's private secretary, he will leave for Paris in order to press claims to the throne of Syria of Abbas Hilmi, with whose emissary he has recently conferred at Alexandria. De Cardes stated that three Egyptian princes were other possible candidates, of whom Omar Toussoun and Mustapha Kemal-Din would probably refuse, but Mahomet Ali might accept.

According to de Cardes, proposal is to create a nominally independent Syria with an autocratic Government and a High Commissioner with a special position. He thought that Abbas Hilmi would be both an autocrat for Syria and an embarrassment for Palestine and Mesopotamia.

Above information was given by Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to one of my staff.

It is confirmed by report from an ex-agent of the French here, who states that de Cardes has been summoned by Quai d'Orsay, and leaves Egypt to-morrow, and that French are working in closest accord with Kemalists.

Full details follow by despatch.

[E 8012/8012/89]

No. 75.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 2582.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 17, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1595 of the 9th June last, with which were enclosed copies of telegrams from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt on the subject of the activities in that country of Lieutenant de Cardes, I transmit herewith a further telegram from Lord Allenby regarding the scheme which that officer has in view for placing an Egyptian prince on the throne of Syria.*

2. In view of the attitude of M. Briand, reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 3383 of the 3rd December last, towards the candidature of the ex-Khedive, it would be of interest to learn whether the views of the French Government have been modified since that date, and you should endeavour to sound the Quai d'Orsay on this point, should a favourable opportunity present itself.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 8245/78/65]

No. 76.

Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon.—(Communicated by Cabinet Offices, August 19.)

The Council of the League of Nations:

WHEREAS the Principal Allied Powers have agreed that the territory of Syria and the Lebanon which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire shall, within such boundaries as may be fixed by the said Powers, be entrusted to a mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population in accordance with the provisions of article 22, paragraph 4 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have decided that the mandate for the territory referred to above should be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it; and

Whereas the terms of this mandate, which are defined in the articles below, have also been accepted by the Government of the French Republic and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas the Government of the French Republic has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the aforementioned article 22 (paragraph 8) it is provided that the degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory not having been previously agreed upon by the members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.

This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities, and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory. The mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent States. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ARTICLE 2.

The mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, to organise such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory, and to employ this militia for defence and also for the

* No. 74.

maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the control which the mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than the above specified save with the consent of the mandatory.

Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the mandatory stationed in the territory.

The mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and fuel.

ARTICLE 3.

The mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon, and with the right to issue exequaturs to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers. Nationals of Syria and the Lebanon living outside the limits of the territory shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the mandatory.

ARTICLE 4.

The mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

ARTICLE 5.

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Syria and the Lebanon. Foreign consular tribunals shall, however, continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organisation provided for in article 6.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on the 1st August, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application during a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately re-established in their entirety, or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

ARTICLE 6.

The mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial system which shall assure to natives, as well as to foreigners, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the mandatory shall exercise control over the administration of Wakfs, in complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 7.

Pending the conclusion of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the mandatory shall apply within the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

ARTICLE 8.

The mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

The mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

ARTICLE 9.

The mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of the Councils of Management ("conseils de fabrique") or in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

ARTICLE 10.

The supervision exercised by the mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and the Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government; the activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measures on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

The religious missions may also concern themselves with education and relief, subject to the general right of regulation and control by the mandatory, or of the local government, in regard to education, public instruction and charitable relief.

ARTICLE 11.

The mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against the nationals (including societies and associations) of any State member of the League of Nations as compared with its own nationals (including societies and associations) or with the nationals of any other foreign State in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries or navigation, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly there shall be no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the said territory.

Subject to the above, the mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary. The mandatory, or the local governments acting under its advice, may also conclude on grounds of contiguity any special customs arrangements with an adjoining country.

The mandatory may take or cause to be taken, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, such steps as it may think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the said territory, and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

Concessions for the development of these natural resources shall be granted without distinction of nationality between the nationals of all States members of the League of Nations, but on condition that they do not infringe upon the authority of the local government. Concessions in the nature of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This clause shall in no way limit the rights of the mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and with a view to assuring to the territory the fiscal resources which would appear best adapted to the local needs, or, in certain cases, with a view to developing the natural resources, either directly by the State or through an organisation under its control, provided that this does not involve, either directly or indirectly, the creation of a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the mandatory or its nationals, nor involve any preferential treatment which would be incompatible with the economic, commercial and industrial equality guaranteed above.

ARTICLE 12.

The mandatory shall adhere, on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon, to any general international agreements already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, in respect of the following: the slave trade, the traffic in drugs, the traffic in arms and munitions, commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, postal, telegraphic or wireless communications and measures for the protection of literature, art or industries.

ARTICLE 13.

The mandatory shall secure the adhesion of Syria and the Lebanon, so far as social, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

ARTICLE 14.

The mandatory shall draw up and put into force within twelve months from this date a law of antiquities in conformity with the following provisions. This law shall

ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States members of the League of Nations:—

(1.)

"Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D.

(2.)

The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorisation referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3.)

No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent department, unless this department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said department.

(4.)

Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5.)

No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty or fine, except to persons authorised by the competent department.

(6.)

Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7.)

Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The mandatory shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8.)

The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent department in a proportion fixed by that department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

ARTICLE 15.

Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in article 1, an arrangement shall be made between the mandatory and the local governments for reimbursement by the latter of all expenses incurred by the mandatory in organising the administration, developing local resources and carrying out permanent public works of which the country retains the benefit. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 16.

Arabic and French shall be the official languages of Syria and the Lebanon.

ARTICLE 17.

The mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report, to the satisfaction of the council, as to the measures then taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.

ARTICLE 18.

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

ARTICLE 19.

On the termination of the mandate the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and the Lebanon of the financial obligations, including pensions and allowances, regularly assumed by the Administration of Syria and the Lebanon during the period of the mandate.

ARTICLE 20.

The mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Done at London on the 24th day of July, 1922, in one original, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat-General of the League of Nations.

Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League to all States members of the League of Nations.

[E 8310/8012/89]

No. 77.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 648. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Ramleh, August 13, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 276 of the 11th August regarding the possibility of the French offering the Crown of Syria to an Egyptian prince, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. A. F. H. Wiggin as a result of his interview with the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

With regard to Captain de Cardes' statement that the governorship of the Lebanon would be offered to M. Neguib Sursock, I understand that this gentleman proposes to proceed to Syria at the end of the present month.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's consul-general, Beirut.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 77.

Report of an Interview with the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

(Secret.)

THE Spanish Chargé d'Affaires spoke to me very openly to-day on the subject of Comte de Cardes, who has lately been confiding in him, chiefly after dinner on the San Stefano terrace.

De Cardes, who professes devotion to Spain, speaks in very different terms of England, for whom he has nothing good to say, regarding her as a natural enemy of the Latin races. He believes incidentally in the possibility of a Franco-Spanish anti-English *entente*.

M. Lopez-Roberts discounts a certain amount of what Comte de Cardes says, first because he loves airing his views on world politics, secondly because he is habitually caustic—as often as not indeed about M. Gaillard and Vicomte d'Aumale. Two nights ago, however, he spoke seriously about Syria, confessing to M. Lopez-Roberts, with a considerable show of pride, his private hopes and ambitions regarding that country. France, he said, had decided definitely to give Syria independence of much the same kind that we were granting to Egypt, i.e., to leave diplomats with a special position in charge, a cadre of officials to run the Government, and consuls elsewhere. For the crown four Egyptians, he proceeded, were in the running. Prince Omar Toussoun and Prince Kemal-ed-Din, both of whom were thought likely to refuse, Prince Mohammed Aly, who it was thought might accept, and last but not least the ex-Khedive.

De Cardes stated that he himself was all out for Abbas Hilmi, a representative of whom came here recently from Paris to see him. He drew a malicious caricature of our

position here and in Mesopotamia if we found the ex-Khedive sandwiched between our two pet monarchs.

Apart from the King, de Cardes said, there was to be a native Governor-General of the Lebanon. Negib Sursock, the wealthy Syrian, father-in-law of George Bey Lotfallah, had already been approached informally, and was willing in principle to accept. Failing him there was a leading Christian sheikh of the Lebanon available, whose name M. Lopez-Roberts could not recall.

De Cardes complained that M. Gaillard, though in sympathy, was too cautious to be of much use. He anticipates that he will be able to convince his Government of the desirability of making the ex-Khedive King of Syria, but is nervous lest they should allow themselves to be overruled by Mr. Lloyd George. He is going to Europe as soon as General Gouraud's private secretary, for whom he is waiting, arrives with all the latest news.

The régime which de Cardes hopes to see in Syria is that of an iron despotism on oriental lines assisted clandestinely by a French High Commissioner, who would, while in intimate personal touch and sympathy with the King, occasionally address ostentatious reprimands to him by mutual arrangement as sops to European public opinion.

M. Lopez-Roberts, who is a cynic like most Spaniards of his class, thinks that on this occasion de Cardes, who had dined very well, was speaking the truth from sheer vanity and without ulterior motive. He has, M. Roberts added, proved himself highly indiscreet more than once already.

In choosing as a confidant M. Lopez-Roberts, who comes of a family well known in Spain for its pro-British sympathy, he chose the wrong man.

Perhaps this is all old history to you. I am not up to date, I am afraid, about Syrian affairs.

A. F. H. W.

August 10, 1922.

[E 8343/178/65]

No. 78.

Count de Salis to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 118.)

My Lord,

Rome, August 18, 1922.

LAST night I duly received your Lordship's despatch No. 168 of the 8th August, enclosing copy of a note addressed by the French Ambassador to Lord Balfour on the 13th July as well as copy of the reply returned to him on the 5th August, on the subject of the mandate for Palestine and the arrangements to be made with regard to the Holy Places.

Cardinal Gasparri has just gone away from Rome until probably the early days of next month. This morning Mgr. Borgongini Duca handed to me a note which the Cardinal had addressed to me just before leaving, in which is enclosed a memorandum dated the 15th August with some observations with regard to article 14 of the mandate. In this paper the Vatican lay stress on the following points:—

1. The commission for the Holy See should be of a permanent character.
2. The principal Catholic nations should be represented, notably Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Brazil.
3. The members should reside in Palestine; it might be composed of the consuls of the Powers represented. But whatever the composition, points (1) and (2) should be borne in mind.

The commission should be under an international organisation, such as the Council of the League of Nations, and should not be allowed to raise discussion on rights already acquired by the Catholics which have been peacefully enjoyed, even under the Turks.

I took the opportunity in reply of reading to Mgr. Borgongini Duca your Lordship's note to Count de Saint-Aulaire, drawing attention to the passages relating to the idea that the commission should be of a permanent character and to the decided objection taken by His Majesty's Government to certain proposals put forward by the French.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

[E 8457/8012/89]

No. 79.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 25.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 435.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 24, 1922.

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 2582 of 17th August.

I informed M. Poincaré this morning of the statement made by Captain de Cardes, General Gouraud's representative in Egypt, that he was leaving Egypt for Paris in order to press the claims to the Throne of Syria of Abbas Hilmi, with whose emissary he had recently been in communication at Alexandria. I reminded M. Poincaré that when a similar question had arisen last December, M. Briand had denied any such possibility, and had stated to me that Abbas Hilmi had acted throughout the war in a spirit of the greatest hostility to France, which he could never forgive. I mentioned at the same time the names of the other Egyptian princes whom Captain de Cardes had mentioned as possible candidates for the throne.

In reply, M. Poincaré stated that he did not know who Captain de Cardes was, but that in any case there was no truth whatsoever in his statements. He himself knew Abbas Hilmi well to be a rascal, and it was he who, as President of the Republic, had ordered the imprisonment of the notorious Bolo, Abbas Hilmi's emissary in Europe. He said that His Majesty's Government might rest assured that the French Government would never act in such an unfriendly spirit towards His Majesty's Government.

[E 8787/178/65]

No. 80.

Note by the Secretary-General, League of Nations.—(Received September 4.)

THE Secretary-General has the honour to submit, for the consideration of the members of the council, the following memorandum by the British representative relating to the Commission on the Holy Places.

Geneva, September 1, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 80.

Memorandum by the British Representative.

ARTICLE 14 of the mandate for Palestine provides as follows:—

"A special commission shall be appointed by the mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places, and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the council."

This provision must be read in connection with article 13, which imposes upon the mandatory the responsibility of preserving existing rights in connection with the Holy Places, thus envisaging the maintenance of the *status quo*.

2. In order to ensure that questions affecting Christians should be considered and settled by Christians without the intervention of Jews and Mahomedans, the Holy Places Commission should be divided into three sub-commissions, one Christian, one Moslem and one Jewish. These sub-commissions should each deal, to the exclusion of the other two, with questions solely affecting the religion concerned. Each sub-commission will have its own president, who will preside over its deliberations.

3. There should be a chairman of the commission, who should be an individual of high standing and judicial temperament, and enjoying a position which will ensure confidence in his impartiality.

4. In each sub-commission the States and confessions more particularly concerned should be represented. The Christian sub-commission might be composed of a French president, three Catholic representatives (Italian, Spanish and Belgian), three Orthodox (one of whom should be Greek and one Russian), one Armenian, and one or possibly two representatives of the Abyssinians and the Copts, unless both these communities are of the same confession, in which case one representative would be sufficient. The Moslem sub-commission might consist of an Italian president, together with a Palestinian, a French and an Indian Moslem. The Jewish sub-commission might consist of an American president and a Palestinian, a British and a Portuguese (or Spanish) Jew to represent the Sephardic sect.

5. Unanimous reports of any one of these sub-commissions should be definitive in every case except where the Council of the League of Nations, under whose guarantee the Holy Places are to be placed, refer back some particular point for further consideration. Where no unanimity can be achieved in a sub-commission, it will be well to refer the point on which the members do not agree to the chairman of the whole commission for decision.

6. Questions or claims affecting more than one religion might be dealt with by representatives of the sub-commissions concerned sitting together. Points upon which there can be no agreement might in the same way be referred to the chairman of the whole commission for decision.

7. A secretariat will be required for the commission, and as the expenses of the secretariat will fall upon the Administration of Palestine, His Majesty's Government will appoint the secretary-general.

8. An American citizen of reasonable prominence would appear to be the most suitable chairman of the whole commission. Such an appointment will be particularly suitable as it will enable representation to be given to the Protestant communities, who would not otherwise be represented in the commission.

9. The chairman of the commission and the president of each sub-commission would be appointed by the mandatory after consultation between His Majesty's Government and the Government concerned. The representatives of the various confessions would be appointed in consultation with the heads of the religious denominations concerned, or, where this was not possible, in consultation with the Governments concerned. These appointments would not be made until they have been approved by the Council of the League.

10. The expenses of the chairman of the commission and of the presidents of the three sub-commissions should be borne by the League of Nations. The expenses of the representatives of the various religions and confessions should be borne by the religious communities whom they represent. The expenses of the secretariat should be borne by the Administration of Palestine.

11. If any permanent arrangements are necessary for dealing with questions which may arise in the future as to the interpretation of the reports and recommendations of the commission, or on new questions that may arise, they might be provided by establishing small local committees to be selected and nominated by each of the sub-commissions. For any matters which these local committees were unable to settle, the sub-committee concerned, or if necessary the whole Holy Places Commission, might be reassembled.

12. It must be clearly understood that the functions of the Holy Places Commission do not include any administrative responsibilities nor any interference with the right and duty of the mandatory to maintain order and decorum.

*Holy Places Commission,
August 31, 1922.*

[E 9298/274/89]

No. 81.

Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)

(Secret.)

THE Director of Military Operations and Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a report received from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, British troops in Egypt, on the situation in Syria up to the 9th August last, and would be glad to be informed if Lord Curzon of Kedleston can corroborate the theory propounded in paragraph 5, or otherwise.

War Office, September 14, 1922.

[9941]

Enclosure in No. 81.

Report on the Situation in Syria.

THE total number of troops that have been despatched as French reinforcements to Constantinople is: 415th French infantry regiment, comprising three battalions complete with machine-guns, companies, transport, &c. One battalion sailed from Tripoli on the 10th instant by the steamship "Trouvord," flying the French flag. The other two battalions left by the steamship "Belgrano," flying the French flag, on the 13th instant. The steamship "Backworth," flying the British flag, and the steamship "Rollan," flying the French flag, left on the 11th and 13th instants respectively, carrying horses, machine-guns and stores.

Kemalist Customs Commission in Beirut.

2. French army officers are beginning to openly ask each other how long Muheddine Pasha and his so-called Customs Commission are going to remain in Beirut. In the meanwhile war material is still being handed over by the French to the Kemalists, who appear to be rapidly gaining a position from which they will be able to dictate whatever terms they like to the French Government.

3. During the week of the 23rd-29th July last the following stores are reported to have been forwarded by rail from Alexandretta to Adana:—

Large quantities of ammunition, gun and S.A.A.

Aeroplanes (numbers not stated).

3 anti-aircraft guns.

About 200 new Beriet 2-ton motor lorries.

160,000 rifles.

Several guns of 75-millim. calibre with ammunition.

4. The French general staff officer who is attached to the Kemalist Customs Commission has admitted that there are a number of Kemalist agents throughout Syria, and that active propaganda is being carried out by the Kemalists, using their commission at Beirut as a base from which to send its agents into Syria, Palestine and Transjordan. Five of these agents recently arrived in Damascus.

5. The following theory has been put forward as an explanation of the present situation in Syria, but its accuracy cannot be vouched for: It will be remembered that early this year, in spite of the Franco-Kemalist accord, the situation in the northern front of Syria was becoming most serious. The trade of Aleppo and also Alexandretta had practically vanished, and various Turkish bands were raising trouble again all along the frontier and even as far south as the Alaouite territory. Appeals from Angora were of no avail, and the Kemalist authorities at Adana seemed to be powerless to prevent any fresh outbreaks of hostilities between the French and the Kemalists. Muheddine Pasha in Cilicia appeared to have lost all his influence with his Government at Angora, and altogether the situation for the French was becoming most uncomfortable. Accordingly it was decided to invite Muheddine Pasha to Beirut to discuss measures, "said to be excise measures," for the revival of the trade of Northern Syria. The Turks, in their usual way, refused to grant any facilities without receiving further concessions from the French, hence the French had to promise more material support. Little by little the capitalists are "bleeding" the French for everything that they particularly want, and, should the French attempt to hesitate or refuse to deliver any particular thing, the result is always the same, i.e., suspension of negotiations by the Turks "pending further instructions from Angora" until the French comply with the demands in question. This procedure goes on until the French now find themselves bound almost hand and foot to the Kemalists.

6. As a sidelight on the Kemalists' attitude towards ourselves, the following remark of M. Laporte, chief of the French Mission in Adana, is not without interest: "The mutual hatred of Greek and Kemalist is not so great that the two of them cannot eventually settle their differences mutually, but I have never seen anything to beat the hatred of the Kemalist for the British. If Mustapha Kemal could have a pickled Englishman served up to him for breakfast every day he would certainly do so."

Public Security in Northern Syria.

7. Reports from Alexandretta, dated the 3rd August, state that great unrest and insecurity prevail again on the Aleppo-Alexandretta road. Some 500 brigands,

"Chetihes," are said to be operating on and in the vicinity of the road to the Antioch plains, between Radjun and Kirikhan. Several gendarmes have lately been killed, also four native carriage drivers. Two motor-car drivers were so severely mutilated that one of them died. The French occupy several heavily-defended posts along this plain, to cover the road and also to watch for any brigand bands using the Amanus mountains or Kurdlagh ranges in order to penetrate into Syria. These posts have at times had to beat off the attacks of "Chetihes" by bringing up artillery support. There is a certain amount of unrest also reported from Antioch. The reason there is stated to be the fact that Soubhi Bereket Bey (really a Turk) has been nominated President of the Federated States of Syria. The fact that the President of the newly-established Federation of Syrian States is a Turk may be only a coincidence, but, in view of the way in which the present political developments seem to be tending, is worth noting. Since the incident between Atrash and the French armoured cars near Sweida in the Jebel Druze, public security throughout the rest of Syria has been more or less normal.

Future of Syria.

8. Evidence coming from various quarters tends to confirm more and more the belief that the French are about to give back more of Syria to the Turks until it is ventured to believe that they will retain their mandate only on the Lebanon, and will either leave the rest of what is now called the Federated States of Syria to look after itself or hand it back to the Turks.

9. From the French press and from the statements of many French officers and officials, there is no doubt that the majority of French public opinion in France and in Syria is for evacuating Syria entirely. The French say that without credits and with only a very small army it is impossible to make anything of the country. The French at home are absolutely persuaded that they will pour no more money into Syria, which they say produces nothing which can in any way give a return on such money expended. "Of what use is Syria to us?" is the present French attitude. "It is only a fruitless expense to France, and we cannot afford to waste money in Syria when we have a large part of France to build up again."

10. It is almost certain that when General Gouraud goes home in the autumn he will not return again. This statement has been made on each occasion that he has returned to France, but this time there certainly appears to be some truth in the assertion. Firstly, certain members of his staff are being suppressed when he leaves; and, secondly, it is said by his own staff officers that the position there will in the near future be much too small for him to occupy, especially with the minimum of an army and no financial credits from the home country.

11. The much-talked-of harbour works at Alexandretta, of which General Gouraud placed the first stone last June and which the French gave out was to be a pledge of their intention to retain their hold on Alexandretta and Syria, turns out to be merely an extension of the present stone jetty by about 25 yards in order to enable sailing vessels to moor alongside the jetty. The work is calculated to have occupied three months only! Reports from that town, dated the 3rd August, indicate that the French control is decreasing daily, and that the garrison has been reduced to one battalion of infantry (Senegalese), who are to be quartered in the big hospital a few kilometres south-east of the town.

12. Without going into further details, it is sufficient to say that there is a great deal more evidence of an approaching evacuation of territory in Northern Syria, even if not of the whole of Syria, by the French.

13. It is said that shortly the French Governor of the Grand Liban will be replaced by a native Governor, as at Damascus, and that the administration will be left in the hands of natives, who will have the advice of a small French Mission to support them. All other French officials will be dispensed with in the administration of this territory.

Kemalist Propaganda in Northern Syria.

14. It is reported from Alexandretta on the 3rd August that two Kemalist pashas had arrived at Adana. They were accompanied by two mullahs and five officers, some of whom left later in the day for Aleppo. This party is said to have brought a large quantity of gold with them for propaganda purposes. The names of the different members of the party have not yet come to hand.

General Sir Charles Townshend, M.P.

15. Sir Charles Townshend returned to Alexandretta by train from Adana on the 1st August and arrived at Beirut on the 5th. He was again the guest of General Gouraud, and left for Europe on the 9th instant. In a conversation Sir Charles said that he had settled everything with Mustapha Kemal, who is prepared to sign peace if we will cause the Greeks to evacuate Asia Minor. Unless Mr. Lloyd George falls in with Mustapha Kemal's conditions, he will launch forth a terrible Holy War throughout India, Afghanistan, Irak, Palestine, Egypt, &c.

16. Apparently Sir Charles obtained a diplomatic visa for his passport from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Paris, thereby enabling him to avoid all passport difficulties in Syria and Turkey.

Situation on the Euphrates.

17. The situation on the Euphrates and to the east of the river remains more or less quiet, except for occasional Bedouin effervescences from time to time. Hachem Bey, the uncle of Mudjem Bey of the Anazeh, has made his submission to the French.

18. There is nothing to report concerning the situation in the remainder of Syria or the Lebanon.

*General Headquarters,
British Troops in Egypt,
August 22, 1922.*

[E 9924/178/65]

No. 82.

Count de Salis to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 129.)

My Lord,

Rome, September 19, 1922.

AT an audience with the Pope this morning the conversation turned upon Palestine, and the Pope said that he had received the communication which I had made to the Secretariate of State relative to the fresh proposals put before the Council of the League of Nations for the constitution of the Holy Places Commission. The Pope feared that the proposals were not acceptable, insisting on the fact that most of the Holy Places were beyond dispute the possession of the Catholic Church which would find itself outvoted in the commission in matters which concerned interests to which the highest importance was attached. He did not wish to make a public protest, but was afraid he might find himself obliged to do so.

I saw Cardinal Gasparri afterwards, who said that they were considering what to do. He thought of making an appeal to the justice of the British Government, who hardly seemed to realise the importance which the Catholic Church attached to the rights it had enjoyed for so many centuries, even under the rule of the Turk.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
CECIL DORMER.

[E 9925/178/65]

No. 83.

Mr. Dormer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

Rome, September 22, 1922.

WITH reference to Count de Salis's despatch No. 129 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith, under flying seal, a letter from the Cardinal Secretary of State addressed to the Prime Minister respecting the fresh proposals submitted by His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the constitution of the Holy Places Commission.

Count de Salis's despatch mentioned above recorded his conversation on the subject with the Pope at his audience on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.
CECIL DORMER.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Cardinal Gasparri to Mr. Lloyd George.

Your Excellency,

The Vatican, September 21, 1922.

I HAD the honour, not long since, of addressing myself to your Excellency, through his Eminence Cardinal Bourne, requesting you to interest yourself in the fate of the Catholic Sanctuaries of Palestine, so seriously threatened by the recent project of Lord Balfour. As it is a question of great moment, not only for the Holy Father, but also for the whole Catholic world, I think it my duty to again address myself to you to secure that the imprescriptible rights of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land be respected, rights that for so many centuries, even under the Turkish dominion, never failed to be recognised.

Your Excellency knows that Lord Balfour's project—presented at the last moment at the General Council of the League of Nations—provides for the formation for the Holy Places, of a Plenary Commission, presided over by a Protestant of American nationality. This commission would form, from its own members, three sub-commissions: one for the Jews, one for the Mussulmans and the third for the Christians.

This last sub-commission would be composed thus: a Frenchman, as president, an Italian, a Spaniard, a Belgian, a Russian, a Roumanian, a Greek, an Armenian, a Copt and an Abyssinian. So that the Catholics, who have almost all the Palestinian Sanctuaries, would find themselves, in the sub-commission for the Christians, in a striking minority, four against six, and these latter, being, on account of their origin and their history, in irreconcilable disagreement with the Catholic Church, will doubtless be united in opposing the minority that represents that Church.

This injustice is aggravated by the fact that no decision can be come to by this sub-commission except by an unanimous vote, and, failing such unanimity, the final decision is to be deferred to the president of the Plenary Commission, who, as I have stated above, is an American Protestant. As unanimity is not likely to be obtained in hardly any case amongst elements so widely different and so hostile, it follows that the interests and the rights of Catholics will be, for all practicable purposes, in the hands of a Protestant, always arbiter of the situation.

Your Excellency will easily understand that the Catholic Church can never accept such a project, and I feel obliged to inform you that, should it become an accomplished fact, the Holy Father would find himself under the unpleasant necessity of making a public protest.

At a moment when the peace of the Near East is so gravely disturbed by the events that are taking place there, I beg your Excellency to so dispose that the noble English nation, so well-deserving of humanity for its efforts for general pacification, may not add to the political fears that already exist such grave preoccupations of a religious nature.

The Holy Father is well aware of your Excellency's solicitude to establish peace among the nations, and he has not failed, as far as in his power, to support it efficaciously. Now it is the Holy Father that asks you, in the interests of universal pacification, to prevent a serious injustice.

With sentiments of profound respect,

I have, &c.
S. CARD. GASPARRI.

[E 9865/78/65]

No. 84.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Harvey.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, October 2, 1922.

WITH further reference to your note of the 14th July to the Earl of Balfour transmitting a counter-draft from the State Department of the proposed convention between Great Britain and the United States regarding the Palestine mandate, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the terms of this convention have received the most careful consideration, and His Majesty's Government are prepared substantially to accept the operative clauses of the convention now proposed by the State Department, subject to certain modifications explained below. At the same

time they desire to suggest a somewhat different form to the preamble to the convention, as suggested by the United States Government.

2. His Majesty's Government are anxious if possible that the convention should contain a specific allusion to the policy of establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, having regard to the interest taken in this policy in the United States and the warm support which it has received in that country, of which the recent resolutions of both Houses of Congress have afforded striking evidence. On this ground, and also because article 2 of the mandate—which is in any case to be recited in the preamble to the convention—contains an explicit reference to the preamble to the mandate, His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will now be willing to agree to the insertion of the whole mandate, including the preamble, in the preamble to the convention. The United States Government will observe that the text of the preamble to the mandate, as now finally defined by the Council of the League at its recent session in London, a copy of which has already been furnished to you, contains no reference to the Treaty of Sévres or to the Turkish renunciation in favour of the Principal Allied Powers of all rights and title over Palestine, thus removing a difficulty to which the United States Government had previously drawn attention in their negotiations with His Majesty's Government on the question of this convention.

3. If the preamble to the mandate is thus to be recited together with the mandate in the preamble to the convention, His Majesty's Government would suggest that a shorter preamble might be adopted for the convention itself in the following sense:—

"Whereas for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations a mandate for the administration of Palestine, including therein the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, has been entrusted to His Britannic Majesty;

"And whereas the terms of the mandate in respect of Palestine have been defined by the Council of the League of Nations as follows:—

[Here insert terms of mandate in full.]

"And whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in the above terms in respect of Palestine and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations;

"And whereas the Government of His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States of America are desirous of reaching a definite understanding as to rights of their respective countries and of their nationals in Palestine;

"His Britannic Majesty and the President of the United States of America have decided to conclude a convention to this effect and have nominated as their plenipotentiaries who have agreed as follows":—

4. This shortened preamble has been specially drafted with a view to avoid these difficulties to which the United States Government have drawn the attention of His Majesty's Government. With regard to the reference to the States by which the mandatory has been selected, it will be seen that the draft merely records that in fact His Britannic Majesty has been selected to be the mandatory for Palestine. As this selection has been accepted by all parties, specific reference to the Powers who were actually present at the meeting where the selection was made in the body of the preamble to the convention seems quite immaterial.

5. If the United States Government, however, still find difficulty in accepting the insertion of the preamble to the mandate in the preamble to the draft convention, and if they see any serious objection to the shortened form of the preamble given above, His Majesty's Government would reluctantly be prepared in the last resort to accept the draft of the preamble as suggested by the United States Government, provided, however, that, in order to meet the desire of His Majesty's Government, regarding a reference in the convention to the policy of establishing a national home for the Jews in Palestine, the United States Government would agree to insert an additional recital immediately after the third recital in the preamble to the United States draft of the convention in something like the following terms:—

"Whereas the Government of the United States have recognised the decision of the Principal Allied Powers that the mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by His Britannic Majesty's Government and adopted by the other Allied Powers in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil or

religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and"

6. As regards the operative clauses of the convention, His Majesty's Government accept the word "consents" instead of "concurs" in article 1 of the convention, subject to the reservations already made on this point by His Majesty's representative at Washington in connection with the African mandates. As a draft alteration they would also suggest that, if the shortened form of the preamble suggested above is accepted by the United States Government, the words "as defined in the preamble hereto" might be substituted for the words "including the territories as ultimately determined" in article 1. If the shortened form of the preamble is not accepted, the American draft of article 1 would stand. Subject to this reservation as regards article 1, His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the State Department's draft of the first four articles of the convention.

7. With regard to article 5 of the American draft convention, I would refer you to the note which I addressed to you on the 30th ultimo regarding the "B" mandates. The considerations there set forth, relating to the necessity for United States persons and institutions in "B" mandate territories being subject to the restrictions required for the maintenance of good government, apply with equal force to Palestine. At the same time, His Majesty's Government desire to assure the United States Government that the use of the word "maintaining" in article 15 of the mandate for Palestine is not intended to restrict the opening of new American schools in that country or to restrict the right of such schools to admit pupils of another community. They also wish to make it clear that the second clause of article 16 of the mandate is intended to show that the supervision of the mandatory will be strictly limited to that required for the maintenance of public order and good government. The fact that schools are not mentioned in article 16, and that article 15 merely provides that schools of local communities shall conform to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, does not imply that schools in Palestine are to be free from the restrictions required for the maintenance of good government. In conclusion, His Majesty's Government assure the United States Government that United States nationals will be perfectly free to teach in the English language in those educational, philanthropic and religious institutions which they may establish and maintain in Palestine. In the light of these explanations and assurances, His Majesty's Government feel sure that the United States Government will regard as unnecessary the insertion in the convention of any article dealing with these points, and article 5 of the American draft has accordingly been omitted in the British counter-draft of the convention.

8. Article 6 in the American draft is identical with that of article 5 in the original British version, and His Majesty's Government have no desire to amend it. They are, however, anxious to substitute in the second paragraph of article 7 of the American draft the expression "coming into force" for the words "formal issue" and "issue."

9. The minutes of the July meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, relating to the mandates for Palestine and Syria, read as follows: "The Council decided that the mandate for Palestine was approved and that the mandate for Syria would come automatically into force as soon as the negotiations between the French and Italian Governments have resulted in a final agreement. It was further understood that the two mandates should come into force simultaneously."

10. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government are anxious that nothing in the proposed convention should give rise to the impression that the suspension of capitulatory rights in Palestine should not take place until the conclusion of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey and the consequent formal issue of the mandate. In their view the mandatory régime has now received formal sanction and will come automatically into force in the manner described in the minutes of the Council of the League, to which reference is made above, and they trust that the United States Government will agree that in these circumstances the provisions of article 8 of the mandate fully safeguard the legitimate interests of American citizens in Palestine.

11. With reference to article 10 of the mandate, His Majesty's Government have inserted in the convention a new article 5 as follows: "The extradition treaties and conventions in force between the United States and the United Kingdom shall apply to Palestine." His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government will see no objection to such an article, but they would, of course, be prepared to accept in its place an assurance from the United States Government that

they regard the words "foreign Powers" in article 10 of the mandate as applying to the United States.

12. I transmit herewith, for convenience of reference, copies of the Anglo-American Convention, amended in accordance with the suggestions set forth above.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 84.

Draft Convention between the United States of America and Great Britain regarding the Mandate for Palestine.

WHEREAS for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations a mandate for the administration of Palestine, including therein the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, has been entrusted to His Britannic Majesty;

And whereas the terms of the mandate in respect of Palestine have been defined by the Council of the League of Nations as follows:—

[Here insert terms of mandate in full.]

And whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in the above terms in respect of Palestine and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations;

And whereas the Government of His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States of America are desirous of reaching a definite understanding as to the rights of their respective Governments and of their nationals in Palestine;

His Britannic Majesty and the President of the United States of America have decided to conclude a convention to this effect, and have nominated as their plenipotentiaries . . . who . . . have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

Subject to the provisions of the present convention the United States consents to the administration by His Britannic Majesty, pursuant to the aforesaid mandate, of Palestine, as defined in the mandate hereto.

ARTICLE 2.

The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 3.

Vested American property rights in the mandated territory shall be respected and in no way impaired.

ARTICLE 4.

A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the mandatory under article 24 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.

ARTICLE 5.

The extradition treaties and convention in force between the United States and the United Kingdom shall apply to Palestine.

ARTICLE 6.

Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate, as recited above, unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.

ARTICLE 7.

The present convention shall be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional methods of the high contracting parties. The ratifications shall be

exchanged in London as soon as practicable. It shall take effect on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

His Britannic Majesty's Government agree that in the conduct of any provisional administration of Palestine pending the entry into force of the mandate the rights and privileges of American citizens, as defined by this convention, shall be fully respected. There shall be no suspension of capitulatory rights prior to the entry into force of the mandate.

In witness whereof

Done in duplicate at this day of September, 1922.

[E 10961/274/89]

No. 85.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 140.)

My Lord,

Beirut, October 3, 1922.

THE effect produced locally by the news of the Kemalist victories has been similar to that produced elsewhere in Moslem communities throughout the world. As regards the Christians their feelings are those of disappointment not unmixed with a certain apprehension.

Among the Moslems even those who are adherents of the Shereefian Party shared in the enthusiasm, although in a lesser degree. After all, the Moslems, to whatever party they may give their sympathies and support, only desire to recover the predominance, and whether they are most likely to achieve their aim through Mustapha Kemal or through the Shereefian family is a matter of opinion. The Christians are now inclined to look to England as their last remaining hope and protector, provided she really makes a firm stand and does something.

The French, who still appear to believe that the conclusion of the Angora Agreement and their much advertised friendship for the Kemalists, which entailed the supplying of arms to the latter, have secured for them the gratitude and respect of the Moslem element, a belief from which I venture to differ, thought the moment a propitious one for a little more propaganda. The rather extraordinary communiqué, of which a translation is enclosed,* was therefore inserted in the "Ray-el-Aam," a paper of strong Kemalist sympathies. It will be noticed that, while emphasising the services rendered by France to the Kemalist cause, it quite unnecessarily gives some measure of credit to the Allies in general. The editor of the paper, however, in a footnote, prefers to attribute the credit elsewhere.

In another part of the same issue of the paper is an exhortation to the people of Beirut not to overdo their rejoicings and so annoy England. I understand that the police, who had received orders to keep the demonstrators within bounds, urged upon them the same reason in favour of orderly rejoicing.

In the circumstances it is curious to read in to-day's press that this same paper has been suspended for a month for having published in a distorted form a Reuter telegram. Another Moslem paper, the "Jamia Souria," has also been suspended for having suggested that the war between the Greeks and the Kemalists was really a war between England and France, that the Wahabite attack on the Beni-Sakr was really a French expedition against England, and that many French officers had been captured by the Greeks while fighting for the Kemalists.

Pro-Kemalist sympathisers must have drawn largely upon Muhieddin Pasha, the president of the Turkish Commission, which has been discussing all the summer through the question of a customs agreement with Syria. If it is true that the protracted negotiations are on the point of resulting in an agreement none too favourable for Syria, the Pasha may shortly be leaving. Seeing that the Lebanon is a pleasant summer resort, the Pasha's inclination to linger is comprehensible, but it is hard to understand why the French have permitted him to remain here as a centre of propaganda while getting very little out of him.

The last time I saw General Gouraud he seemed to be genuinely perturbed by the unpleasantness of the possibilities opened up by the Kemalist successes, and he did not seem to share the consoling opinion held by some Frenchmen that whatever happened Syria would not be attacked, and only Irak would be liable to aggression.

* Not printed.

The change in the situation has given renewed currency to the rumours that some part of Northern Syria is shortly to be restored to the Kemalists, and a paragraph appeared in the "Syrie," of the 24th September, doubtless by official suggestion, pointing out the absurdity of such rumours. Nevertheless they are widely believed, and as a matter of fact the retrocession of Aleppo, and of its port Alexandretta, to Turkey would probably mean the economic salvation of the town.

In general, very little news as to the course of events in Asia Minor and Constantinople appears in the local press, and the public has to subsist on such rumours as are afloat.

(Copies to Bagdad, Cairo and Jerusalem.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 10617/178/65]

No. 86.

Mr. Lloyd George to Cardinal Gasparri (The Vatican).

Your Eminence,

October 13, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 21st September regarding the project for the Holy Places Commission put forward by the British representative on the Council of the League of Nations during the recent meetings of the latter at Geneva.

2. I need hardly assure your Eminence that the scheme proposed by His Majesty's Government for the constitution of this commission was carefully considered, and was framed, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, in such a way as to ensure that the claims and rights of the three great religions in Palestine, as well as of the great Christian Churches, should be impartially examined and determined in a spirit of even-handed justice. As mandatory for Palestine, and as representative of an empire which includes among its citizens devoted adherents of all these religions and Churches, His Majesty's Government could indeed have sought no other object.

3. In putting forward a scheme which, in their view, appeared to be essentially fair and honest, His Majesty's Government did not in any way intend to exclude a full discussion of its merits or any agreed modifications which might result from such discussions. As a matter of fact, the particular objection to which your Eminence has drawn attention—the powers of the proposed American president of the main commission—appears to rest on some misapprehension. Not only did His Majesty's Government believe that the world would appreciate the obvious advantages of having as a judge a man who widely sympathises with the religious sentiments of all those concerned, while himself wholly unconnected either with one party to the litigation or with the other; but they had also intended that whether the president received a unanimous report or a majority and minority report from any sub-commission, his finding should be subject to the ultimate confirmation of the Council of the League, on which, as your Eminence is aware, the Catholic countries are not without strong representation. Whether or not the intentions of His Majesty's Government on this point were rightly understood when their draft project was originally circulated to the members of the council, no misapprehension could have remained as a result of the discussions inside and outside the Council Chamber which followed, and clearly showed that His Majesty's Government were prepared to consider any reasonable and agreed procedure to settle those cases where unanimity was not achieved in the sub-commissions. In point of fact, the chief stumbling-block to agreement in these discussions appears to have been the presidency of the Christian sub-commission, and not that of the procedure to be followed by the sub-commissions, main commission and the League.

4. Since, unfortunately, agreement on this point could not be reached, Lord Balfour formally withdrew the British project at the last session of the council on the 4th October, making it clear that His Majesty's Government were prepared sympathetically to consider any equitable scheme which commends itself to the other members of the council and might be brought forward in agreement by them.

5. I trust that these explanations will satisfy your Eminence that the sole desire of His Majesty's Government throughout these proceedings has been to find, as quickly as possible, some impartial arrangement which might meet with the ready assent of all parties concerned, and not least with that of the great Church of which your Eminence

is so distinguished a representative. If such agreement has not yet been found, the fault does not lie with my Government or its delegate at Geneva, who spared no pains to bring the discussions of the council to a successful issue.

With sentiments of profound respect, I have, &c.

(Unsigned.)*

[E 11353/274/89]

No. 87.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 20.)

My Lord,

Damascus, October 5, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to quote below the following information from "Henry":—

1. The Turkish Colonel Adnan arrived from Angora at Osmanieh, near Marash, some twelve days ago. He is now stopping here with Mustapha Pasha El Abed.

Another Turkish captain, Nuri Effendi, arrived here four days ago from Angora.

A certain sheikh well known by the name of Katoni, of the ulema, accompanied by another, Nuri Effendi (Turkish origin), went to Angora eleven days ago, and they are carrying important "mazbatas" (declarations) from the Mahommedan notables of Damascus.

(To Mustapha Kemal.)

The French pay their expenses. Mohammed Ibn Dakhil, once Turkish officer, is now a messenger and goes and comes often between Damascus, Angora and the Senussi at Mardin. He is paid by the French.

"Mazabatas" have been prepared and handed over to the French by the Mahommedans at Damascus through a well-known sheikh, called Abu-el-Chamat, in which the Mahommedans thank the French for their help to the Khalifate.

2. I have recently had several applications for visas for Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt, &c., from persons speaking Turkish and little Arabic. They had various types of passports; but all were from French authorities either at Constantinople or here in Syria.

I have consistently refused to grant visas; and shall in future endeavour—at the request of the Central C.I.D., Jerusalem—to secure a photograph of these persons, besides notifying my refusal to grant a visa to the various consular and passport authorities concerned; and endorsing upon the back of their passports in red ink the words "Visa refused."

3. A leading member of the Nationalist Party came to see me some days ago—I withhold his name for obvious reasons—and declared an Algerian Moslem officer, named Captain Attaf, had been sent here by the French Haut-Commissariat to sound local patriots as to their grievances against France, and to enquire whether local opinion would be satisfied with the pardon of all exiles and prisoners (concerned in the recent disturbances). He added that Subhi Baraket—the new Turkish president of the Syrian Federal Council—had also sent agents here to endeavour to procure signatures to an appeal for the release of Dr. Shahbander. My informant said he considered the above were all spies or agents provocateurs, and that he prevented any response to their questions.

4. I should not like to guarantee anything of the above, as this person did not impress me favourably.

His statement that Dr. Shahbander was now at Rouad Isle and in good health may, however, be correct.

5. I should not be at all surprised—in the light of recent events in Anatolia—if the French were to evacuate much of Syria (but not the Grand Liban) and allow the Kemalists to occupy it.

The embarrassment which would result for Palestine and Transjordan and (to a lesser degree) for Irak is too obvious to need elaboration.

6. I have hitherto left it almost entirely to the British liaison officer to furnish details of alleged French military supplies to the Kemalists.

A casual Syrian journalist acquaintance of mine assured me less than a week ago that 300 aeroplanes had been delivered to the Kemalists by the French, and that 8,000 horses had been sold to them at the purely nominal price of 11l. each.

* See No. 89.

I do not guarantee one word of the above, but gathered that this person had twice been imprisoned at Beirut in the last twelve months for anti-French newspaper articles.

My own surmise is expressed in the preceding paragraph, but I would not yet care to accept any responsibility for its accuracy.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 11677/274/89]

No. 88.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 545.)

[By Bag.]

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, October 26, 1922.

"TEMPS" reported last night that a rumour was current in the Chamber of Deputies that General Gouraud had resigned owing to refusal of adequate credits for Syria.

Press this morning denies truth of report, and points to fact that credits for army of Levant till end of year were yesterday voted by Chamber.

There appears, however, ground for believing that General Gouraud will, in fact, resign at the beginning of the new year in order to fill the vacant seat on the "Conseil supérieur de la Guerre."

[E 11689/178/65]

No. 89.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Dormer (Vatican Mission).

(No. 218.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 27, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 213 of the 19th October, I transmit to you the original letter to the Cardinal Secretary of State in reply to the Cardinal's letter of the 21st September to the late Prime Minister regarding the Holy Places Commission.*

2. Mr. Lloyd George had approved the draft of this letter, but refrained from signing it on its submission to him just before his resignation as he felt that he would have been presuming on his position at any time during the week in question if he had done so.

3. You should, therefore, communicate the letter in original and unsigned to Cardinal Gasparri, explaining the circumstances in order that his Eminence may not think that there has been any lack of courtesy.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11883/274/89]

No. 90.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 152.)

My Lord,

Beirut, October 18, 1922.

I HAVE in several recent despatches referred to the negotiations in progress here with the Kemalist delegation under Muhieddin Pasha for the conclusion of a customs agreement between Syria and Nationalist Turkey.

This agreement was signed on the 7th October. Its terms have not yet been made public, but it is understood that it is not what the French would have liked to obtain. That it is in the main unfavourable may be gathered from a leading article in "La Syrie," a local paper owned by a Frenchman, which, if not officially inspired, at any rate usually attempts to take the line which it believes to be agreeable to the French authorities. In this article great insistence is laid on the benefits which will accrue to Syria and the Lebanon, and notably from the favourable treatment to be afforded to Syrian silk and silk products, shoes and locally manufactured cotton cloths. Actually, the silk industry, which has greatly declined, is not of much importance from a

* See No. 86.

commercial standpoint; and what the Beirut and Aleppo merchants are interested in are the staple imported foreign goods which they wish to sell to their former customers over the border.

The rumours that Northern Syria, or some part of it, is to be handed back to the Turks are nowadays extremely persistent. I do not know of any concrete facts on which this belief is based, but it is impossible to know what bargaining has been going on here, and what promises M. Franklin-Bouillon may not have made since his reappearance in Asia Minor. But as a matter of practical politics it is clear that if Aleppo, and its port Alexandretta, are not on the same side of the frontier as their customers, they are already condemned to a lingering decline. Such palliative measures in the way of drawbacks on goods exported from Syria to Anatolia as the French may devise may delay the process, but they cannot avert it.

If the French Government were to decide to evacuate some part of the territory under its mandate, it could, I imagine, urge that its decision was justified on grounds of self-determination. In Syria, the Moslem majority is absolute, and there is no doubt that in their present mood the mass of the Moslems would welcome the return of the Turks. If I were called upon to hazard a personal opinion it would be that rumour is right, and that at no very distant date some part of Northern Syria will revert to Turkey.

(Copies to Cairo, Constantinople, Bagdad and Jerusalem.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 11992/274/89]

No. 91.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 293/217.)

My Lord,

Damascus, October 20, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that Sheikh Katani, referred to in my No. 280/206 of the 5th October, has now returned here, and from an anti-Turk local sheikh I have obtained confirmation of most of Henry's remarks contained in the previous despatch.

The sheikh declares his uneasiness as to the object of Katani's mission. Most people here believe it was to discuss the return of the Turks to Syria. The mission left here with the cognisance of the French delegation, and proceeded via Beyrout on a French steamer to some Anatolian port.

Katani refuses to discuss the object or result of his interviews in Anatolia, but since his return praises the Turks, and speaks highly of their affection for the Arabs.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 12306/274/89]

No. 92.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 300.)

My Lord,

Damascus, October 24, 1922.

WITH reference to passages in my recent reports in which I commented unfavourably upon the undue severity of the French authorities here with respect to the demonstrations of last April, and to my report of the forthcoming departure of Colonel Catroux (the French délégué), I now have the honour to give below some observations made by a reliable person who does not desire his name to be disclosed:—

"Colonel Catroux has resigned his position. His resignation is due to two reasons:—

"(1.) He proved that he was not wise in dealing with the people here during the demonstrations which took place a few months ago.

"(2.) It is supposed that he insisted upon the subject of the Syrian unity, i.e., to have one Syrian Government for all the Syrian zones which would be responsible to a Syrian Parliament in case of need.

"Having refused this last suggestion, the French Government hinted to Colonel Catroux that his resignation would be acceptable."

2. I cannot vouch for the above at all, and Colonel Catroux's departure was mooted before the arrival here of the French "Economic Mission."

The activities of the latter here would appear to have been confined largely to accepting invitations to banquets, &c., and making the usual speeches thereat. At Baalbek they arrived just in time for dinner in the ruins of the old Acropolis. This was followed by a few impassioned speeches and by a "Greek" dance upon a suitable platform among the ruins. The commission left immediately afterwards, and can scarcely have formed a correct impression of the economic conditions in the Northern Bekaa.

Their tour was stage-managed by the Haut-Commissariat, which would appear to have spared no effort to keep them amused while endeavouring to prevent them from hearing too many complaints.

3. Colonel Catroux's departure was, in fact, already certain before the arrival of this commission.

4. While the "Economic Mission" was watching Greek dances in the ruins of Baalbek the Damascus court-martial was attending to its duty, as will be seen from the extract from the "Alif Ba" of the 22nd October quoted below:—

"The court-martial in Damascus has sentenced Abdul Hakim Darkasly to five years' imprisonment, Rislân-el-Silk to three years, Hamdi Shalati and Hassan Mardini to two years' imprisonment each, because of the declarations they published during the final demonstrations which took place a few months ago."

I have, &c.
C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 12546/178/65]

No. 93.

Baron Moncheur to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 13.)

*Ambassade de Belgique, Londres,
le 11 novembre 1922.*

Milord,

MON Gouvernement a apprécié hautement la pensée de conciliation qui inspirait Lord Balfour lorsqu'à la séance privée du Conseil de la Société des Nations, tenue à Genève le 4 octobre, il a fait appel aux représentants des pays dans lesquels la majorité des chrétiens est catholique pour aider à résoudre la difficulté relative à la constitution de la Commission des Lieux-Saints en Palestine.

Je suis chargé de faire connaître à votre Seigneurie que le Gouvernement belge est heureux de répondre à cet appel, et s'efforcera, d'accord avec les autres nations catholiques, d'aider à la solution de la question.

Je saisis, &c.
BN. MONCHEUR.

[E 12582/582/65]

No. 94.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 13.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, November 13, 1922.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to refer to my letter of 30th October, in which you were informed of the oral assurances which had been given to the Emir Abdullah in regard to the future of Trans-Jordan, and to state that after discussion between his Highness and a representative of the Middle East Department of this Office the assurance, in a somewhat modified form, has been drafted for publication. A copy of this draft is enclosed for the consideration of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. The draft is practically a translation of an Arabic draft prepared by his Highness the Emir, with the important omission, however, of the word "completely," which appeared before "independent," and in such a connection might have been held to bind His Majesty's Government to recognise the sovereign independence of the Government of Trans-Jordan. As it now stands, the draft appears to his Grace to be unobjectionable and he trusts that it will commend itself to his Lordship.

2. As the arrangements are all made for his Highness to leave England to-morrow, and as it is most desirable that the text of the assurance should be agreed upon before he leaves, his Grace trusts that he may be favoured with an immediate reply.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 94.

Draft Notice for Publication of the Assurance given to Emir Abdullah.

SUBJECT to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, His Britannic Majesty's Government recognise the existence of an independent Government in Trans-Jordan, under the rule of his Highness the Emir Abdullah-bin-Hussein, provided that such Government be constitutional and place His Britannic Majesty's Government in a position to fulfil their international obligations in respect of that territory by means of an agreement to be concluded between the two Governments.

[E 12684/274/89]

No. 95.

Consul Morgan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 132.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, October 28, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that a party of Americans and English, who left Aleppo by car to visit Antioch on the 26th October, were attacked on the return journey on the 27th October by armed robbers. One of the Americans was killed.

The attack took place after sunset between the Afrin River and Katma. After firing a volley at the car the robbers looted what they could and made off. The car subsequently reached the French camp at Katma, and the travellers received every consideration.

Of the two Americans in the car, one, Wright by name, was killed instantaneously. The other was wounded in the leg. The chauffeur was also wounded.

The two British subjects, Dr. C. S. G. Mylrea and his wife, were not injured.

Dr. Mylrea is a medical missionary from Koweit, who has been spending a few days in Aleppo.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[E 12679/274/89]

No. 96.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 165.)

My Lord,

Beirut, October 31, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that, latterly, the state of public security in Central and Southern Syria has deteriorated. It has not yet reached the condition of the Aleppo district, as to which Mr. Morgan keeps your Lordship constantly informed, and where the latest incidents are the murders of Mustapha Bey-al-Azm, near Hama, and of Mr. Wright, a member of the American Near East Relief, but things have got to a point where travellers rather hesitate before setting out for such a well-known tourist resort as Baalbek.

The Bekaa Plain, in which Baalbek lies, is at present the scene of the operations of certain brigands who are said to be chiefly recruited from the villages of Britene and Nebi Osman. These operations are extended also to the Beirut-Damascus road. They not only pillage their victims, but also strip them. Recently some women arrived at Shtora, where the Baalbek and Damascus roads separate, clothed in but one garment apiece. Also quite recently M. Rouffie, Financial Adviser to the French High Commission, was attacked in the Anti-Lebanon, before reaching the Bekaa, robbed and stripped to his shirt. Yesterday armoured cars were noticed at Shtora, and efforts are evidently being made to restore the safety of this much-frequented route.

This state of things is probably in part due to the decrease of the French forces in Syria. The Turkish victories in Asia Minor, which have diminished European prestige, have also doubtless tended to lessen such respect for law and order as exists. Further, the local gendarmerie has not yet reached the highest point of efficiency.

(Copies to Bagdad, Cairo and Jerusalem.)

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[E 12677/178/65]

No. 97.

Mr. Wingfield to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 741.)

My Lord,

Madrid, November 8, 1922.

WITH reference to Sir Esme Howard's despatch No. 717 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Nuncio has now returned to Madrid, and has promptly published the following communiqué contradicting statements in the "Sol" with regard to the attitude of the Vatican on the question of the Holy Places:—

"A morning paper has stated that Cardinal Gasparri is unfriendly to Spain, and that in collaboration with the Italian Government he has sent to Palestine Cardinal Agustini (Giustini), in order that, in agreement with England and France, he should complete the total elimination from the Holy Land of the patronage of the Crown of Spain. It is but justice to state that these statements are false and entirely devoid of foundation."

The "Sol" publishes this notice with a statement that the articles referred to are by Señor Torrubiano y Ripoll, a learned theologian whose orthodoxy is above suspicion, but the purity of whose doctrine does not prevent him from exposing diplomatic intrigues against the spiritual empire of Spain.

A further article on this subject was published in the "Sol" on the same day by Señor Torrubiano, who claimed that his previous articles had had for effect the prompt return of the Nuncio, and a change in the policy of the Holy See, which had before, through the machinations of persons unnamed, been misinformed as to facts, and now realised that Spanish rights could not be set aside.

The Clerical and Conservative "Debate" accused the "Sol" of an attempt to stir up Anti-Clericalism by these articles, and stated that the Nuncio's activities in Rome have been all in the interests of Spain. It, moreover, published on the 28th ultimo a notice to the effect that the "Osservatore Romano" had denied that there was any truth in the reports of strained relations between Spain and the Vatican over "the scheme put forward by Lord Balfour concerning the Holy Places."

Yesterday I received a visit from the Belgian Ambassador, who came to enquire whether this Embassy was carrying on negotiations with the Spanish Government respecting the constitution of the commission to be set up in Palestine to deal with questions affecting the Holy Places. I told his Excellency that we were carrying on no negotiations on the subject here, and that, so far as I knew, the situation was that His Majesty's Government had submitted to the Council of the League of Nations proposals as to the constitution of such a commission, which had been withdrawn owing to the opposition met with, emanating principally, I believed, from the French member of the council. His Excellency replied that this was so, and that it had been left to the Catholic Powers to evolve an alternative scheme for acceptance by His Majesty's Government and by the Council of the League. He imagined that negotiations must now be in progress with a view to evolving such a scheme, and he desired to find out whether these negotiations were going on in Madrid, since Belgium desired to take part in them. He felt that Belgium, a Catholic country which was not a Great Power, might play an important part on any such commission; for the conflicting claims of France, Italy and Spain would cause each of those countries to be jealous of the others, with the result that the part of mediator might by common consent be assigned to Belgium.

His Excellency proposed to visit the Nuncio and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make enquiries of them as to where the negotiations in question were being conducted. I hope to learn from him in due course if these negotiations are taking place in Madrid.

I may mention in this connection that I have seen reports in the press of negotiations with the Vatican for an increase of the salaries of the parochial clergy, the funds being obtained by a reduction in the funds devoted to maintaining canons and other cathedral clergy.

I have, &c.
CHARLES WINGFIELD.

[E 12582/582/65]

No. 98.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 15, 1922.

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state for the information of the Duke of Devonshire that no objection is seen to the publication of a declaration to the Emir Abdullah on the lines indicated in the enclosure which accompanied your letter of the 13th instant, provided that the word "will" is inserted between "His Majesty's Government" and "recognise."

2. Having regard, however, to the difficult questions now at issue between the French Government and His Majesty's Government Lord Curzon is anxious that this declaration, which is susceptible of misconstruction in France, shall not be made public for at least ten days.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 13088/582/65]

No. 99.

The Duke of Devonshire to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).—(Received at Foreign Office, November 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, November 21, 1922.

PLEASE refer to Young's letter of 2nd November to Deedes on subject of negotiations with Abdullah. In light of representations made by Abdullah himself we have since considered terms of oral assurance. Amended formula has been agreed upon here (see my immediately following telegram), but as terms were still under discussion with Foreign Office when Abdullah left it was not given to him before his departure, though he knows the general nature of the proposed alterations. In order to have some tangible result of visit to England to show his people, he is most anxious to be able to announce terms of the assurance immediately on his return. This presents difficulties, as at a moment when cordial Anglo-French co-operation is absolutely essential, we are naturally averse to making an announcement that may possibly offend French Government. As Abdullah will be aware that on outcome of present Near East negotiations the future of Irak, Trans-Jordan, &c., may largely depend and that it would be just as fatal to his own interests as to ours to make any move at this juncture calculated to affect Anglo-French solidarity, he will appreciate the delicacy of the situation. We regret that for these reasons we must temporarily postpone publication of assurance. You may, however, tell Abdullah that revised wording is accepted and that when circumstances permit a public announcement will be made. He will realise that we shall have far less difficulty in making announcement if the arrest of Sultan Atrash and Gouraud's assailants has in the meanwhile reassured the French. Abdullah was due to arrive at Alexandria on 20th November, but his further movements are not known for certain. You should send Deedes or other senior official to meet him in Egypt if he remains any time there and make the position clear to him.

[E 13088/582/65]

No. 100.

The Duke of Devonshire to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).—(Received at Foreign Office, November 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, November 21, 1922.

SUBJECT to approval of the Council of the League of Nations, His Britannic Majesty's Government will recognise the existence of an independent Government in

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Trans-Jordan, under the rule of His Highness the Emir Abdullah Ibn Hussein, provided that such Government is constitutional and places His Britannic Majesty's Government in a position to fulfil their international obligations in respect of that territory by means of an agreement to be concluded between the two Governments.

[E 13235/13235/89]

No. 101.

Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 914.)

My Lord,

Cairo, November 18, 1922.

WITH reference to Lord Allenby's despatch No. 648 of the 13th August, in which was enclosed an account of some statements by Captain de Cardes, a member of General Gouraud's staff and now attached to the French Legation here, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of two letters addressed by the General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt to the War Office, relative to further expressions of opinion by the above-mentioned officer.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

ERNEST SCOTT.

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt to the Director of Military Intelligence.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Cairo, October 20, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to forward the following report of an interview with Captain de Cardes, who is detached from General Gouraud's headquarters in Syria to the French Residency here, and who has just returned from France, where he has been on leave. He came to General Headquarters recently and mentioned a good many subjects of interest as regards the French point of view in the Middle East. At the same time, although personally friendly in his relations with the staff here, it should be remembered that he has a reputation of being very anti-British, and it is said that he believes the aims of France and Great Britain in the world are irreconcilable.

First of all, he referred to the intrigues of the ex-Khedive, who is at the present moment at Lausanne, and, according to de Cardes, is anxious to obtain permission to visit France. He is said to have aspirations not so much in regard to this country, but towards obtaining some exalted position in Syria or Mesopotamia, and he is also stated to have entered into relations with the Lotfalla family as regards these objects. The Lotfalla family of rich Syrians has been on intimate terms with King Feisal and his brother. The members of the family are not viewed favourably by the French authorities in Syria, and General Gouraud recently refused to receive one of them at Beirut.

Continuing about Syria, Captain de Cardes said that General Gouraud had been a good deal criticised for the way in which he had established the Federation of the Lebanon; that, instead of forming a Government for the whole country in the hands of the Syrians, advised and supported by the French authorities, he had formed a number of separate provinces of petty States, in each of which a relatively large number of French advisers and other subordinates was necessary, and in consequence the expenses of the French civil administration could not be reduced. In Paris it was considered that he would have done better to have a separate native Government for the whole country, and that it was possible in consequence that if he failed to obtain the support of the French Government he would resign and be replaced by some other person.

In this connection, M. Jonnart had been mentioned, but Captain de Cardes had thought that he had no intention of accepting so difficult a post, and that it was more probable that M. de Caix, at present head of the civil administration in Syria, would replace General Gouraud.

On it being mentioned to Captain de Cardes that there had been persistent rumours in the press that the French Government intended to hand over the northern part of Syria to the Turks, he replied that he was certain that this policy had not been considered by the French Foreign Office, although he was aware of these rumours.

In speaking about the recent victories of Mustapha Kemal over the Greeks, Captain de Cardes stated that no French officers attached to the Turkish armies, with the exception of Colonel Mougin and his French mission at Angora and another officer employed in the local gendarmerie. He was very critical about M. Franklin-Bouillon, and said that this gentleman, in his original negotiations with Mustapha Kemal for the evacuation of Cilicia, had treated the Turks as victors and the French as vanquished, with the results which are now well known. He admitted that, in his opinion, it was a great mistake that the French troops should not have remained side by side with their British comrades in the neutral zone of the Straits, and appeared to regret that Italy and France had not supported Great Britain with their military forces. He did not, however, believe that Mustapha Kemal would either endeavour to extend Turkish rule to the south or towards Mesopotamia, thought that any movement against Mosul was highly improbable, and quoted the French Foreign Office in support of his opinion.

Referring to Egypt and to the proposed fête, which is spoken of in the local press in honour of the French support of Mustapha Kemal, Captain de Cardes stated that he was certain M. Gaillard, the French Minister in Egypt, had no intention of attending or being represented officially, and said he was far too intelligent to allow himself to be compromised in any such way.

Although there is perhaps nothing of great interest in Captain de Cardes's remarks, it is the first time that he has come to General Headquarters with the object of discussing generally the affairs of France in the Middle East.

I have, &c.

(For General Officer Commanding.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt to the Director of Military Intelligence.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Cairo, November 9, 1922.

IN continuation of my letter of the 20th October, 1922, I have the honour to inform you that Captain de Cardes came to General Headquarters on his return from Syria a few days ago.

He considered that it was certain that General Gouraud would resign his appointment in the near future, on the question of his policy. The Federated States of Syria which he has organised have not yet been successful in tranquillising and reorganising the country, and the French administration is very costly. In these circumstances General Gouraud feels that he cannot remain in his present position, and he is not prepared to change his policy or to refuse to support the policy of such persons as General de Lamoignon. Captain de Cardes did not, however, suggest the name of any possible successor to General Gouraud.

In regard to the rumours which I have already mentioned in my letter of the 20th October that there was some possibility of the French Government withdrawing from the north of Syria, Captain de Cardes stated categorically that there was no possibility of this, and that the French Government intended to remain in Syria in the territories in which the French now supervise the administration, and which, in fact, they govern.

The local troops now raised and being raised are not making much progress, and Captain de Cardes thought it probable that some attempt would be made to reorganise these forces on the same lines as those on which the Egyptian forces have now for so many years been organised and trained by British officers.

In spite of these remarks, it may be pointed out that rumours of a French withdrawal from part of Syria, purporting to come from well-informed persons, are still very prevalent in this country.

I have, &c.

(For General Officer Commanding.)

[E 13430/274/89]

No. 102.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 314.)

My Lord,

Damascus, November 16, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that Soubhi Bey Barakat, the President of the new Syrian Confederation, arrived here yesterday, and a fairly cordial reception was organised for him.

At the first dinner given him (last night) 100 notables, consuls, members of the delegation, &c., attended. Even Nouri Shalan was there.

The French delegate's speech was one of the most anodyne one could imagine, although he spoke for several minutes. Such sentiments as "You, Mr. President, feel exactly the same about the future of the Syrian Confederation as I do"; or "I feel the French are, in organising this federation, interpreting the mandate in the most liberal terms applicable, and I am pleased that the representatives of the foreign Powers are present to hear me make this statement" would not seem to commit anyone to anything in particular, and sceptics are not lacking who even consider the long life of the "Syrian Confederation" scarcely guaranteed by these pronouncements.

Barakat's reply, read by one of his staff, because he himself speaks neither Arabic nor French well, and presumably felt it out of place as yet to speak Turkish, was so anodyne as to be almost soporific. I gathered from the French delegate that both speeches had been drawn up by himself.

2. There was, however, one remark of real interest in the French delegate's speech. He talked of probable withdrawal of several of the actual "advisers" and of the restoration of certain power of administration and "self-expression" to the natives of this State.

I can therefore see no reason to change my view that the French are contemplating a gradual withdrawal from most of Syria, but I am no longer quite so convinced that motives other than those of indispensable economy are prompting them to take this step.

3. The present delegate leaves Syria on the 25th November, and, despite all direct enquiries, I have not been able to ascertain if any successor with the same full powers has been, or will be, appointed.

There are several rumours, but there is as yet nothing definite to go upon, and I fancy the delegation itself does not know what will eventually be done.

4. My own idea is that the recent visit of the "French Economic Mission" sounded the death-knell of the present (war time) semi-military form of administration.

5. This military administration has been, like all other similar ones in all countries, very efficient but slightly expensive, and the French delegate, despite his indisputable capacity and enormous energy, has never succeeded in completely pacifying this State for more than a few weeks at a time.

6. If your Lordship will pardon me for stating my opinion: We seem to manage somehow in Transjordan with a few "gendarmes," while the French appear to need whole brigades a few miles further north. Comment seems needless.

7. There appears to be a strong flow of possible Kemalist and even Bolshevik agents into Damascus recently.

In the case of Mohammed Kharboutli, quoted below, the French took strong action themselves and evicted him to Aleppo. I now hear he has been ordered to leave Aleppo, presumably for Anatolia.

I quote below *verbatim* the report on this individual and my informant's conclusions, but would venture to add that I consider extra vigilance to prevent entrance of Kemalists or possible Bolsheviks into our zones would not be misdirected at present. I am more stringent myself as to granting visas in doubtful cases.

Report follows:—

"(a.) Mohammed Kharboutli, the chief detective of Jemal Pasha, was permitted to return here, and the people began to think that the French meant something by allowing this man back.

"(b.) Meetings are being held in this town to discuss the situation should the Turks return here. The majority of the upper class people are against the Turks, but all the rest are in favour of them.

"(c.) The Turkish propaganda is successful; money is being bountifully spent for it.

"(d.) I see many Turks are returning here. Most of these are young and vigorous."

8. I also annex a further report upon the activities of a small alleged Turco-Bolshevik group.

As a comment, I can only say that no one likes the present Administration except those in it or connected with it, and the Kemalists would, according to the informant already quoted above, not be unpopular with much of the masses.

Soubhi Barakat himself is considered to be anti-European at heart, and fought the French at the head of his own "band" for several months, so that it might seem as if the French are likely to have their own troubles with the Kemalists, &c., before long. The only point I consider I have to keep in mind is, will Palestine or Irak be in any way affected?

The second report follows, but I can accept no responsibility for the accuracy of either this or the preceding report, as neither informant is personally known to me:—

"Subject:—

"Dr. Mustafa Fakhri.

"Raji Effendi-el-Kabanny.

"The above-mentioned have been imprisoned on the ground that they were negotiating with the Turks in Angora to start a Turkish-Bolshevik party in Syria. Besides this, they went to see Muhyeddin Pasha, the Governor of Adana and Celicia, when he was in Beyrout, and after having exchanged their views, Muhyeddin Pasha gave them 200 Turkish gold pounds to start this business, promising that in due course he would get them 25,000 Turkish gold pounds for the expenses of the propaganda in question.

"Raji Effendi-el-Kabanny confessed these facts at the Damascus court-martial, but his associates denied it."

9. It is needless for me to do more than allude to the many passages in the French press concerning possible further reductions of military and financial commitments in Syria. But it is clear that any sudden withdrawal of troops or collapse of the French "front" in the north might entail grave consequences for Palestine at least.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 13441/582/65]

No. 103.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 30.)

S r,

Downing Street, November 30, 1922.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to refer to your letter of the 15th November, regarding the publication of the assurance given to the Emir Abdullah, and to a copy of a telegram sent to you on the 25th November, in which the High Commissioner of Palestine stated that he had asked His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo to be good enough to convey to the Emir a statement in the sense of his Grace's telegram to Palestine, No. 390, dated the 21st November, of which you have received a copy.

I am to say that as the ten days covered by the stipulation in your above-mentioned letter have now elapsed, and as the Emir will have been fully acquainted by now with the views of His Majesty's Government as to the necessity for conciliating public opinion in France at this juncture, his Grace would be glad to know whether the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston agrees that the declaration to the Emir may now be published subject to the addition of the word "will," as suggested in the Foreign Office letter under reply.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 13757/274/89]

No. 104.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 8.)

My Lord,

Damascus, November 24, 1922.

COLONEL CATROUX'S views on Kemalism and Syria: American ideas: Kemalist bands.

I have the honour to report that Colonel Catroux, the French *délégué*, left here on the 22nd—probably for good.

Our last relations were cordial and the Consular Corps gave him a dinner. He is replaced at present by M. Schoeffler, head of the civil section of the delegation.

2. Colonel Catroux says he will take six months' leave, probably return to the army for a time and then look around.

One rumour is that he may become Député for his native town (in Algeria).

3. Catroux declared to me that he was leaving because the great reduction of credits for Syria made it impossible for him to run the local Administration on the old lines.

This would appear to agree with my previous surmises that the military administration was nearing its end and that Oseimi, &c., feared their subsidies would stop.

4. To my American colleague he declared that he feared France was too deeply involved with the Kemalists, and that France would either have to fight them in order to retain Syria, but—he feared from motives of economy—more probably have to evacuate the country. This might seem to confirm other "alarmist" surmises of mine.

5. My American colleague, *à propos de* what precedes, volunteered the opinion that if a conflict between ourselves and the Kemalists became inevitable the vast majority of public opinion in America would be in our favour.

He considered all the American army pro-British, but all the fleet anti-British.

He fancied Admiral Bristol would not return to Constantinople for any great length of time after the Lausanne Conference.

I made a non-committal reply.

6. Mr. Morgan has in recent despatches reported the activities of a band of brigands upon the Aleppo-Alexandretta road. They wiped out a small detachment of Senegalese (and incidentally mutilated their corpses) and shot a member of the American Near East Relief.

A friend of mine in the colonial infantry has just returned here and told me he was in charge of an independent detachment of forty-five men, two machine guns and a mule-gun. By sheer luck he blundered upon this band at a village in the adjoining mountains zone and got his gun and machine guns to bear in time. The band was dispersed, leaving seven dead and several wounded. Their leader was among the killed. Rifles captured from the Senegalese detail were found and also English rifles—obviously from the "gun-running districts" of Damascus, Hama, &c. They also had one Lewis gun. But the interesting point is that letters were found upon their leader clearly proving that he was in communication with Kemalists at Marash and elsewhere in Anatolia.

Whatever this particular officer's feelings may have been a few months ago, he is now—having himself discovered these letters and the mutilated bodies of the Senegalese detail—not exactly pro-Kemalist.

It is of interest to note that this band would not appear to have been of purely local origin, but to have been aided by the Kemalists; and clearly-proved cases like this might in the long run induce intelligent Frenchmen to realise they may have been "backing the wrong horse" themselves.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 14040/274/89]

No. 105.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 14).

(No. 180.)

My Lord,

Beirut, December 4, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the French intelligence report for the period 1st to 20th November, which is sufficiently interesting to be sent *in extenso*. I venture to call attention to the report as to the plantation of Russian colonists in Asia Minor in place of the deported Christians.

Copies of the report have been sent to General Staff Intelligence at Cairo, Constantinople, Bagdad and Jerusalem. As, however, I have two extra copies of the report, these have been sent to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Cairo and at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Bulletin périodique No. 56.—Période du 1^{er} au 20 Novembre 1922.

(Secret.)

AU cours de ces vingt jours, les événements en Turquie se sont précipités.

Mettant fin à la situation paradoxale qui partageait le pouvoir entre deux Gouvernements rivaux, la grande Assemblée d'Angora a destitué le Sultan, comme traître à la nation, et l'a décrété d'accusation publique. Sentant ses jours en danger, le Souverain déchu s'est réfugié à bord d'un navire anglais. Le Gouvernement d'Angora a pris tous les pouvoirs à Constantinople et dans la partie de la Thrace reconnue terre turque par l'Armistice de Moudania.

Le Khalifat vrai a été maintenu dans la famille d'Osman, mais sans aucun pouvoir temporel. La grande Assemblée, représentant la souveraineté nationale, détient seule tous les pouvoirs civils et militaires.

A la date du 18, le Prince héritier, Abdul Medjid, fils du Sultan Abdul Aziz, a été élu Khalif par la grande Assemblée et a accepté.

En même temps que s'effectuait cette double révolution, Angora mettait en application, sans transition ni ménagement, son programme national dans tous les territoires soumis à son autorité. A l'intransigeance, et souvent à l'exagération, des mesures prises, il semble bien se confirmer que, comme on pouvait le craindre, les Députés, grisés par leur victoire, sans contact suffisant avec l'extérieur, sont en prise à une véritable ivresse de nationalisme, qui parfois leur fait perdre le sens des réalités, et qui, en tous cas, soulève, en Anatolie, une nouvelle vague de xénophobie et de fanatisme; Moustapha Kémal et les éléments modérés semblent débordés.

L'influence des Soviets se fait aussi sentir plus efficacement, comme on le verra ci-après (Anatolie).

Entre-temps, la délégation turque, présidée par Ismet Pacha, se mettait en route pour Lausanne, et on apprenait que les conditions qu'elle compte présenter comportent non seulement la rétrocession du vilayet de Moussoul, mais encore une large rectification de frontière au profit des Turcs du côté de la Syrie.

De tels événements ne pouvaient que prolonger, en l'amplifiant, l'écho que la défaite des armées grecques avait eu en Syrie et dans les autres pays musulmans. Dans tous les pays de mandat, l'opinion s'est répandue, habilement propagée par la presse et les propagandistes de l'indépendance, que les mandats se trouvaient remis en question, puisque le Traité de Sèvres, qui le premier les a institués, se trouvera lui-même révisé à Lausanne. Une campagne se fait clandestinement dans ce sens en Syrie. De Palestine et d'Égypte, des délégations sont en route pour porter devant le Congrès de la Paix orientale les revendications des champions de l'indépendance arabe.

Si certains de ceux-ci, à qui leur passé fait redouter les Turcs, n'ont voulu attendre que d'eux-mêmes la défense de leur cause, d'autres, à tendances turcophiles, entraînés par les succès marquants que vient de remporter le Gouvernement d'Angora, ont mis leurs espoirs en lui. Ils se sont souvenus que l'article 1^{er} du Pacte national d'Angora stipule le droit pour les pays arabes de disposer d'eux-mêmes par un referendum, et une délégation syro-palestinienne, partie de Palestine, est allée le rappeler à Moustapha Kémal et lui demander son appui dans ce but, avant de se rendre à Lausanne.

Les décisions prises par Angora au sujet du Khalifat ont, de leur côté, causé une grosse émotion dans les milieux musulmans. Dans le premier moment de surprise, la réprobation a été presque générale. Puis ces milieux, balancés entre leurs sentiments religieux et l'attrait qu'exercent sur eux les Nationalistes d'Angora, sont ressaisis. Ils envisagent maintenant la situation avec plus d'indifférence. Il faut, en tout cas, attendre le développement des événements pour juger de leur attitude définitive, qui d'ailleurs ne semble pas devoir se marquer par de très vives manifestations.

L'annonce de la demande d'une rectification de frontière en Syrie a, de son côté, contribué à troubler les esprits, aussi bien chez les chrétiens que chez les musulmans; ces derniers, persuadés pour la plupart de la puissance actuelle de la Turquie restaurée par le Gouvernement d'Angora, y ont vu le prélude d'une aide prochaine. Les bruits les plus tendancieux sur la prochaine évacuation du pays par les Français, bruits auxquels les débats du Parlement et réductions des troupes d'occupation ont donné créance plus grande encore, se sont remis à circuler. Une active propagande des milieux turcophiles a aidé à leur diffusion.

Malgré cette fermentation des esprits, la Syrie est restée calme. La seule région encore troublée est le sud du Djebel-Druze, où Sultan Pacha-el-Attrache, toujours réfugié en Transjordanie, continue ses agissements et a encore opéré un coup de main.

Sir Herbert Samuel a annoncé que, sous la pression du Gouvernement britannique, l'Emir Abdallah a donné télégraphiquement de Londres, où il se trouve, des ordres pour l'arrestation de ce rebelle. Il est nécessaire que ses ordres reçoivent promptement exécution ou que le Haut-Commissaire français soit autorisé à faire bombarder le campement du Sultan Pacha, ainsi qu'il l'a demandé.

Anatolie.

Un renseignement de bonne source et recoupé rapporte qu'Aralof, représentant des Soviets à Angora, y jouit d'une très grande influence. Il poursuit avec opiniâtreté son programme d'amener progressivement la Russie à Constantinople et aux Détroits par l'Anatolie.

Il aurait déjà obtenu le remplacement des minorités chrétiennes d'Anatolie par des paysans ou artisans russes affamés. Ce mouvement, qu'il présente comme nécessaire à la régénération de la Turquie, épuisée par la guerre, aurait commencé au début d'octobre et devrait porter sur 500,000 personnes.

Les exilés russes, débarquant à Trébizonde, seraient transportés par camions dans les zones suivantes :

Première zone, Sivas	150,000
Deuxième zone, Kharput	150,000
Troisième zone, Césarée	100,000
Quatrième zone, Marache	50,000

Au début de novembre, une centaine de mille Russes auraient déjà été installés dans la première zone.

Ces faits, dont l'importance n'échappera pas, éclairent, s'ils se confirment, tout particulièrement la politique extrémiste d'Angora.

Territoires rétrocédés.

De Cilicie, notre consul à Adana fait connaître que les autorités locales, sur l'ordre d'Angora, ont institué une série de mesures comminatoires qui ont pour but de soumettre nos institutions et tous nos ressortissants aux règles édictées par Angora, les Capitulations n'existant plus aux yeux de ce Gouvernement.

Les écoles, à qui est imposée l'obligation d'avoir un certain nombre de professeurs turcs nommés par le Gouvernement, se verraient obligées, si elles ne se soumettent pas, de fermer leurs portes. Il en serait de même pour un certain nombre d'entreprises commerciales ou industrielles soumises à des exigences et à des entraves nouvelles.

L'évacuation complète de tous les chrétiens de l'Anatolie du Sud sera peut-être bientôt un fait accompli. Une proclamation affichée dans les principales villes les a invités à quitter volontairement le pays dans le délai d'un mois; 1,500 de ces malheureux sont déjà concentrés sans ressource à Mersine. Plusieurs convois importants de réfugiés sont arrivés à Djerablous. Après l'exode continu, qui s'est produit depuis l'accord d'Angora, on peut estimer à une dizaine de mille le nombre des chrétiens qui se trouvent encore en territoire turc, au voisinage de la frontière turco-syrienne. Le nombre de ceux qui sont entrés dans l'État d'Alep, du 1^{er} août au 1^{er} novembre, est de 3,900.

Mouheddine Pacha, Gouverneur général du vilayet d'Adana, a été nommé Ambassadeur à Téhéran et remplacé par le Colonel Kenaan Bey, le même qui avait succédé à Edib Bey dans la présidence de la Commission de Délimitation de la Frontière turco-syrienne.

État d'Alep.

Ouest d'Alep.—Le calme se rétablit peu à peu dans les régions récemment troublées, entre Alep et Antioche. De nombreuses arrestations d'individus ayant appartenu aux bandes ont été opérées dans les villages. Le versement des armes de guerre se poursuit simultanément. Plus de 9,000 fusils, provenant du Djebel-Zavaye, ont été recensés à Idlis dans le seul mois d'octobre.

Le groupe mobile du poste de Hadjilar a eu deux engagements, avec une bande connue, venant du territoire turc. Plusieurs bandits, dont un des chefs, des armes et des animaux, sont restés sur le terrain. Le reste de la bande a repassé la frontière.

On peut évaluer au minimum à une centaine le nombre des bandits tués jusqu'ici ou restés entre nos mains. Beaucoup de complices sont également arrêtés.

Alep.—Les décisions révolutionnaires d'Angora relatives au Khalifat et contraires à la loi religieuse ont été assez mal accueillies, en particulier par les personnages religieux, qui sont unanimes à les considérer comme une faute politique grave.

D'après les renseignements qui parviennent des villes turques voisines de la frontière, elles y auraient produit la même impression défavorable.

Territoires de l'Euphrate.

Calme.

État des Alaouites.

Aucun événement saillant. L'organisation du pays se poursuit méthodiquement. Trois nouvelles écoles ont été ouvertes, d'autres réparées, plusieurs tronçons de route achevés. Le développement du réseau routier amène une augmentation de transactions et par suite une baisse du prix de la vie. La situation agricole est satisfaisante; les surfaces cultivées sont supérieures à celles de l'année passée.

La culture du tabac, l'une des principales productions du pays, se poursuit normalement.

État de Damas.

La transhumance des grands nomades s'achève sans incidents. Presque tous ont entièrement acquitté l'impôt avant de regagner le désert. Le montant des sommes ainsi encaissées est de 150,000 francs.

Un peloton de la compagnie méhariste de Palmyre a eu un brillant engagement avec un rezzou de Sbaas, qui a été entièrement capturé, soit cinquante hommes et autant de méhara.

Djebel-Druze.

Sultan Pacha a exécuté un coup de main sur le village du Semej, voisin de la frontière, d'où il a enlevé une partie des récoltes. Le même jour, des cavaliers pillaient une caravane près de Muneidere (20 kilom. est de Basra). Un certain nombre d'agitateurs, gagnés à sa cause, jettent le trouble dans les villages de la frontière et y font du recrutement. Il leur est possible de représenter Sultan Pacha, en raison de l'impunité dont il jouit en Transjordanie, comme protégé par les Anglais, et ses gens payés par l'Emir Abdallah. Le Général Haut-Commissaire a demandé de nouveau au Haut-Commissaire britannique l'extradition de Sultan Pacha ou la liberté de bombarder son camp par avions. Une mesure énergique s'impose, en effet, pour mettre fin à une situation instable et dangereuse. Il a reçu la réponse mentionnée précédemment.

Grand Liban.

Les fêtes de la Nativité du Prophète se sont passées dans le calme, ainsi que dans le reste de la Syrie. Les éléments turcophiles les plus bruyants avaient renoncé à certaines manifestations qu'ils avaient préparées et auxquelles la Turquie devrait être associée. Toutefois, un groupe de manifestants ayant essayé d'arborer un drapeau turc, la gendarmerie est intervenue, comme l'ordre lui en avait été donné; au cours de l'échauffourée qui s'ensuivit, quatre manifestants et deux gendarmes ont été blessés.

Quant aux fêtes du 11 novembre, elles ont été célébrées avec un éclat tout spécial. Après une émouvante cérémonie aux cimetières militaires français, britannique, arabe et hindou, le Général Haut-Commissaire réunissait dans un banquet de 150 couverts toutes les notabilités de la ville. La journée se terminait par des fêtes et une grandiose retraite aux flambeaux, qui fut acclamée par les musulmans comme par les chrétiens.

*Haut-Commissariat de la République
française en Syrie et au Liban,
Beyrouth, le 21 novembre, 1922.*

[E 14257/582/65]

No. 106.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 20.)

Sir,

Downing Street, December 19, 1922.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of correspondence with Brigadier-General Sir G. Clayton on the subject of the future status of Trans-Jordan.

I am, &c.

J. E. MASTERTON-SMITH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 106.

Colonial Office to Brigadier-General Sir G. Clayton.

Sir,

Downing Street, December 18, 1922.

WITH reference to your previous communications with this office on the subject of the negotiations which you have been conducting on behalf of His Majesty's Government with the Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, and subsequently with His Highness's chief Minister, Riza Pasha-al-Rikabi, I am directed by the Duke of Devonshire to convey to you the following instructions.

With regard to the oral assurance that has been given to the Emir as to the recognition of an independent Government in Trans-Jordan, you should inform the Pasha that the question of publishing this assurance must be deferred pending the outcome of the Lausanne Conference.

With regard to the proposed agreement contemplated in the latter part of the above assurance, his Grace considers that negotiations cannot be carried beyond the stage which they have already reached. The draft agreement communicated to you on the 8th November has since undergone successive modifications as a result of your discussions with Rikabi, and of consultations with this Department and the Foreign Office. His Grace now desires me to communicate to you the enclosed revised draft ("draft of the 15th December") as representing the provisional conclusions that have been reached. You are authorised to communicate the substance, not the text itself, of this draft in the form of a written memorandum to Rikabi. In doing so you should explain to the Pasha that the document is not the draft of an agreement formally offered by His Majesty's Government, but merely represents the outcome of your own preliminary discussions with his Excellency. You may add, however, that you have been in close consultation with the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office throughout these discussions, and that the Department has laid the draft before the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who will be prepared, when the time comes, to submit the whole question for the consideration of the British Cabinet. You should make it plain to Rikabi that you can give no guarantee that your proposals will be accepted by the Cabinet either in whole or in part. You should also intimate to him that as His Majesty's Government are not prepared to carry the matter further for the present, no useful purpose will be served by his remaining any longer in England.

Your communication to the Pasha should be submitted to this Department in draft before it is actually presented to him.

I am to enclose for your information and guidance a copy of a note dealing with certain matters raised in the course of conversations on the draft of the 1st December last.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

*Agreement regarding Trans-Jordan. Draft dated December 15, 1922.**Preamble.*

Whereas it is desirable to take steps for the proper administration of the territories known as Trans-Jordan; and

Whereas the Government of His Highness the Emir Abdullah has set up a satisfactory administration in Trans-Jordan; and

Whereas, having regard to the just aspirations of the Arab peoples and to the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, dated the 16th September, 1922, His Britannic Majesty's Government have recognised the existence of an independent constitutional Government in Trans-Jordan under the rule of His Highness the Emir Abdullah Ibn Hussein:

Now it is hereby agreed and declared, &c., as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The executive authority entrusted to His Britannic Majesty as mandatory for Palestine shall be exercised by His Highness the Emir in that part of the area which is known as Trans-Jordan, and of which the boundaries shall be defined at the first favourable opportunity. Throughout the remaining clauses of this agreement the word Palestine, unless otherwise defined, shall be taken to mean that portion of the mandated territory which lies to the west of Trans-Jordan.

ARTICLE 2.

Subject to the provisions of this agreement, laws as also orders and regulations, with the full force of law for the good government of Trans-Jordan and for regulating the holding, disposal and devolution of property of every kind therein situate may from time to time be adopted, made, altered or abrogated by proclamation of the Emir. Such laws, orders and regulations may apply to any named part of Trans-Jordan, and may either explicitly or by necessary implication alter or abrogate any existing law, order or regulation. All such proclamations shall be forthwith notified to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE 3.

The laws, order, decrees or other enactments of the Legislative Council of Palestine shall not apply to Trans-Jordan, provided that where it appears to the Emir that any such laws, order, decree or other enactment is in conformity with the special conditions prevailing in Trans-Jordan and that its application to Trans-Jordan offers manifest advantages, he may by proclamation order its application to Trans-Jordan.

ARTICLE 4.

The Emir agrees that he will adopt or make all such laws, orders or regulations as may be required for the full discharge of the international responsibilities and obligations of His Britannic Majesty in respect of the territory of Trans-Jordan, and that no laws, orders or regulations shall be adopted or made by him which may hinder the full discharge of such international responsibilities and obligations.

ARTICLE 5.

The Emir agrees to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty's Government on all important matters affecting the international and financial obligations and interests of His Britannic Majesty. The Emir undertakes to follow a sound administrative, financial and fiscal policy in Trans-Jordan, and one which will ensure the stability and good organisation of its finances. He will take steps from time to time to keep His Britannic Majesty's Government informed of the measures adopted to give due effect to this undertaking.

ARTICLE 6.

There shall be an identical customs tariff, to be approved by His Majesty's Government, in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and there shall be no customs barrier between them.

Palestine shall pay to Trans-Jordan the estimated amount of customs duties levied on that part of the goods entering Palestine from territory other than Trans-Jordan which subsequently enters Trans-Jordan for local consumption, but shall be entitled to withhold from the sums to be paid on this account the estimated amount of customs duties levied by Trans-Jordan on that part of the goods entering Trans-Jordan from other than Palestine territory which subsequently enters Palestine for local consumption. The trade and commerce of Trans-Jordan shall receive equal facilities with those of Palestine at Palestinian ports.

ARTICLE 7.

So far as is consistent with the international obligations of His Britannic Majesty no obstacle shall be placed in the way of the association of Trans-Jordan for customs or other purposes with such neighbouring Arab States as may desire it.

ARTICLE 8.

The Emir Abdullah undertakes that he will accept and give effect to such reasonable provisions as His Britannic Majesty's Government may consider necessary in judicial matters to safeguard the interests of foreigners. These provisions shall be embodied in a separate agreement, which shall be communicated to the League of Nations, and pending the conclusion of such agreement no foreigner shall be brought before a Trans-Jordan court without the concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE 9.

His Britannic Majesty's Government undertakes that military support and assistance shall be provided to the armed forces of Trans-Jordan to such extent and on such terms as may from time to time be regulated by separate agreement.

ARTICLE 10.

Special agreements shall be made from time to time to regulate the granting of concessions, the exploitation of natural resources, railways, the making of loans and the granting of financial assistance, and other matters affecting the financial and economic development of Trans-Jordan.

ARTICLE 11.

A special agreement shall be concluded to provide for the extradition of persons convicted or accused of certain crimes.

ARTICLE 12.

This agreement shall come into force as soon as it has been approved by the Council of the League of Nations, to whom it will be submitted by His Majesty's Government. Nothing shall prevent the contracting parties from reviewing from time to time the provisions of this agreement with a view to any revision which may seem desirable in the circumstances then existing, and any modifications which may be agreed upon shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations for their approval.

Enclosure 2 in No. 106.

Brigadier-General Sir G. Clayton to Colonial Office.

Sir,

London, December 18, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of to-day's date, and, in reply, to submit the draft of a communication which I propose, subject to the approval of his Grace the Duke of Devonshire, to hand to Riza Pasha-al-Rikabi.

I have, &c.

G. F. CLAYTON.

Draft Letter to Riza Pasha-al-Rikabi.

Your Excellency,

December 1922.

I have the honour to state that I am now in a position to inform you of the results arrived at in consequence of the conversations which I have held with His Highness the Emir Abdulla and with your Excellency.

With regard to the oral assurance that has been given to His Highness the Emir Abdulla as to the recognition of an independent Government in Trans-Jordan, I am directed to inform your Excellency that it is regretted that publication of this assurance must be deferred pending the outcome of the Lausanne Conference.

With regard to the proposed agreement contemplated in the latter part of the above-mentioned assurance, the Secretary of State for the Colonies considers that negotiations cannot for the present be carried beyond the stage which they have already reached, and I am instructed to state that His Britannic Majesty's Government are not prepared to give a definite decision on this question for the moment.

It would therefore appear that no useful purpose would be served by delaying your Excellency any further in England.

Throughout the course of our conversations I have been in close consultation with the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office, and the proposals which I have put forward as a result of our discussions have been laid before the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who will be prepared, when the time comes, to submit the whole question for the consideration of the British Cabinet.

While unable to give any guarantee that my proposals will be accepted by the Cabinet either in whole or in part, I think it desirable to recapitulate them in this letter for the information of your Excellency, and in order that you may be in a position to report fully to His Highness the Emir Abdulla on your return to Trans-Jordan.

I have suggested that the agreement contemplated in the latter part of the oral assurance given to His Highness the Emir should be drawn up on the following lines:—

A preamble, stating the desirability of taking steps for the proper administration of the territories known as Trans-Jordan which are at present being satisfactorily administered by the Emir Abdulla Ibn Hussein, alluding to the regard of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the just aspirations of the Arab peoples, quoting a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, dated the 16th September, 1922, and recording the recognition by His Britannic Majesty's Government of an independent constitutional Government in Trans-Jordan under the rule of His Highness the Emir Abdulla Ibn Hussein. A series of articles:—

Providing for the exercise by His Highness the Emir Abdulla Ibn Hussein of the executive authority entrusted to His Britannic Majesty's Government as mandatory for Palestine in that portion of the area known as Trans-Jordan, of which the boundaries will be defined at the next favourable opportunity.

Authorising the issue by proclamation of His Highness the Emir of laws, orders and regulations with the full force of law for the good government of Trans-Jordan. All such proclamations to be notified to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Laying down that laws, orders and decrees or other enactments of the Legislative Council of Palestine shall not apply to Trans-Jordan, except in cases where His Highness the Emir shall deem it in the interests of Trans-Jordan to so apply them.

Recording the consent of His Highness the Emir to adopt or make all such laws, orders or regulations as may be required for the purpose of ensuring full discharge of the international responsibilities and obligations of His Britannic Majesty in respect of Trans-Jordan, and an assurance that no laws, orders or regulations will be adopted or made by him which may hinder the full discharge of such international responsibilities and obligations.

Noting the willingness of His Highness the Emir to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty's Government in all important matters affecting the international and financial obligations and interests of His Britannic Majesty and his undertaking to follow a sound administrative, financial and fiscal policy in Trans-Jordan with a view especially to ensuring the stability and organisation of its finances.

Recognising the right of Trans-Jordan to the full amount of customs duties on goods entering Palestine from territory other than Trans-Jordan and subsequently entering Trans-Jordan for local consumption, it being understood that there shall be an identical customs tariff to be approved by His Britannic Majesty's Government in Palestine and Trans-Jordan and no customs barrier between the two countries.

Undertaking that trade and commerce of Trans-Jordan will receive equal facilities with those of Palestine at Palestinian ports and recording the fact that His Britannic Majesty's Government will place no obstacle in the way of the association of Trans-Jordan for customs or other purposes with such neighbouring Arab States as may desire it, provided the international obligations of His Britannic Majesty are not adversely affected thereby.

Giving an undertaking by His Highness the Emir Abdulla that he will accept and give effect to such reasonable provisions as His Britannic Majesty's Government may consider necessary in judicial matters in order to safeguard the interests of foreigners, and laying down that until a separate agreement is concluded on this subject, no foreigner will be brought before a Trans-Jordan court without notification to and the concurrence of the chief British representative in Trans-Jordan.

Providing for the conclusion of special agreements to be made from time to time to regulate the granting of concessions, the exploitation of natural resources, railways, the making of loans and the granting of financial assistance and other matters affecting the financial and economic development of Trans-Jordan; and the provision of military support and assistance on such terms and subject to such conditions as may from time to time be agreed upon by the two Governments.

Provision for a special agreement to be concluded in order to provide for the extradition of persons convicted or accused of certain crimes.

It would be understood that any agreement which may hereafter be concluded on the above lines would be submitted by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations, and that nothing would prevent the contracting parties from reviewing from time to time the provisions of such agreement with a view to any revision which might seem desirable in the circumstances then existing, provided

that any modifications which might so be agreed upon should be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

I trust that your Excellency will consider that the result of our conversations is not unsatisfactory, bearing in mind the change which has arisen in the general situation since the date on which His Highness the Emir and yourself were invited to come to London. I think it may be said that considerable progress has been made, and the ground cleared for a future definite arrangement on lines satisfactory to both parties, when His Britannic Majesty's Government find themselves in a position to deal fully with the whole question. I venture to conclude by a sincere expression of my personal thanks for the invariable courtesy and consideration which has been shown to me throughout our conversations by His Highness the Emir and your Excellency.

Enclosure 3 in No. 106.

Colonial Office to Brigadier-General Sir G. Clayton.

Sir,

Downing Street, December 18, 1922.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to acknowledge receipt of your letter enclosing the draft of a communication which you propose to hand to Riza Pasha-al-Rikabi, in pursuance of instructions contained in my letter of to-day's date. In reply, I am to inform you that the terms of the draft enclosed in your letter are approved.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 14552/891/89]

No. 107.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 186.)

My Lord,

Beirut, December 12, 1922.

WHENEVER an occasion arises, the local representative council, which, it may be mentioned in passing, has so far not distinguished itself, unless its unanimous decision to increase its members' salaries may so be reckoned, is always glad of an occasion to display its dislike of the continued existence of the Capitulations.

Recently such an occasion presented itself when the council was called upon to discuss the proposed sale of certain Crown land near the Beirut River to the Vacuum Oil Company. It unanimously refused to sanction the particular sale, or indeed the sale of any such land to foreigners, so long as the Capitulations are in force. The Government delegate assured the council that the question of the suspension of the Capitulations was being studied by the Haut-Commissariat, and he begged the Deputies to weigh their words lest they should be interpreted as signs of xenophobia and upset other negotiations in progress.

I venture to think that this incident is significant. To my mind there undoubtedly exists a certain jealousy of foreigners. This may be due to perverted feelings of nationalism, but it is none the less unfortunate, as, if Syria is to thrive, it has great need both of foreigners and of foreign capital.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 14562/274/89]

No. 108.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 341.)

My Lord,

Damascus, December 13, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that a few days ago the local papers announced that the Jebel Druze had been recognised as an independent State (i.e., outside the new Syrian Confederation).

It is too early yet to speculate on what the exact political position of the Jebel Druze is. But they have a small agency here—rather similar to that now being created (under my supervision) by Ibn Saud's new agent.

This will form the subject of a separate despatch in due course.

2. The Governor called upon me last Friday, and informed me that in most of the mosques the prayers had not been offered in the name of Kemal's new Caliph, but still in the name of the former Caliph.

He added that the vast majority of Moslems here were—at least for the moment—alienated by the action of Angora; and that he considered the Kemalists had won a victory in the field, only to lose part of its fruits through bad diplomacy.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 14549/274/89]

No. 109.

Consul Morgan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 154.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, December 16, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that the ceremony of the unveiling of the new Syrian Federal Flag and of the opening of the Federal Council took place here on the 11th December in the presence of the acting French High Commissioner.

An orderly and representative crowd assisted at the ceremony. Nothing in the nature of a hostile attitude or demonstration was remarked.

The people seem now well in hand.

Subhi Bey Bereket, in his speech, stated that the nation would prove itself worthy of its independence by reforming the tribunals.

(This is certainly the most urgent need of this country. The tribunals have not been reformed yet, nor, as long as they are left in the hands of natives as at present, will they ever be.)

M. de Caix, in his reply, explained that it was the wish of France that Syria should advance towards independence, that France had given liberty to most nations. More especially its decisive intervention had assured the independence of the United States and the freedom of Belgium, and he hoped that the destiny of Syria would be as fortunate as that of these two nations whom France had helped to come into being.

After the opening of the Federal Council it proceeded to the formation of commissions for Finance, Justice and Evkaf Affairs, Public Works and Agriculture, Commerce, Education and Health.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 14637/582/65]

No. 110.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 30.)

Sir,

Downing Street, December 29, 1922.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, copy of a letter from Riza Pasha-al-Rikabi to Sir G. Clayton, on the subject of the future status of Trans-Jordan.

I am, &c.

J. E. MASTERTON-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Riza Pasha-al-Rikabi to Sir G. Clayton.

Your Excellency,

London, December 19, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letters of the 18th December, which deal with our conversations.

I beg to remind your Excellency that matters related to the foreign representation and the use of good offices to secure the admission of Transjordan to membership of the League of Nations and that all advices and assistance provided by His Britannic Majesty's Government shall be without prejudice to the independence of Transjordan, were mentioned in the original draft of the proposed agreement to which His Highness

Emir Abdullah gives great importance and which I trust will be placed before the Cabinet when the proposed agreement is submitted to her.

I beg to inform your Excellency also that on my arrival at Amman I shall submit the whole of these questions to His Highness and hope to give you a full answer at an early date.

I have lately received a cablegram from His Highness, in which he states that the prevailing local situation and his great confidence in His Britannic Majesty's Government's good intentions made him believe that the announcement of the declaration and proposed agreement would have been hastened during the fixed period.

I take, &c.

RIZA PASHA-AL-RIKABI.

CHAPTER IV.—GENERAL.

[E 6871/6453/65]

No. 111.

British Counter-draft of a proposed Agreement with the Italian Government.—
(Communicated to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 7, 1922.)

Preamble.

THE Italian Government and the Government of His Britannic Majesty, being desirous of collaborating in a friendly spirit, and in harmony with the other Powers, in the re-establishment of the peace and economic prosperity of Europe;

Having agreed that in all questions which may arise between them, and in particular in all questions affecting the political and economic settlement in the Mediterranean, they will proceed to a full and frank exchange of views:

Have considered it desirable previously to examine certain specific questions outstanding between them and by mutual and interdependent concessions on these questions to prepare the way for amicable collaboration in the future.

His Majesty's Government, recognising that circumstances have precluded Italy from realising to the full her aspirations as embodied in the Treaty of London of the 26th April, 1915, and desiring to fulfil, in so far as is now possible, the assurances given to Italy under that treaty, welcome the present agreement as liquidating such obligations in a manner satisfactory to both countries. The Italian Government for their part recognise that with the signature of the present agreement the obligations of His Majesty's Government under the treaty of the 26th April, 1915, must be regarded as having been met.

ARTICLE 1.

Peace with Turkey.

The British and Italian Governments agree to conform their policies, on the basis of the conclusions arrived at unanimously by the representatives of the British, Italian and French Governments at the conference held at Paris in March last, with a view to expedite the establishment of peace between Greece and Turkey and between Turkey and the Allies, and particularly with a view to ensure in the eventual settlement the freedom of the Straits and the effective protection of the minorities in the Near East.

ARTICLE 2.

Palestine and Irak Mandates.

In order to facilitate the return to normal conditions in Palestine and Irak, the Italian Government agree, in view of the explanations and assurances given by His Majesty's Government in the annex, to give their formal support to the terms of the mandate for Palestine at the forthcoming session of the Council of the League of Nations, and also to support the terms of the draft mandate for Irak when this draft comes before the council.

His Majesty's Government agree on their part that article 18 of the Palestine mandate shall be regarded as applying to Italy notwithstanding the provisions of article 6 of the tripartite agreement of the 10th August, 1920.

ARTICLE 3.

Tripartite Agreement.

With a view to assist the Italian Government as far as possible in securing the benefits recognised in favour of Italy under the tripartite agreement, His Majesty's Government are prepared to support diplomatically with the Turkish Government any reasonable claim for economic concessions in the zone where Italian interests are specially recognised, which Italian financial groups may put forward to the said Government in accordance with the terms of the tripartite agreement, provided always that the said claims for concessions do not infringe in any way the interests already

acquired by British nationals or firms or British-controlled firms, and that in particular the Italian Government pledge themselves to take into friendly consideration the interests of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company.

ARTICLE 4.

Oil Concessions in Anatolia.

In accordance with the terms of Mr. Lloyd George's letter addressed to Signor Schanzer on the 17th May, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support any agreement freely negotiated by Italian and British firms for oil concessions in Northern Anatolia outside the zone in which French interests are specially recognised, provided that the British and Italian firms in question agree to act in concert and apply to their respective Governments for the necessary support, and provided that no pledge for official support had already been given by His Majesty's Government to other firms applying for similar concessions in the area concerned.

ARTICLE 5.

Cœnaculum.

His Majesty's Government have redrafted article 14 of the draft mandate for Palestine, and they are confident that under the provisions of that article in its present form the Italian desiderata regarding the Holy Place near Jerusalem, known as the Cœnaculum, will receive full and impartial consideration.

Should the report of the Holy Places Commission be in favour of the Italian claim, and be confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government will do all in their power to secure its immediate execution.

ARTICLE 6.

Cyrenaica.

(British Counter-Draft.)

His Majesty's Government agree to furnish to the Italian Government their support with the Egyptian Government in order to reach a speedy conclusion of the convention for the modification of the Cyrenaico-Egyptian frontier on the basis already agreed between the British and Italian Governments.

ARTICLE 7.

Senoussi.

(British Counter-Draft.)

His Majesty's Government undertake to conform their policy in regard to the Senoussi and their chiefs to that of the Italian Government in accordance with the agreement of July 1916.

ARTICLE 8.

Jubaland.

His Majesty's Government undertake to sign a convention to come into force on the 1st June, 1923, for the cession to Italy of Jubaland, provided such convention covers the conditions contained in the two notes of the 23rd December, 1921, from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador in London.

ARTICLE 9.

Dodecanese.

The Italian Government on their part undertake to execute, at the end of six months from the date of the signature of the present agreement, the treaty signed between Greece and Italy on the 10th August, 1920, relating to the Dodecanese, subject to any revision of that treaty which may be agreed upon between the two parties within the said period of six months. His Majesty's Government will support the view of the Italian Government that in such a revised treaty between Greece and Italy provision should be made in accordance with the recommendation of the Ambassadors' Conference of 1913-14, and with the clause of the Tittoni-Veniseles Agreement for the neutralisation of the Corfu Channel.

ARTICLE 10.

Emigration.

[To be drafted in direct communication between the Italian delegates and the Board of Trade.]

ARTICLE 11.

Publication of Agreement.

The text of this agreement shall be communicated to the League of Nations in accordance with article 18 of the covenant.

Annex.

Palestine.

1. The British Government assure the Italian Government that nothing will be done in establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine which might prejudice the civil or religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

2. Article 11 of the draft mandate for Palestine is not intended to preclude the participation of Italian enterprise in public works, services and utilities, and in the development of the national resources of the country so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. In the event of such participation, His Majesty's Government are prepared favourably to consider a special arrangement being negotiated with the Italian Government to regulate the conditions of such Italian labour as might consequently be admitted into Palestine.

3. The British Government assure the Italian Government that, under the constitutional proposals that are now under consideration for Palestine, His Majesty's Government have included provisions in virtue of which foreign nationals, including, of course, Italian citizens, should have the right to be tried by a court with a majority of British judges; except in trivial cases, in which these provisions would lead to administrative inconvenience, and that in this case foreign nationals would have the special right to appeal to a court composed with a majority of British judges.

4. The British Government assure the Italian Government that the use of the word "maintain" in article 15 of the draft mandate was not intended to restrict the opening of new Italian schools or to restrict the right of such schools to admit pupils of another community.

5. The British Government assure the Italian Government that the second clause of article 16 of the draft mandate is intended to show that the supervision of the mandatory will be strictly limited to that required for the maintenance of public order and good government. They add that there is no intention of permitting any arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of any religious community.

6. The British Government assure the Italian Government that in the event of the Italian economical zone in Asia Minor materialising, and in the event of any customs arrangement being concluded with the French Government in respect of sea-borne commerce between Palestine and Syria, His Majesty's Government would give a favourable consideration to any proposals for a similar arrangement to be entered into with the Italian Government in respect of sea-borne traffic between Palestine, on the one hand, and the Italian economic zone and Rhodes on the other.

7. The British Government assure the Italian Government that consignments imported for the use of Italian schools, orphanages, asylums, hospitals and dispensaries in Palestine should be admitted free of duty. Consignments addressed to other institutions, such as hospices, wine industries, printing-presses, bookbinding establishments, &c., would, however, be chargeable with full import duties. Consignments intended for the use of places of worship, monastic orders (not engaged in any form of trade, profession or commerce) would be admitted free of duty. Goods intended for the personal use of all members of any ecclesiastical institution would be admitted free only up to a limited sum. It is clearly understood that these privileges are only accorded so far as and so long as their terms are strictly adhered to in the letter and in the spirit.

8. The intention of the new draft of article 14 of the mandate for Palestine, as amplified by the explanations given to the council of the League of Nations in the note sent by His Majesty's Government to the council on the 1st July, in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter of the 15th May, 1922, is to ensure that the well-known

Catholic interests in the Holy Places of Palestine, as, indeed, the interests of all confessions, should be completely guaranteed and adequately safeguarded in perpetuity.

In the view of His Majesty's Government the use of the words "determine existing rights" in the new draft of article 14 does not imply that in cases where these rights are clearly established and there are no conflicting claims, more is required than that such rights should be registered by the commission and included in their report to the mandatory.

Irak.

In view of the fact that the Irak mandate is not at the present under discussion and that the political conditions in Irak and Palestine are not exactly similar, the British Government give to the Italian Government the general assurance that, so far as the different conditions of Irak will permit, His Majesty's Government will ensure that Italian interests in Irak will be safeguarded on similar lines to those now suggested for Palestine.

Foreign Office, July 5, 1922.

[E 11065/27/44]

No. 112.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 3112.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 13, 1922.

THE French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and asked on behalf of his Government if His Majesty's Government would agree to a proposal that the Allied contingents which, under the Mudania Convention, are on the eve of starting for Thrace should be placed under the single command of the French General Charpy. He pointed out that that officer had had considerable experience of Thrace during and since the war, and he thought that his appointment would be agreeable to everyone concerned.

I asked whether this appointment, if made, was in any way to derogate from the authority of General Harington, who was the Allied Commander-in-chief in Constantinople; and I said that I thought the command would more naturally have devolved upon the latter officer.

The Comte de Saint-Aulaire, however, assured me that there was no idea of impugning the authority of General Harington, and the suggestion was that General Charpy should be in command of the various detachments in Thrace alone.

I had in my hands a telegram just received from General Harington, in which he himself appeared to concur in the advisability of having a single commander, but added that his colleagues had regarded it as inadvisable. There was, however, to be a further meeting on the subject to-day, the result of which General Harington had promised to telegraph to England. I thought, therefore, that I had better await this communication before expressing a final opinion to the Ambassador.

His Excellency next referred to a communication his Government had received from General Gouraud, pointing out that the British consul in Damascus had claimed the right to protect certain Arabs of Nejd, who were in the Syrian capital. The French Government wished to know whether we regarded Nejd as being within the British sphere of influence, though it did not seem to be so regarded in the arrangements that had been concluded with regard to the Near East.

I replied at once that Ibn Saud, the ruler of Nejd, was in treaty relations with us; that he was one of the Arab chiefs who received an annual subsidy from Great Britain; and that accordingly the claim of the British consul in Damascus seemed to be entirely justified.

The Ambassador then asked me what was the opinion of His Majesty's Government with regard to the announcement just made by the Italian Government that they regarded the agreement concerning the surrender of the Dodecanese, which they had made with the Greek Government after the war, as null and void, their argument apparently being that, as the Treaty of Sèvres had fallen to the ground, this agreement, which was connected with it, had collapsed also.

I replied immediately that this was an attitude in which we could not possibly acquiesce, and that I was engaged at the moment in drawing up a note in reply to the communication of the Italian Ambassador, in which I should point out to him that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, which had frequently been expressed

before, all these arrangements were part of a single whole; that the Italian Government could not escape from their obligation by repudiating it merely because Greece was down; and that we, at any rate, could lend no sort of support to such a proceeding.

Finally, I acquainted his Excellency with the communications which had just passed between M. Poincaré and myself with regard to the impending Peace Conference for the affairs of the Near East. I told him that I had learnt with surprise, both that M. Poincaré was prepared to reconsider the suggestion of Smyrna as the seat of the conference, although it had been ridiculed both by M. Poincaré himself in Paris and by his Excellency whenever I had mentioned the subject to him; and also that, in the same communication in which the French Prime Minister insisted upon an almost immediate meeting of the conference, he actually proposed to make his final opinion on this point dependent upon the advice of M. Franklin-Bouillon, who was not expected to return to France for two or three days. I told the Ambassador unhesitatingly that we would in no circumstances accept Smyrna, and, indeed, would be very reluctant to depart from the suggestion of Lausanne or Geneva, which I had submitted, and that we regarded with no small resentment this constant appeal to the intervention and authority of M. Franklin-Bouillon, whom His Majesty's Government did not regard as entitled to any voice in the matter at all. M. Poincaré had been kind enough to promise to continue the discussion with me by personal correspondence, but, upon the two points I had mentioned, I thought it right to indicate to the Ambassador my opinions without further delay.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11066/27/44]

No. 113.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 1534.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 13, 1922.

IN my conversation with the American Ambassador yesterday afternoon I mentioned to him the question of the forthcoming peace conference to settle the conditions of the Near East.

I told him that the conference would assemble probably within a month's time and that the most important question which it would have to settle would be the future regulation of the Straits. I said that I had observed with much interest that American opinion was greatly aroused on this matter, and, as far as I could judge, was entirely in favour of the strong line which the British Government had been compelled to take in order to ensure the future freedom of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. Such I believed also to be the opinion of the President and the Secretary of State. I had even seen indications that America might not be unwilling to join in some capacity in the discussion and settlement of a question that so clearly concerned the peace, not of Europe or Asia only, but of the world. It had not yet been settled where the conference was to meet or who should issue the invitations. Everyone, I was sure, would like America to be represented during that part of the discussions which dealt with the Straits, but there would be a natural reluctance to issue an invitation if it were destined to be refused. I reminded Mr. Harvey that, while the conference that drew up the Treaty of Sèvres was sitting in San Remo, the then American Ambassador in Rome, Mr. Johnson, had appeared upon the scene and had assisted at, though he had not actually taken part in, the deliberations of the conference. This was a precedent that might be borne in mind. Anyhow, I suggested to Mr. Harvey that he should consult his Government as to their views on the matter, and should let me know whether the idea of attendance would be welcome to them. The British point of view was, as I believed, the American point of view, and the stronger the backing that it had at the conference the more likely it would be to prevail.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Note on the Possibility of a Turco-Egyptian Peace Treaty.

IT has been suggested that the possibility of inviting Egypt to conclude a separate treaty with Turkey on the matters hitherto covered by the Egyptian chapter in the Treaty of Sèvres should be examined. In the accompanying memorandum an endeavour has accordingly been made to analyse the articles dealing with Egypt in the Treaty of Sèvres from this standpoint. In the absence of Sir Cecil Hurst and Mr. Malkin, I have consulted Mr. Sherman on many points, and he has expressed his general agreement with the contents of this analysis.

2. If Egypt is to conclude a separate treaty with Turkey, it is of importance to His Majesty's Government that no risks should be run of certain interests, vital to Great Britain and hitherto covered by the draft Treaty of Sèvres, being compromised by separate negotiations between Egypt and Turkey. These interests are set forth in paragraphs I (a) to (d) in the accompanying memorandum. There appear to be two ways of ensuring that these interests are safeguarded:—

- (a.) By His Majesty's Government being a third party to any negotiations or treaty signed between Egypt and Turkey;
- (b.) By His Majesty's Government obtaining preliminary assurances from Egypt that these interests shall be safeguarded before Egypt and Turkey meet at the conference table.

3. I venture to think that the second alternative (b) has distinct advantages over (a), inasmuch as we can probably secure more out of Egypt alone without Turkish interference and intrigue to contend with at the same time, and our credit in Egypt will be enhanced if we leave her alone to negotiate with Turkey and do not appear as a sort of watchdog and spoil-sport in the background.

4. If the second alternative be accepted, it remains to be decided how we should approach the Egyptian Government and what form we should give to our requirements. It will be seen from paragraph I of the attached memorandum that most of the essential British interests can be safeguarded if we secure from Egypt an assurance that she will enter into no agreement with Turkey upon any point which prejudices the maintenance of the *status quo* as regards the four reserved subjects without previously obtaining our consent. The present Egyptian Government could hardly refuse to give such an assurance, seeing that its tenure of office depends upon its acceptance of the *status quo*.

5. As regards the matters I have characterised in the memorandum as non-British and purely Egyptian interests, subject to any observations Lord Allenby may have to offer on them (and especially on the matters dealt with in articles 110 and 111), I think we can safely allow Egypt to come to what arrangement she chooses upon them.

6. There remain the Allied interests as specified under paragraph III of the memorandum. As regards the service of the Tribute Loans, we might perhaps suggest to Egypt that we will be prepared to exact from Turkey in the treaty to be signed with the Allied Powers the recognition of Egyptian independence and of Egypt's condominium with us over the Soudan, if she will enter into a preliminary agreement with us to pay, as heretofore, the service of the Tribute Loans. The quarantine question, we can argue, is a foreign interest regarding which the *status quo* must be maintained, and Egypt must enter into no agreement with Turkey which prejudices it.

7. I venture therefore to suggest that we should inform Lord Allenby that we have given careful consideration to his arguments in favour of supporting Egypt's claim to be a signatory at the forthcoming conference; that while we should welcome the presence of an Egyptian representative at the seat of the conference, the eventuality of Egypt being invited to sign the treaty is excluded for the reasons mentioned in our telegram No. 257. We have, however, been examining the possibility of Egypt's signing a separate treaty with Turkey in order to liquidate the state of affairs between the two countries arising out of the war, and the following procedure, on which we should be grateful for his views, has been suggested:—

That His Majesty's Government should inform the Egyptian Government that, in view of the newly acquired status of Egypt under the declaration to King Fuad of the 28th February, they would be glad to see Egypt negotiating a separate treaty with Turkey with the above object in view; that in order to permit of such a procedure His Majesty's Government are willing to secure from Turkey, in the treaty of peace to

be signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers, the recognition of Egypt's independence as defined in that declaration, and the recognition of Egypt's condominium in conjunction with Great Britain over the Soudan, if Egypt on her side is prepared to guarantee the service of the Tribute Loans in the manner outlined in our telegram No. 259, and to give an undertaking that she will enter into no agreement with Turkey upon any point which prejudices the maintenance of the *status quo* as regards the four reserved subjects mentioned in the declaration of the 28th February without previously obtaining our consent.

8. We could in another telegram explain to Lord Allenby how the above formula appears to us to safeguard essential British interests, and ask for his advice as regards the special points connected with articles 110 and 111.

E. M. B. INGRAM.

October 19, 1922.

Egypt and the Treaty of Sèvres.

The matters regarding Egypt dealt with in the Treaty of Sèvres may be said to fall under three heads:—

- I.—Matters as between Egypt and Turkey in which His Majesty's Government have a vital interest.
- II.—Matters as between Egypt and Turkey in which His Majesty's Government have little or no interest, but in which Egypt is vitally affected.
- III.—Matters as between Egypt and Turkey in which the Allied Powers are vitally affected.

I.—Matters in which His Majesty's Government have a Vital Interest.

(a.) *Article 101.*—It is important to us that Turkey should renounce all rights and title in or over Egypt. This, however, is so much an Egyptian interest as affecting the validity of her full independence that we may practically take it for granted that she will insist on Turkey recognising her independence.

(b.) *Article 107* provides for recognition by Turkey that Egyptian nationals are entitled to British diplomatic and consular protection. Before the termination of the protectorate this was of considerable interest to Great Britain. It would have been undesirable for Egypt to come to a separate arrangement with Turkey whereby the latter and not ourselves should exercise the predominant influence over Egypt's foreign affairs. At the present moment, however, we are protecting Egypt's interests abroad by an arrangement with, and at the request of, the Egyptian Government, and there is small likelihood of her desiring to modify at the moment this arrangement, which is all to her advantage.

(c.) *Article 109.*—Turkey renounces in favour of Great Britain the powers conferred on her by the 1888 convention relating to the free navigation of the Suez Canal. Under articles 9 and 10 of this convention it is laid down—

- 1. That, if the Egyptian Government is unable to take adequate measures to ensure the execution of this treaty regarding the free navigation of the Canal, they "shall call upon the Ottoman Government, which shall take the necessary measures to respond to such an appeal"; and
- 2. That the clauses of the treaty relating to the free navigation of the Canal shall not apply if the Ottoman forces are required for the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order.

Under the original draft of the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey renounced these powers in favour of Great Britain, and it is of vital importance to His Majesty's Government that similar provisions should be inserted in any instrument which may be signed as binding on Turkey.

(d.) *Articles 113 and 114* impose on Turkey the recognition of the condominium over the Soudan of His Majesty's Government and Egypt as laid down in the Boutros-Cromer Convention of 1899, and the recognition that Soudanese are entitled to British diplomatic and consular protection.

The provisions of these articles again may be regarded as vital British interests.

It will be seen that of the above there is likely to be no difficulty as regards (a). As regards (b), it had already been decided to omit this article in the revision of the

treaty in view of the liberty of action regarding foreign affairs accorded to Egypt by the declaration to the Sultan of the 28th February last. The only articles vital to British interests over which Egypt, if allowed to treat alone with Turkey, might create difficulties for us are (c) and (d) above, if our position is not previously safeguarded. Under the declaration to the King of Egypt of the 28th February it was laid down that the *status quo* should be maintained on the following points pending the conclusion of agreements in regard thereto between Egypt and Great Britain:—

1. The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.
2. The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.
3. The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.
4. The Soudan.

It could be argued with some force therefore that the vital interests (c) and (d) (the Suez Canal and the Soudan) were protected by the above declaration. In the event of greater importance being attached to (b) than seems likely at the moment, we could adopt the standpoint that we regarded any attempt by Turkey to upset the present arrangement whereby we are in charge of Egyptian interests abroad as "indirect interference" within the meaning of the second reservation.

The important thing, therefore, as regards vital British interests, is to make it clear to Egypt that she must not come to an agreement with Turkey on any matter which can in any respect be construed as prejudicing the *status quo* as regards the reserved subjects without our consent, and it will be essential to obtain a written assurance on this point binding the Egyptian Government.

II.—Matters in which Egypt has a Vital Interest and in which His Majesty's Government have little or no Interest.

(a.) Articles 102, 103, 105 and 106 deal with Egyptian and Turkish nationality problems. Their object is to secure the right of option for ex-Ottoman subjects resident in Egypt before the war of deciding whether they desire to remain Ottoman or become Egyptian subjects. They also prescribe the machinery for carrying this object into effect.

In this His Majesty's Government have but little interest. France, however, has an interest to secure as nationals of Syria, or anyhow as French-protected persons, the many Syrians now in Egypt, whose ability constitutes so valuable an addition to the personnel of the Egyptian Administration. That, however, is a matter for Egypt to fight out with the French, and with the termination of our moral responsibility for the efficiency of Egyptian Administration, the inclusion of these elements as Egyptian nationals can no longer be regarded as an essential British interest.

The effect of these articles upon Palestinian nationals will require to be considered in consultation with the Colonial Office, but if Egypt is given a free hand in negotiating with Turkey, I doubt if anything she can do will materially affect the rights of Palestinians.

(b.) Article 104 assimilates Egypt, her nationals, goods and vessels to the Allied Powers, their nationals, goods and vessels (except in so far as article 261 gives the latter capitulatory rights in Turkey) as from the 1st August, 1914, and has the effect of rendering her immune from liability *vis-à-vis* the Turks in respect of any of her acts during the war.

This, again, appears to be a purely Egyptian concern. It is vastly to her interest to secure such immunity from the Turks. But it is important that any acts of His Majesty's Government in Egypt during and since the war should not be called in question, and it would seem that His Majesty's Government are safeguarded in this respect by sections 3 and 4 of Part IX of the treaty (economic clauses).

(c.) Article 108 provides that Egyptian goods entering Turkey shall enjoy the treatment accorded to British goods.

This is a matter which solely interests Egypt, and cannot be regarded as any concern of ours.

(d.) Article 110 enacts that all property and possessions in Egypt belonging to the Turkish Government pass without payment to the Egyptian Government.

Here, again, as far as I am aware, His Majesty's Government have no interest in securing this concession from the Turks. But Lord Allenby should be consulted before it is definitely written off as a purely Egyptian concern. Article 111 lays down that all property of Turkish nationals in Egypt shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Part IX (economic clauses) of the Treaty of Sévres. This, at first

sight, seems again a purely Egyptian concern, but it may have been complicated by action on the part of the Public Custodian in Egypt. We should consult Lord Allenby before coming to any decision in the matter.

Subject, therefore, to any observations which Lord Allenby and the legal advisers may have to make on the above, it would seem that Egypt could be left to make any arrangement she chooses on the above points.

III.—Matters in which the Allied Powers are Vitally Affected.

(a.) Article 112 arranges for the payment of the interest on the Turkish loans hitherto secured on the Egyptian tribute. This is a matter in which the Allied bondholders are vitally interested, and which has already formed the subject of telegraphic correspondence with Lord Allenby. It had been suggested that, in the event of Egypt not being a signatory to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, a binding agreement between His Majesty's Government and Egypt should be entered into prior to the signature of the treaty with Turkey, whereby Egypt should promise to pay over to the Bank of England and the houses who issued the loans the sums hitherto paid as interest thereon by the Khedives of Egypt in lieu of tribute to Turkey.

Were Egypt to conclude a separate treaty with Turkey, we could still negotiate a preliminary agreement with her on these lines.

(b.) Article 428 binds Turkey to accept any decisions the Allies may take in relation to matters previously dealt with by the Constantinople Superior Council of Health or the Turkish Sanitary Administration or by the Alexandria Quarantine Board.

The decisions in question relate to quarantine administration in territory detached from Turkey, and provide for the organisation of quarantine control of the Hedjaz pilgrimage by a committee, on which the Allies and the Alexandria Quarantine Board will be represented. This is an international affair, and there can be little doubt that Egypt, who is as much interested as any country in the exercise of careful quarantine administration, would subscribe to a similar article in any separate treaty she might conclude with Turkey. In any case, if we obtain a guarantee from Egypt that she will conclude nothing with Turkey that prejudices the *status quo* regarding the four reserved subjects without previously consulting us, we can argue that the question of quarantine administration affects foreign interests, for whose protection we are responsible.

E. M. B. INGRAM.

October 19, 1922.

[E 11909/27/44]

No. 115.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 3283.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 31, 1922.

THE French Ambassador came to me this afternoon with the information that the Kemalist authorities were opening recruiting offices in different parts of Thrace, and had announced the intention of raising two divisions of Turks in that country for the defence of Thrace and Constantinople. He pointed out that this was entirely contrary to the provisions of the Mudania Agreement, and that it could not be tolerated. He asked accordingly if I had any confirmation of this report, and whether, in any case, I would telegraph to our representative in Constantinople to join with his colleagues in protesting against this unwarrantable proceeding.

I replied that it had not yet been reported to me, but that I would certainly take the action he suggested.

This led me to enquire what was now the view of the French Government about the attitude of the Kemalist Party. I judged from his reply that the honeymoon was now well over, and that even the Divorce Court was not a remote alternative, for his Excellency told me that the conduct of the Kemalist Turks was becoming absolutely insupportable, both in Europe and in Asia; that their pretensions would have to be firmly resisted; and that in Smyrna, where they had desecrated and destroyed the European cemetery, that part of it which had been the chief object of their sacrilege had been the French cemetery.

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I learnt with interest from the Ambassador these symptoms of a sharp reaction on the part of our Allies.

The Count de Saint-Aulaire went on to ask me to take advantage of the presence in this country of the Emir Abdullah, from Transjordan, to press upon him the arrest of the persons who had been implicated in the attempt to assassinate General Gouraud.

I said that this was not a case with which I was personally familiar, since it was in the hands of the Colonial Office; but I would take steps to inform the new Secretary of State for the Colonies of the request that the Ambassador had made.

The Ambassador then repeated to me, with considerable hesitation and as though he were performing a most unpleasant task, the request for the recall of our consul-general in Tunis, Mr. Sarell, which he had already submitted without any success to Sir Eyre Crowe.

I informed him that I entirely agreed with the reply of the Permanent Under-Secretary. It seemed to me an extraordinary thing, the attitude of the British consul-general having been completely vindicated by what had happened, that the French Government should now propose to us that he should be withdrawn, whereas the French Governor-General, to whose errors the whole *contretemps* had been due, was to be left in possession of the field. I was not much addicted to recommending to foreign Governments the withdrawal of any of their high officers, but, if anyone had to be retired in consequence of recent events in Tunis, it seemed to me that the chief French representative was the man who was marked out for the change.

The Ambassador could only reply that some of the letters which Mr. Sarell had addressed to the French Governor-General were lacking in courtesy, and that, when I was Governor-General in India, I should not have liked to be addressed in a similar way by a consul-general.

I indicated that the two cases were hardly *in pari materia*, and expressed my inability to take any action of the nature proposed.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[C 15067/12995/62]

No 116.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels).

(No. 998.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 1, 1922.

THE Belgian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon with a message from his Government. He began by referring to the suggested conference on reparations and inter-Allied debts at Brussels, the acceptance of the invitation to which by Great Britain had been deferred until the result had been made known of the proposed British Mission to the United States on the subject of the repayment of the debt due to that country. The sending of that mission had had to be postponed for political reasons, and no envoy had yet started. In these circumstances the French Government had approached the Belgian Government, and urged them to issue immediate invitations to the conference in Brussels in the opening days of December, threatening them that, if Belgium did not do so, France would not hesitate to take the initiative herself. His Excellency impressed upon me the importance of holding the conference before the end of the year, because the Governments would have to decide before the 31st December upon the payments to be demanded from Germany in 1923. He further pointed out to me the superiority of the political atmosphere of Brussels to that of Paris for any such discussions. He wished to know what reply His Majesty's Government would advise his own Government to return.

I told him that, only ten days ago, the French Ambassador had come to me with a somewhat similar message from the French Government, although the threat with which it had concluded had assumed a rather different form. To me, M. Poincaré had not given any hint of an intention to summon a conference himself: he had merely said that, unless a conference were convened, France must claim the right to act on her own account. I informed Baron Moncheur that I did not think that either of us need be much disturbed by these threats, because, whether a conference was summoned or not, and wherever it was summoned, it could not take place until the principal parties had agreed to accept the invitations to it. For the moment, it was obviously impossible for His Majesty's Government to give a decided answer on this point. In the first

place, I should require to consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the point whether he still regarded the visit to America as an essential preliminary to the holding of a reparations conference in Europe. Secondly, in view of the elections now proceeding in this country, it seemed to me very unlikely that the British Government, whether represented at the conference by the Chancellor of the Exchequer or by anyone else, would be in a position to take part as early as the first week in December. Thirdly, until the result of the elections was known, it would be impossible for the present holders of office to commit the British Government in any of these respects, since it was conceivable, though perhaps not likely, that within three weeks' time other people might be occupying their posts. On all these grounds I recommended that the Belgian Government should express their inability to reply at the present juncture to the veiled threat which they had received from the French. For my own part, I added that I did not intend to be in the least degree deflected by the latter from the most expedient course of action.

Baron Moncheur then went on to ask me whether his Government, without making any claim to take a regular part in the Peace Conference about to be convened at Lausanne to draw up a new Treaty of Sèvres, might notwithstanding, as signatories of the original treaty, be permitted to state their views on any points in the new treaty in which Belgium was vitally interested. He reminded me of the very large share of the Ottoman Debt in the hands of Belgian bondholders, and of the interest felt by Belgium in the general financial position of Turkey. He recalled that, when the meetings of the Supreme Council at which the first outlines of the former Treaty of Sèvres were drawn up had been held in Downing Street in 1920, he himself had been admitted to the council table on more than one occasion to state the claims of Belgium. In these circumstances, he enquired whether a similar privilege might not be accorded to Belgian representatives in Lausanne.

I said that, as the conference was to meet on neutral territory, it would not, on the present occasion, rest with any individual Power to control the issue of the invitations, and these could be sent only by common consent. For my own part, I was disposed to consider the request of the Ambassador as reasonable, and, without giving a definite pledge at the moment on a matter which he now brought before me for the first time, and which I had not yet had the opportunity to examine carefully, I would consult my advisers as to the manner in which it might be possible to respond to his wishes.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11996/27/44]

No 117.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 1346.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 1, 1922.

THE Italian Ambassador, in the course of a visit to the Foreign Office this afternoon, spoke to me about the character and prospects of the new Fascisti Government which had just assumed power in Italy. He thought that it would be a strong and honest Government; that a good many of the pronouncements of its chiefs, made when they were in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility, would now be forgotten; and that a policy of solidarity with the Allies would be pursued.

I reciprocated these sentiments, and told Signor de Martino that both the Prime Minister and I had just sent telegrams, couched in this sense, to Signor Mussolini. I was however, somewhat apprehensive that the new Government might associate itself with a strongly imperialistic, and even chauvinistic, conception of foreign policy.

Upon my asking why Count Sforza had resigned the Italian Embassy in Paris, Signor de Martino told me that, as the author of the Rapallo Agreement, for which he had been furiously denounced at the time by the Fascisti, Count Sforza would naturally shrink from serving under their auspices. The manner in which he had announced his resignation had, however, drawn upon him a severe rebuke from Signor Mussolini, which I should see in the newspapers to-morrow.

Referring to an announcement in the press that I was likely, in the course of next week, to make a speech in the City of London on foreign affairs, the Ambassador entreated me to make some reference of a friendly character to Italy in the course of my remarks, intimating that, if I did not do so, the gravest resentment would be caused in his country, which was in a very sensitive and emotional frame of mind.

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Without attaching as much importance to any remarks of mine as the Ambassador seemed disposed to ascribe to them, I promised to bear in mind his appeal.

He next asked me what was the precise attitude of the British Government towards the Tripartite Agreement. Was it true, as had been publicly stated in Paris, that we had decided to repudiate that agreement *in toto*? If this was the case, did it mean that we regarded the whole of the subsidiary agreements concluded at the same time as the Treaty of Sèvres as having fallen to the ground?

I replied that, as regards the Tripartite Agreement, the attitude of this country remained the same as it had been when I was in Paris in March of the present year. Great Britain, who profited in no sense from that agreement, had always been ready to adhere to the obligation, into which she had entered by the agreement, to help in this respect the economic ambitions of her allies. But in Paris it had been frankly recognised that the agreement would never be accepted in anything like its original form by the Angora Government. This had been admitted, not only by the French, but by Signor Schanzer himself, who had spent a good deal of our time in the conference in endeavouring to substitute for the original arrangement some clauses affecting the grant of concessions by Turkey in the future which would enable Italy to obtain the equivalent of the advantages reserved for her under the original agreement. From that position I had not receded, though I did not anticipate, in view of the temper of the Angora Government, that much success would be achieved in Lausanne in endeavouring to give expression to the agreement in any overt form. As regards denunciation, I had not taken any steps in that direction, but his Excellency would remember that, in the letter which I had recently addressed to him about the Dodecanese, I had told him quite plainly that if the Italian Government proposed in their own interest to drop one of the agreements supplementary to the Treaty of Sèvres, which we regarded as inseparably bound up with that treaty, they had no right to demand our adherence to the remainder. In that sense, the Italian action in respect of the Dodecanese might compel us to insist upon a release from other obligations assumed in the same category at the same time.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 14103/13003/44]

No. 118.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Ismet Pasha.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 16.)

Dear Ismet Pasha,

Lausanne, December 14, 1922.

IN our various conversations about Mosul, you mentioned to me the grounds, racial, political, strategic, historical, &c., on which your Government rested their claims for the return of the Mosul Vilayet. I told you in reply that I contested each one of these claims, and I now send you a memorandum with the reasons for which I do so, and which—quite apart from the fact that Great Britain cannot give back a country of which she is a mandatory under the League of Nations—render it quite impossible for my Government to contemplate the surrender of the Mosul Vilayet.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Memorandum on Mosul.

THIS memorandum is submitted by the British delegation in order to summarise the reasons for which the demand made by the Turkish delegation for the restoration to Turkey of the Mosul Vilayet cannot possibly be entertained.

These reasons are racial, political, historical and economic. In each case they contradict and destroy the arguments, based on the same considerations, upon which it is understood, from such explanations as have been received, that the Turkish delegation relies in support of its case.

1. Racial.

The population of the Mosul Vilayet consists of Kurds, Arabs, "Turks" (Turkomans) and Christians, with some thousands of Yazidis. The number of these various elements may be deduced from two tables of statistics, which were compiled by British officers employed in the vilayet, who, partly on horseback, and partly with the aid of the roads made and the motor transport introduced since the British occupation, visited most of the corners of the vilayet in the years after the war. Table A is an estimate made in 1919, in which the population of the vilayet is shown by religions. Table B is an estimate made in 1921 as the result of a close and more prolonged investigation. The population in this table is divided according to race.

The total population of the Mosul Vilayet is returned as 703,000 odd in the 1919 estimate and 785,000 odd in the 1921 estimate, the difference being due to an increase in the population in the Mosul plain area, formed by the Mosul plain and the surrounding hills, arising from—

1. The return of large numbers of the population from the Turkish or Arab armies.
2. The return of still larger numbers of families to villages which, owing to the state of starvation resulting from war conditions, had been abandoned before the British occupation.
3. The settlement of a large number of Assyrian refugees.

It was established by these investigations that the whole of the great town of Mosul, the whole of the country north of Mosul on the right bank of the Tigris as far as the boundary of the vilayet, the whole of the country south of Mosul on the right bank of the Tigris, and most of the country south of Mosul on the left bank of that river as far as the Erbil-Kirkuk-Kifri road, is Arab.

As to the "Turks," they are not Osmanli Turks; they call themselves Turkomans, and the Turanian language they speak resembles Azerbaijani rather than the Turkish of Constantinople. They are undoubtedly descendants of Turkomans who came to Irak long before Osman founded the Ottoman Empire, probably from those Turkomans whom the Abbasside Caliphs hired to defend their territory. The theory that the Turkomans are descendants of what was formerly a foreign mercenary garrison is supported by their distribution. Tall Afar, an almost exclusively Turkoman town, stands guard 45 miles west of Mosul on the border of the Syrian desert. Except for this town and the neighbouring Turkoman villages, and for a few scattered Turkoman villages in the Mosul plain, the whole of the Turkoman population is distributed along the eastern road from Mosul to Bagdad, notably in and around the towns of Erbil, Altun Keupru, Kerkuk, Taza Khurmatu, Tauq, Tuz Khurmatu, Kifri and Qara Tepé. The estimates of numbers are:—

Tall Afar and surrounding villages	10,000
Villages in the Mosul plain	4,895
			14,895
Kirkuk and surrounding villages	25,000
Kifri, Taza Khurmatu, Tauq, Tuz Khurmatu and Qara Tepé	10,000
			35,000
Erbil and Altun Keupru	15,000
Grand total of "Turks" (the few in the Suleimaniyah area being omitted)	64,895

The proportion of "Turks" to Arabs can be shown most effectively by the statement that the "Turks" in the whole of the Mosul Vilayet are less numerous than the Arabs in the town of Mosul alone.

The Kurds are estimated to be more than twice as numerous as the Arabs in the Mosul Vilayet, and about seven times as numerous as the Turkomans. They are separated from the Arabs by a line which follows roughly the line of Turkoman

towns mentioned above and north of that the foothills of the mountains. They are believed to be descended from the Medes, who were so closely identified with the Persians in early times; but whether this is true or not, they speak an Iranian tongue closely allied to Persian and resemble the Persians far more closely than either the Turks or the Arabs.

Of the non-Mahommedan populations, though in the aggregate they outnumber the Turkomans considerably, it is not necessary to speak in great detail. The estimates are:—

Yazidis (probably of Kurdish origin, but holding a non-Moslem belief)	30,000
Christians (mainly Assyrians—some Nestorian, some Catholic)	62,225
Jews	16,865

The main body of the Yazidis live in Jebel Sinjar, but there are many Yazidi villages north-east of Mosul. The Christians are to be found mainly in Mosul city, in the Erbil area, in a string of prosperous villages (of which Al Qosh and Tall Kaif are the largest) to the east of the Tigris, and in the Dohuk-Amadiyah country. Most of the Jews live in Mosul city, but Jewish communities are to be found in the Kurdish and Turkoman towns, and isolated individuals or families among the Kurdish tribes.

The case of the Turkish delegation in so far as it is based on ethnic considerations comes, therefore, to this:—

They ask that there should be united with the Turks of Asia Minor a population consisting as to one-twelfth of Turkomans, with whom they may be admitted to have some racial affinity; as to nearly seven-twelfths of Kurds, who have no more affinity with the Turk, except the possession of a common religion, than have the Chinese; as to three-twelfths of Arabs, who not only differ from the Turks in race and language, but are connected by the strongest bonds of language, race and sympathy with the population of Bagdad and Basra; and as to more than one-twelfth of non-Moslem elements, which, however much they may differ from each other, have not a single bond—racial, linguistic, religious or cultural—with the Turks.

Table I.—POPULATION of the Vilayet of Mosul by Religions according to an Estimate made in 1919.

Division.	Sunni.	Shiah.	Jewish.	Christian.	Other Religions.	Total.
Mosul ...	244,713	17,180	7,635	50,670	30,180	350,378
Erbil ...	96,100	...	4,800	4,100	1,000	106,000
Kirkuk ...	85,000	5,000	1,400	600	...	92,000
Suleimaniyah ...	153,900	...	1,000	100	...	155,000
Total ...	579,713	22,180	14,835	55,470	31,180	703,378

Table II.—POPULATION of the Vilayet of Mosul by Races according to an Estimate made in 1921.

Division.	Arabs.	Kurds.	"Turks."	Christians.	Jews.	Total.
Mosul ...	170,663	179,820*	14,895	57,425	9,665	432,468
Erbil ...	5,100	77,000	15,000	4,100	4,800	106,000
Kirkuk ...	10,000	45,000	35,000	600	1,400	92,000
Suleimaniyah	152,900	1,000	100	1,000	155,000
Total ...	185,763	454,720	65,895	62,225	16,865	785,468

* Including 30,000 Yazidis.

2. Political.

The next claim of the Turkish delegation is that the population of the Mosul Vilayet desires to return to Turkey because of its political or historical affinities with Turkish rule. Even if this were true of a majority of the inhabitants of the Turkoman towns who, under Turkish rule, enjoyed a position of privilege by no means warranted by their numbers, it cannot possibly be sustained in so far as the Kurds, the Arabs and the non-Moslem elements of the population are concerned. It is undeniable that the Arabs of Mosul are enthusiastic supporters of the new Irak State and of King Feisal. The result of a plebiscite conducted throughout Irak in 1919 gave a unanimous vote on the point that Basra, Bagdad and Mosul should be united and form one State. Since then, on the arrival of the Emir Feisal in the country, the Mosul Arabs showed quite unmistakably their desire to be connected with the Arab Government at Bagdad and to be under the rulership of King Feisal. They received the Emir with acclamation, they voted unanimously that he should be King, they swore allegiance to him. This latter plebiscite included the whole of the vilayet except the Kurds in the Suleimaniyah, Raniya and Rowanduz areas, who, being a compact body of people of an entirely different race and language, obviously required separate treatment. The Arab areas with the Kurdish districts adjacent to them, and the Turkoman towns, all gave their votes, and with the exception of Kirkuk all voted for inclusion in the Irak State and for the accession of Feisal to the throne of Irak.

As to the Kurds, they are a people with a keen sense of nationality, a deep pride in their race and language, and a desire to be as free to manage their own affairs as their pursuit of economic progress will allow.

It is said to be the contention of the Turkish delegation that the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet are one with the Turks of Asia Minor in aim. Two points may be stated in reply:—

1. It is perfectly well known to people who lived in Irak before the war that communications between Suleimaniyah on the one side and Bagdad and Mosul on the other were constantly cut, that Turkish officials appointed to Suleimaniyah often waited at Mosul for months before they could venture to set out on their journey, and that when such Turkish officials reached their posts in Southern Kurdistan they were frequently helpless in the face of the determination of the Kurds to brook no interference from the distant Government of Constantinople.
2. The Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet showed, throughout the war, that far from being united with the Turks in aim, they regarded the Turkish quarrel with the *Entente* as none of theirs. The Turkish delegation can be challenged to produce any evidence that the Turkish forces in Irak ever received any assistance from the Kurds against the British. A small Kurdish tribal contingent was present with the Turkish force at Shu'aibah, near Basra, in the spring of 1915. They were present, but they took an insignificant part in the operations; they returned to their homes after the battle; and from that time the Kurds got no more help from the Kurds than they did from the Arabs. The Kurds of the Kifri and Kirkuk areas left their homes and lands in great numbers to avoid conscription, and as soon as those areas were occupied by British troops thousands of local Kurds came down from the hills whither they had fled to avoid having to identify themselves with the aims of Turkey.

Finally, there remain the large Christian element (mainly Nestorians and Chaldeans) and the Yazidis. If the claim of the Turkish delegation is weak in so far as the non-Turkish Moslem population is concerned, it is still weaker as applied to these non-Moslem communities. It is to Turkish misrule, active and passive, that the Yazidis attribute the enormous reduction in their numbers which has occurred during the last generation. The Chaldeans remember too well what their co-religionists in the Diarbekir-Mardin-Jazirah area suffered during the war to desire the restoration of the Turkish rule. And finally, the Nestorians, who were driven from the region of Julamerk and the Persian border by Turkish troops during the war, who died in thousands in their flight to Irak, and who have settled in that alien country rather than submit to Turkish rule in their own land, would fight to the death rather than permit the return of their new homes to a people who to them are the symbol of misrule and oppression.

3. Historical.

The Turkish contention that the long historical connection of Mosul with the Ottoman Empire justifies their demanding its return would apply with equal force to Bagdad: for, except for insignificant periods when it was under Persian rule, Bagdad was part of Turkey as long as Mosul. Both are Arab towns built by Arabs and maintaining their Arab character, in spite of their long inclusion in the Turkish Empire. In point of fact, the close connection between Mosul and Bagdad was recognised by the Turks to this extent, that the Mosul Vilayet was formerly part of the Pashalik of Bagdad. Even as late as the eighties of the last century, when Midhat Pasha was Vali of Bagdad, Mosul was included in his governorship. The conversion of Mosul into a separate vilayet in Turkey, depending upon Constantinople, was a measure dictated by administrative convenience only.

The argument from history is therefore not one to which importance can properly be attached. It could equally be applied to a demand from Turkey for the return of all the territories and States which she has lost. It would justify the demand by any country for any city or province of which it had been deprived as the consequence of defeat in war.

4. Economic.

If we turn to the economic argument, it is the weakest of all. The economic relations of the Mosul Vilayet are entirely with Bagdad and with the Arab City of Aleppo, both of which cities the National Pact itself leaves outside the boundaries of Turkey. If we take the three chief towns in the vilayet, viz., Suleimaniyah, Kirkuk and Mosul, the exports of Suleimaniyah all go to Bagdad, whence all its requirements in foreign goods are obtained in exchange; Kirkuk lives mainly on the carrying trade between Bagdad on the one hand, and Mosul and Suleimaniyah on the other, and its prosperity depends on the maintenance of the connection between the three; as for Mosul, which, being nearest to Turkey, should present the most favourable case for the argument of the Turkish delegation, it is notorious that the trade of Mosul is almost entirely down-river with Bagdad and across the desert with Syria. The imports of the vilayet are piece goods, tea, sugar and coffee. Not one of these is produced in Turkey or could even be obtained through Turkish territory except with great difficulty and by diverting trade from routes which it has followed for centuries. As to the exports, the principal are grain, wool and hides, and tobacco, and the smaller but still important exports are timber, gum-tragacanth and gall-nuts. Every ounce of the tobacco grown, except the relatively small quantity needed for local consumption, goes to Bagdad and is consumed in the Bagdad and Basra Vilayets; the surplus grain of the Mosul Vilayet goes to feed the people of Bagdad, and the timber to build houses in Bagdad. The wool, the hides and the gum, and the gall-nuts which are an important ingredient in the manufacture of European ink, go entirely to foreign countries. How could Mosul dispose of grain, wool or hides in Turkey, when Turkey itself is a large producer of all these products; or of tobacco in a country which has large tobacco producing areas of its own? Bagdad is dependent on the Mosul Vilayet for its wheat supplies to such an extent that during the war, when the two vilayets were separated by military operations, the British military authorities had to import wheat from India to feed Bagdad city and district. A striking instance of the manner in which economic considerations cut across ethnic boundaries is the fact that the Erbil-Altun Keupru district, which is partly Turkoman as to the towns and mainly Kurdish as to the agricultural areas, lives almost entirely on supplying Bagdad with grain. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that if the country north of the existing boundary between Turkey on one side, and Syria and Irak on the other, ceased to exist, the economic life of the Mosul Vilayet would hardly be disturbed at all. Irak, as it is, can do without Turkey, but Mosul is indispensable to Bagdad.

5. Strategic.

It is further urged by the Turkish delegation that the southern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul, which runs along the Jabal Hamrin in a south-easterly direction as far as the River Diyala, and then along the Diyala as far as the Persian frontier, would constitute an excellent strategical frontier between Turkey and Irak. This contention cannot be accepted for one moment. The adoption of the Jabal Hamrin-Diyala line would in fact make the position of the Irak State untenable. In the first place, the Power occupying Mosul need only hold up the

export of grain from that place to cut off the capital of Irak from its main source of wheat supply. Secondly, a day's easy march would enable any such Power to cut the sole road between Irak and Persia, a road which is vital to the economic life of Bagdad and Basra, whose people live very largely on the Persian trade. Thirdly, the position of an Arab Government in Bagdad, which is some 560 miles by river from the southern limit of the Irak State, would be quite impossible if the frontier of a possibly unfriendly State were only 70 miles distant. Lastly, there appears to be no particular reason why the Arab State of Irak or Great Britain as the Mandatory Power, should hand over to the Turkish Government a place where it might think fit to maintain an army corps as a menace to the surrounding regions.

6. The National Pact.

Lastly it has more than once been stated by the Turkish delegation that their claim for the recovery of the Mosul Vilayet, or at any rate of Mosul town, is supported by the first article of the National Pact, passed by the Turkish Chamber of Deputies on the 17th February, 1920. It can easily be shown that this is not the case. The article reads as follows:—

"Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the armistice of the 30th October, 1918, were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of those parts, whether within or outside the said armistice line, which are inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance."

In the first place it is both a novel and a startling pretension that a Power which has been vanquished in war should dictate to the victors the manner in which they are to dispose of the territories which they have wrested from the former. It would be interesting to know if a single instance can be found in history in which the Turks having conquered any territory by force of arms have ever encouraged the vanquished to demand a plebiscite in the area in question or have expressed a willingness to abide by the result of such a vote.

But let us examine the argument a little more closely in reference to the present case. The first proposition of the article is that the plebiscite is to be held in areas "populated exclusively by an Arab majority." It is difficult to understand how any area can be populated exclusively by a majority since the existence of a majority implies the existence of minorities also. But further it is the contention of the Turks themselves that the Arabs are not in a majority in the Mosul Vilayet, but that they are outnumbered by the other elements in the population, viz., Kurds and Turks: and that this is the case is shown by the figures of the second table to which reference has been made, and which reveal a total of 454,720 Kurds and 65,895 Turks or Turkomans, as compared with 185,763 Arabs. Therefore, if the Turks are to claim a plebiscite, it would seem that their argument does not admit of its being applied to the Mosul Vilayet, because the Arabs are not in a majority there.

But, thirdly, supposing the argument to apply to the entire area, irrespective of majorities or minorities, it has already been pointed out that such a plebiscite has already twice been held and that on each occasion it has resulted in a verdict hostile to the Turkish claim. In 1919 the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet voted unanimously in favour of continued incorporation with Bagdad and Basra. In 1921 the whole of the Arabs, the Kurds of the adjacent districts and the whole of the Turkomans (with the exception of Kirkuk) voted again for inclusion in a State of Irak, and chose the Emir Feisal as their King.

But the article in the Pact introduces another and still more fantastic distinction. According to it, only those portions of territory which were occupied by enemy forces on the 30th October, 1918, are to be allowed thus to decide their destinies. On that day the British forces were about 30 miles distant on the south from Mosul, which they entered immediately afterwards. We are thus led to this absurd result that the Arabs who live in the entire territory south of the armistice line are to be invited to dispose of their fate four years later by plebiscite, while the Arab population of Mosul town itself, who form more than one-third of the Arab population of

the whole vilayet, are to be deprived of that right. The case has only to be stated to demonstrate the absurdity of such a claim. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that armistice conditions have nothing to do with the provisions of peace treaties and that no European peace treaty made since the armistice of 1918 has attempted to follow the lines of occupation laid down in the armistice which preceded them.

Finally, a claim, equally untenable and even more incomprehensible, is put forward in the second half of the article, which reads: "The whole of those parts, whether within or outside the said armistice line, which are inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifices and wholly respectful of each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance." It may be remarked in passing that the word "Ottoman" is not easily understood in this context. The sympathy which unites Moslem peoples is generally recognised; it is a matter of religion; but it is difficult to appreciate what unity of race can link together Semitic Arabs, Iranian Kurds and Ural-Altaic Turks, or why the fact that they have once been forced to submit to Ottoman rule should bind them to remain in the Ottoman Empire for all time. In fact, the Turkish Government and the Turkish people are apparently ready at one moment to concede the free determination of their future destinies to the Arab peoples, and at the next moment to demand that territories inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority—a phrase which, if it means anything at all, applies equally to the Kurdish, Turkish and Arab populations of the former Turkish Empire—should not be divided "for any reason in truth or in ordinance."

It would appear, therefore, that the claim for the restoration to Turkey of the Mosul Vilayet is not only prohibited by the considerations, racial, political, historical and economic, which have been enumerated in the earlier part of this memorandum, but that it is quite inconsistent with any interpretation that can possibly be applied to the first article of the National Pact.

Lausanne, December 14, 1922.

[E 14402/13003/44]

No. 119.

Ismet Pasha to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received in Foreign Office December 27.)

Cher Lord Curzon,

Lausanne, le 23 décembre 1922.

À CHACUNE de nos réunions j'ai eu l'honneur d'exposer à votre Seigneurie les arguments irréfutables sur lesquels je me base pour demander la restitution du vilayet de Mossoul à la Turquie. De même que j'ai chaque fois écouté avec l'attention la plus soutenue les considérations que vous avez bien voulu émettre à ce sujet, j'ai de même longuement étudié le mémorandum relatif à la question de Mossoul que vous avez eu la bonté de me faire parvenir dernièrement.

Je ne doute pas que le mémorandum responsif que j'ai l'honneur de remettre ci-inclus à votre Excellence constitue une réponse convaincante aux arguments émis en faveur de la thèse britannique.

Je me permettrai d'ajouter que le Gouvernement turc ne peut songer à renoncer à ses droits souverains sur Mossoul, qui fait partie intégrante de la patrie turque.

Votre très dévoué,

C. N. ISMET.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Réponse au Mémorandum britannique relatif à la Question de Mossoul.

SE basant sur une série de considérations extrêmement légitimes, la délégation turque affirme avec insistance que le vilayet de Mossoul appartient à la Turquie.

Les raisons sur lesquelles se fonde notre demande sont les suivantes :

I.—Raison d'ordre ethnographique.

La population sédentaire du vilayet de Mossoul s'élève à 503,000 hommes; il s'y trouve, en outre, des tribus nomades kurdes, turques et arabes comprenant environ 170,000 individus.

Ces tribus changent de place suivant les saisons, et même quittent à certaines époques de l'année le vilayet de Mossoul, il est donc impossible de fixer d'une façon exacte leur nombre. Elles passent, suivant leurs besoins, les différentes saisons de l'année dans les régions de Bagdad, de Nedjef, de Mossoul, de Zor, de Diarbékir, et même sur les plateaux de l'Iran; c'est pourquoi il n'est pas non plus possible de les considérer comme faisant effectivement partie de la population du vilayet de Mossoul.

Les 503,000 hommes formant la population sédentaire du vilayet de Mossoul se composent d'après les dernières statistiques officielles turques de :

	Kurdes.	Turcs.	Arabes.	Yézidis.	Non-Musulmans.	Total.
Sandjak de Suleymanié ..	62,830	32,960	7,210	103,000
" Kerkuk ..	97,000	79,000	8,000	184,000
" Mossoul ..	104,000	35,000	28,000	18,000	31,000	216,000
Total pour le vilayet de Mossoul ..	263,830	146,960	43,210	18,000	31,000	503,000

Ce tableau montre :

Que l'élément arabe est insignifiant dans les sandjaks de Suleymanié et de Kerkuk ;
Que dans le sandjak central de Mossoul il n'y a que 28,000 Arabes contre 139,000 Turcs et Kurdes ; et

Qu'enfin dans tout le vilayet de Mossoul contre 410,790 Turcs et Kurdes il y a 43,210 Arabes et 31,000 non-musulmans. Plus des 4/5 de la population du vilayet sont donc constitués par les Turcs et les Kurdes et moins de 1/5 par les Arabes et les non-musulmans.

Les Arabes du vilayet de Mossoul se trouvent presque entièrement à Gayara, au sud de la ligne de Sandjar et sur la rive droite du Tigre. Si l'on excepte une étroite bande de territoire s'étendant de Féthié (placé entre le Djébel-Hamrine et le Djébel-Fouhou) vers Kerkuk, la région située à gauche du Tigre est entièrement peuplée de Kurdes et de Turcs.

Dans la ville de Mossoul on parle en même temps le turc, le kurde et l'arabe ; ceux des habitants de cette ville qui actuellement parlent l'arabe et que l'on prend pour des Arabes sont en réalité des Turcs qui, ayant été pendant longtemps en contact continu avec les Kurdes et les Arabes, ont appris également ces deux langues.

Ceux qui connaissent les affaires de l'Irak savent que la population de Mossoul ne s'est, jusqu'à présent, jamais considérée comme étant arabe et comme faisant partie de la population de l'Irak.

Le mémorandum britannique reconnaît que la ville de Tel-Afr est une ville turque et qu'il se trouve une foule de villageurs turcs autour de Mossoul. Effectivement, le nahié de Cheihan rattaché à Mossoul et comprenant 68 localités, celui de Achair-Selâ, qui en comprend 78, sont peuplés en totalité par des Turcs et le nahié dépendant directement de Mossoul, qui comprend 77 localités, est peuplé en très grande majorité par des Turcs.

L'existence tout autour de Mossoul de villages portant des noms purement turcs, tels que Kara-Koyounlou, Kara-Ali, Ketchi-Hani, Narine-Keupru, Buyuk-Keuchk, &c., est une preuve de plus de ce que nous venons de dire.

Les Yézidis sont des Kurdes au point de vue de la race et ont les mêmes mœurs et les mêmes coutumes qu'eux ; il n'y a entre eux qu'une différence de secte, ce qui évidemment ne peut en aucune façon servir de prétexte à les différencier les uns des autres. Le même fait s'observe d'ailleurs chez les peuples chrétiens ; il ne viendrait par exemple à l'esprit de personne de considérer comme faisant partie de groupements ethniques différents des individus de même race dont les uns seraient catholiques et les autres protestants.

Quant aux Turcs du vilayet de Mossoul, nous dirons que la différence que l'on veut établir entre eux et les Turcs anatoliens en les appelant Turkmènes n'existe nullement en réalité et que c'est là une opinion indéfendable. On dit dans le mémorandum britannique que la langue turque parlée à Mossoul n'est pas identique à celle parlée à Constantinople ; mais existe-il en Anatolie un endroit où l'on parle un turc identique à celui de Constantinople ? Par contre le dialecte employé par les Turcs de Mossoul est le même que celui qui se parle en Anatolie ; la différence qui existe entre eux est moindre que celle qui existe entre le français parlé au nord et celui parlé

au sud de la France. Il est d'ailleurs naturel que dans les différentes parties d'un pays une même langue présente quelques variations.

Au sujet de la différence qui existerait entre les Turcs et les Turkmènes, nous croyons superflu d'entrer à ce sujet dans des considérations historiques; qu'il nous suffise seulement de dire que les Turcs anatoliens sont des Turkmènes et que ces deux mots signifient une seule et même chose.

Contrairement aux assertions contenues dans le mémorandum britannique, le peuple kurde n'est pas d'origine iranienne, mais au contraire d'origine touranienne. Cette opinion est actuellement presque unanimement partagée par tous les historiens qui se sont occupés de cette question. Il est établi en effet qu'un peuple d'origine touranienne appelé "Gudu" habitait aux temps les plus reculés de l'histoire les montagnes dominant l'Assyrie, que ce peuple était très belliqueux et que son nom qui signifiait "guerrier" se traduisait en assyrien par le synonyme "Gardu" ou "Kardu," d'où dérive le mot Kurde.

Les annales cunéiformes parlent souvent des "Kardus," qu'ils citent sur un pied d'égalité avec les Syriens, les Hittites, les Susiens, les Élamites, les Akkadiens, &c.

Les considérations ethniques qui précèdent suffisent à démontrer que le vilayet de Moussoul doit revenir à la Turquie.

À la présence à l'intérieur de ce vilayet d'une certaine quantité d'Arabes habitant la rive droite du Tigre on peut opposer l'existence en Irak et en dehors de ce vilayet d'une nombreuse population turque et de nombreuses localités peuplées par cet élément.

Si l'on voulait s'appuyer sur les Arabes de la province de Moussoul pour demander son rattachement à l'Irak nous pourrions avec tout autant de raison nous réclamer de la présence de Turcs dans les vilayets arabes et notamment dans le vilayet de Bagdad pour demander l'annexion de ces territoires à la Turquie.

II.—Raisons d'ordre politique.

Les Turcs et les Kurdes, qui constituent la grande majorité de la population du vilayet de Moussoul, sont fermement décidés à obtenir le rattachement de leurs pays à la Turquie; aucun doute n'est possible là-dessus.

Ceci est démontré par le fait que les habitants des sandjaks de Suleymanié et de Kerkuk ont refusé de voter en faveur de leur annexion à l'Irak et, lorsque la population de Moussoul et de ses environs aura acquis la possibilité d'exprimer librement ses volontés, on verra qu'elle non plus, n'est pas partisan de son rattachement à l'Irak.

Si sur les habitants de 18 kazas qui constituent le vilayet de Moussoul seules les minorités de la ville de Moussoul ont pu, soit par suite de la violente pression qui fut exercée sur elles, soit encore par intérêt personnel, voter pour l'Irak, il est évident que ce vote d'une infime minorité ne peut en aucun cas servir à déterminer le sort de toute la population du vilayet de Moussoul.

Pour ce qui est des aspirations du peuple kurde, la délégation turque a l'honneur de déclarer que la population kurde se trouve unie au peuple turc sous tous les rapports et en particulier au point de vue de la race, de la religion, des mœurs ainsi que des us et coutumes. Ces deux peuples ont décidé de mener une vie commune et de maintenir unies leurs destinées. Si l'on étudiait leur histoire, on s'apercevrait que les Kurdes ont passé de plein gré sous l'administration turque et ont, depuis des siècles, lié leur sort à celui des Turcs.

Tous les chefs de l'armée turque, ayant participé à la guerre générale et à la guerre d'indépendance, ont proclamé avec respect et admiration les services rendus et les sacrifices consentis par le peuple kurde pour le salut de la patrie.

Surtout dans la lutte contre le Sultan et contre le Gouvernement à jamais disparu de Constantinople, dans la défense des différents fronts anatoliens assaillis par nos ennemis ainsi que dans l'offensive qui aboutit à l'écrasement complet des Grecs, les Kurdes travaillèrent en parfaite communauté avec les Turcs pour l'obtention d'un même but et à la poursuite d'un même idéal.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie est le Gouvernement des Kurdes dans la même mesure que celui des Turcs.

Les véritables et légitimes représentants des Kurdes siégeant à la grande Assemblée nationale proclament qu'ils considèrent comme d'un intérêt vital pour eux que leurs frères restés en dehors des territoires administrés actuellement par le Gouvernement turc soient rattachés à la Turquie.

Dernièrement encore, à la suite des tentatives pour passer du côté turc faites par les détachements kurdes, enrôlés par le Gouvernement de l'Irak, le peu de fidélité de ceux-ci avait été annoncé par les communiqués officiels britanniques.

Les efforts tentés au moyen d'escadrilles aériennes de bombardement en vue d'affaiblir l'attachement témoigné par la population du vilayet de Moussoul envers la Turquie suffisent à eux seuls à montrer la force de cet attachement pour la patrie commune.

Nous voulons, avant de terminer cette partie de notre exposé, parler également des Nestoriens, des Assyriens et des Chaldéens.

Les premiers ont, lors de l'invasion du vilayet de Van par les armées de la Russie tsariste, agi si trahitusement envers leurs compatriotes avec lesquels ils vivaient tranquillement depuis des siècles, ils ont tellement surpassé en cruauté les envahisseurs eux-mêmes, qu'au moment du départ de ceux-ci, ils ont cru ne pouvoir plus vivre en commun avec les Turcs et les Kurdes et sont partis avec les Russes.

Quant aux Chaldéens et surtout aux Assyriens du vilayet de Diarbékir, comme ils ne se sont jamais laissés influencer par les excitations venues du dehors, ils continuent à vivre en parfaite intelligence avec leurs compatriotes turcs.

III.—Raisons historiques.

Les raisons historiques qui militent en faveur du rattachement du vilayet de Moussoul à la Turquie ne datent pas de la période ottomane seulement; dans le cas contraire, nos arguments auraient également pu s'appliquer au vilayet de Bagdad ainsi qu'aux autres vilayets perdus par nous et le raisonnement formulé à ce sujet dans le mémorandum britannique aurait été justifié.

Depuis plus de onze siècles, le vilayet de Moussoul et même la région s'étendant jusqu'au nord de Bagdad se trouvent au pouvoir des Turcs.

Du temps des Khalifes Abbassides, ces pays étaient aux mains des Gouverneurs, des soldats et de la population turcs. Ces Gouverneurs turcs jouissaient d'une indépendance complète et de droits souverains; le premier de ceux-ci fut Itah (année 229 de l'Hégire); parmi eux, Kir-Boga et Ak-Soungour se sont distingués par les monuments d'art et d'utilité publique qu'ils ont édifiés.

Imad-el-Dine Zengui, fils de Ak-Soungour, un des Gouverneurs cités plus haut, fonda à Moussoul l'État turc des Ata-Bey.

Il y eut également des États turcs où régnèrent des membres de la dynastie des Ata-Bey, à Sandjar et à Djéziret-ibn-Eumer, région formant la partie ouest de Moussoul.

Plus tard, la dynastie des Artiks fonda des États turcs à Moussoul, à Djéziret-ibn-Eumer, à Harpout et à Mardine. Tel-Keyf, situé près de Moussoul, fut une des principales forteresses des Artiks, Il-Gazi-Han, un Souverain de cette dynastie, détruisit à Tel-Afr une importante force croisée.

On trouve dans ces régions de nombreux monuments d'art et d'utilité publique que ces Souverains ont fait construire et dont quelques-uns sont en ruines; on trouve de même dans les musées de nombreuses pièces de monnaie qu'ils ont fait frapper.

Après ces dynasties, les Turcs Seldjoucides se rendirent maîtres de Moussoul; ils l'embellirent et l'agrandirent considérablement et firent de cette ville un centre de haute culture. Ce n'est qu'après les Turcs Seldjoucides que les Turcs Osmanlis régnèrent sur ces pays.

Comme on le voit, depuis onze siècles, cette région a toujours été possédée et gouvernée par les Turcs.

Le territoire s'étendant de Bagdad jusqu'au sud de la limite actuelle du vilayet de Moussoul est désigné dans les anciens ouvrages d'histoire sous le nom de Tataristan; cela prouve qu'une tribu turque s'y était installée. On trouve encore la trace de cette appellation dans la vallée désignée sur les cartes sous le nom de Vadi-i-Tatar.

Le mémorandum britannique déclare que Moussoul a été rattaché à Bagdad à l'époque de Midhat Pacha; il faut remarquer que ce rattachement temporaire était dû à certaines considérations d'ordre personnel et administratif. D'ailleurs, à cette époque les régions d'Ourfa et de Diarbékir avaient également été placées temporairement sous l'administration du Vali de Bagdad, Midhat Pacha.

Le fait que dans le passé Moussoul ait été de la sorte rattaché momentanément à Bagdad ne peut être considéré aujourd'hui comme une raison suffisante pour la détermination de son sort.

IV.—Raisons géographiques.

Le vilayet de Moussoul n'est pas compris dans l'Irak-i-Arabi; il fait, au contraire, partie de l'Él-Djéziré. L'histoire comme la géographie laissent la région de Moussoul complètement en dehors de l'Irak.

Au point de vue du climat, non plus, Moussoul ne fait pas partie de l'Irak ; on peut citer à l'appui de ceci le fait qu'on ne trouve plus de dattiers au nord de la ligne Kefri-Tekrit. La frontière qui sépare l'Anatolie de l'Irak est la ligne Djébel-Hamrine-Djébel-Fouhoul-Djébel-Sandjar.

Au nord de cette ligne, le vilayet de Moussoul présente les mêmes conditions climatiques et la même constitution de terrain que l'Anatolie, tandis qu'à ces points de vue le vilayet de Bagdad diffère complètement de celui de Moussoul, ainsi que de l'Anatolie.

V.—Raisons économiques.

Les relations économiques et commerciales de Moussoul avec l'Anatolie méridionale, et particulièrement avec les régions de Diarbékir, Van, Bitlis, sont en tout cas beaucoup plus importantes que ses relations de même ordre avec Bagdad. De plus, l'unique voie commerciale reliant le sud de l'Anatolie à la Perse passe par Moussoul.

Ceux qui connaissent ce pays savent qu'à l'encontre de l'assertion contenue dans le mémorandum britannique, le bois de construction employé à Bagdad ne vient pas de Moussoul, mais de Diarbékir. En outre, la quantité de blé que Moussoul achète à Diarbékir à meilleur marché pour la revendre plus cher à Bagdad dépasse la quantité de blé exporté directement de Moussoul à Bagdad. De plus, les relations économiques entre Suleymanîé et Van sont extrêmement importantes, et Moussoul exporte en Anatolie une grande quantité de bestiaux, surtout des buffles.

La ville et le vilayet de Moussoul ont une importance considérable au point de vue des relations commerciales et des communications par le fait qu'ils se trouvent au croisement de toutes les routes reliant les unes aux autres l'Anatolie, la Syrie, l'Irak et la Perse.

Un autre fait que nous tenons à faire remarquer est qu'actuellement, par suite de la construction du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, qui a coûté tant d'argent à la Turquie, la région de Moussoul se trouve, au point de vue économique, reliée plus intimement que jamais à l'Anatolie.

Moussoul se trouve par là même plus rapproché actuellement des ports de la Méditerranée que de ceux du golfe Persique. Il est, d'ailleurs, inutile d'expliquer, que, au point de vue des facilités d'écoulement et des avantages commerciaux qu'ils présentent, les ports méditerranéens sont de beaucoup préférables aux ports de la région de Basra.

VI.—Raisons d'ordre militaire.

La ville et la région de Moussoul se trouvent, comme nous l'avons dit, au croisement des routes venant des régions de Suleymanîé, Kerkuk, Van, Bitlis, Diarbékir, Siird, &c. Les communications faciles et naturelles entre les différentes parties de l'Anatolie méridionale ne peuvent donc avoir lieu qu'en passant par Moussoul.

D'ailleurs le mot de "Moussoul" signifie "liaison ou union."

Sans la ville de Moussoul la liaison des régions de Suleymanîé et de Kerkuk avec la mère patrie serait impossible, et, au point de vue de la sécurité des parties méridionales de notre pays, la possession de Moussoul nous est indispensable.

Nous indiquons la ligne de Djébel-Hamrine-Djébel-Fouhoul et Djébel-Sandjar comme frontière entre l'Anatolie et l'Irak parce que cette ligne constitue, indépendamment des considérations ethnographiques, géographiques, politiques, &c., que nous venons de citer une ligne de séparation précise et naturelle entre ces deux régions.

L'argument d'après lequel cette frontière menacerait Bagdad ainsi que les communications entre Bagdad et la Perse ne peut être sérieusement invoqué au sujet de la délimitation d'une frontière ; d'ailleurs la frontière persane est aussi proche de Bagdad que la ligne que nous proposons. On sait en outre qu'un grand nombre d'États ont leur capitale ou des villes importantes situées sur ou près de la frontière. Si les arguments de cette sorte devaient être pris en considération, il nous faudrait, afin de préserver Constantinople, fermer les Détroits aux navires de guerre étrangers ; nous pouvons encore ajouter qu'autrefois, lorsqu'il y avait des souverains turcs à Moussoul, il existait un Gouvernement différent à Bagdad.

Tandis qu'on nous refuse un petit territoire autour d'Andrinople, qui est une ville historique si importante pour nous, on ne peut en toute justice nous opposer comme un argument valable au sujet de nos demandes relatives à Moussoul le fait que notre frontière en se rapprochant de 70 milles de Bagdad constitue une menace pour cette ville.

VII.—Le Pacte national turc.

Il n'est pas possible qu'un peuple ne s'intéresse plus en aucune façon aux destinées de la population d'un territoire qu'il a perdu à la suite d'une guerre.

C'est pourquoi nous avons obligation morale de dire que les régions à majorité arabe et musulmane se trouvant sous l'occupation étrangère lors de la conclusion de l'armistice étaient libres, conformément aux principes wilsoniens de disposer de leur propre sort. D'autre part, c'était pour nous un droit naturel de demander la restitution des régions à majorité turque tombées sous l'occupation étrangère.

Il est également évident que les territoires occupés continuent et continueront à nous appartenir en droit jusqu'à ce que nous y ayons renoncé.

Quant au vilayet de Mossoul, il fut préservé de l'occupation étrangère jusqu'à la conclusion de l'armistice et fut, sans aucun droit, partiellement occupé, comme beaucoup d'autres régions de la Turquie, seulement après la suspension des hostilités. Comme pour Adana, Smyrne, Ourfa, Constantinople, Aintab et la Thrace orientale, tombés sous l'occupation étrangère, le peuple de Turquie a également décidé d'employer, jusqu'à la dernière limite de ses forces, tous les moyens en son pouvoir afin d'obtenir le retour à la mère patrie du vilayet de Moussoul. Il a donc établi son pacte national en conséquence.

La nation turque ne peut, en aucun cas, consentir à ce que, par suite de la présence d'une petite minorité arabe dans la province de Moussoul, ses frères turcs et kurdes, constituant la majorité de la population de ce vilayet, restent en dehors de la Turquie.

Conclusion.

Les raisons d'ordre ethnographique, politique, économique, géographique et militaire énumérées ci-dessus suffisent à démontrer que le vilayet de Moussoul forme partie intégrante de la Turquie.

Le vilayet a été occupé contrairement à tout droit après l'armistice.

Le maintien sous une occupation étrangère de la majorité turque et kurde de ce vilayet constitue un grave danger pour nos futures relations de bon voisinage ainsi que pour la paix en faveur de laquelle le peuple turc et le monde entier ont consenti de si grands sacrifices.

D'autre part, si la ville de Moussoul restait en dehors des frontières de la Turquie, cela aurait pour résultat, en dehors de toutes les autres considérations émises, de laisser exposée à de grands dangers l'Anatolie méridionale et d'empêcher les communications entre les différentes parties de notre patrie.

Pour toutes ces raisons, la délégation turque est convaincue que sa demande relative au vilayet de Moussoul est entièrement justifiée.

[E 14464/13003/44]

No. 120.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Ismet Pasha.—(Received in Foreign Office December 28.)

Dear Ismet Pasha,

Lausanne, December 26, 1922.

I HAVE given careful study to the detailed statement which you sent to me on the 23rd December with regard to the Mosul Vilayet; and I must be permitted to say that while the greater part of the arguments contained in my memorandum of the 14th December remain—even after your prolonged examination of them—untouched and unanswered, the reasons which you now adduce, and which I should be quite willing to submit to the public judgment, do but confirm my opinion that no case whatever can be made out—even on the grounds which have been selected by your Excellency—for the surrender by the British Government of the Mosul Vilayet.

Will you allow me, however, to put the case before you—apart from those particular arguments—in a way which will admit of no further misunderstanding?

The British Government which had been forced into war with the Turkish Government by the unprovoked action of the latter in 1914, ultimately defeated the Turkish forces and expelled them from the entire area of Irak and far beyond.

Those territories have ever since been occupied by British forces, and were for some time administered by British officials.

In the course of the war the British Government entered into a definite and honourable pledge to the Arab inhabitants of those regions to free them from Turkish rule, and at the earliest possible date they took steps to inaugurate an Arab Administration.

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They accepted at San Remo in April 1920 a definite mandate under the League of Nations (which the Turkish Government has now intimated its intention to join), and in accordance with article 22 of the Covenant, for the Irak State.

As regards the Kurds in particular, the draft mandate for Irak, which has been published, stipulates that "nothing in this mandate shall prevent the mandatory from establishing a system of local autonomy for predominantly Kurdish areas in Irak as he may consider suitable." I have not found anything in the statement of the Turkish delegation that would lead me to think that your Government contemplates any more liberal régime for the Kurdish populations still remaining in Turkey.

More recently still His Majesty's Government have signed a treaty with the freely elected King of Irak, the Emir Feisal. This treaty contains a clause that "no territory in Irak shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power."

This chain of events constitutes an obligation which no Government possessing the least self respect can honourably ignore, and from which His Majesty's Government certainly have not the slightest intention to recede. That position is confirmed at every point by the local considerations which your challenge has fortunately enabled me to adduce.

In these circumstances I should merely be deceiving your Excellency and the Turkish delegation if I led you to think that any prolongation of this controversy could make any difference whatever in the attitude which I have felt it my duty to assume.

As I told you, however, at our first meeting on the subject, I shall be prepared at any time to instruct my experts to discuss with yours the precise trace of the northern frontier of the Mosul Vilayet, which will constitute in the treaty the future boundary between Turkey and Irak. Time is slipping by, and the sooner this subject is discussed in the most friendly spirit the better.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 120.

Counter Reply to the Memorandum of the Turkish Delegation concerning the Question of the Vilayet of Mosul.

THE memorandum of the Turkish delegation, far from being convincing, only provides fresh support to the contention that the Mosul Vilayet is naturally and must remain a part of the mandatory area of Irak. Many of the Turkish arguments are disposed of by the previous British memorandum, dated the 14th December. Nevertheless they have again been given full consideration.

1. Racial.

Although the Turkish Government ruled the Mosul Vilayet for many centuries, no correct Turkish map of the vilayet exists, nor, so far as the British delegation is aware, are there any pre-war statistics on a racial basis collected by the Turkish Government. On the other hand, British officers during the last few years have made accurate maps of the whole area and have visited every corner of it. The British delegation has, therefore, good reason for thinking that its statistics are more likely to be accurate than those of the Turkish delegation, which, it may be noted, bear no date. The British figures for Kurds do not include those Persian Kurds who simply pass part of their time in Irak. As to the nomad and semi-nomad Arab tribes, the area to which they belong is perfectly well known. Only Arabs of the Mosul Vilayet are included in the British statistics.

The nature of the Turkish statistics can be illustrated by reference to the figures given by the Turkish delegation for the Sulaimaniyeh "liwa." The Turkish delegation states (1) that there are over 7,000 Arabs in this area, whereas not even the most ardent Arab patriot claims that it contains any Arabs at all; and (2) that the Turks are half as numerous as the Kurds, although every traveller knows that to meet a Turk among the Sulaimaniyeh Kurds is almost as rare as it will presently be to meet a Greek in Anatolia. But still more open to question is the Turkish statement that there are only 28,000 Arabs in the Mosul "liwa," when it is notorious that Mosul town alone contains twice that number of Arabs. Apart from the intimate knowledge gained by British officials during the last few years, Mosul was well known to

travellers before the war as one of the great Arab towns; yet we are asked to believe that a population who, with insignificant exceptions, talk only Arabic and call themselves Arab, are really Turks who happen to have learned Arabic. This argument is on a par with that in which the Turkish delegation attempts to establish the Turkish character of an area by referring to the Turkish names of some of the villages, forgetting that in the preceding paragraph it had claimed as Turkish an area bearing the purely Arab name of Ashair Saba. By a similar process of reasoning it might be demonstrated that Diarbekr and Marmurat-al-Aziz are Arab towns and that Constantinople, Adrianople, Konia and Angora are Greek cities, an argumentation that would probably not be welcome to the Turkish delegation.

Further, the Turkish contention that Mosul town is Turkish is confuted by a map (*Carte ethnographique de l'Empire ottoman*) which was produced by Bekir Sami Bey as an official map during the negotiations in London in March 1921. This map, though it indicates as inhabited by Turks and Kurds rather more territory than is actually occupied by those two races, nevertheless supports fully the claim put forward in the British memorandum of the 14th, viz., that the whole of the great town of Mosul, the whole of the country north of Mosul on the right bank of the Tigris as far as the boundary of the vilayet, the whole of the country south of Mosul on the right bank of the Tigris, and most of the country south of Mosul on the left bank of the Tigris as far as the Erbil-Kirkuk-Kifri road, are Arab.

Unable, even with the aid of the contentions which have been demolished in the preceding paragraphs, to show that there is a Turkish majority in the Mosul Vilayet, the Turkish delegation then proceeds to reinforce its case by the astounding claim that the Kurds and the Turks are of the same stock. The Turkish delegation can hardly expect credence for such a claim in face of a people who speak an Iranian tongue closely allied to Persian, whose national customs are unlike those of the Turks, who in particular differ from the Turks in their attitude to women to such an extent that the theory of a different origin for the two races could almost be established by that difference alone, and who present in physical appearance so striking a contrast to the Turks that a traveller in any area where the population is mixed can tell merely by looking at the faces of the people whether a particular village is Turkish or Kurdish. But it is enough to say that for this theory there is no historical or other evidence of any weight, and that it is one which the Kurds themselves would reject with scorn.

The British delegation therefore maintains the claim put forward in its previous memorandum, that the only element of the population of the Mosul Vilayet which can be said to be connected with the population of Anatolia by racial affinity is the Turkoman, which numbers only one-twelfth of the total population.

2. Political.

Even if it were admitted that the small "Turkish" minority of the Mosul Vilayet would be glad to return to the rule under which they enjoyed so many unfair advantages, the British delegation denies categorically that this view is shared by any other element. The views of the Christians and the Yazidis are so well known that no further argument on this point is required. As to the Arabs, the British delegation not only repeats that these have unanimously voted for inclusion in the Irak State, but maintains that after the exploits of the Arabs during the war and the setting up of an Arab State in Irak with an Arab King at its head, no Arab would hesitate for a moment in preferring to remain a subject of that State rather than return to a rule which did not even recognise the Arab tongue as an official language.

It is regretted that the Turkish delegation has misinterpreted certain admissions which the British delegation, in the desire to be perfectly just and fair, included in its previous memorandum. The people of the Sulaimaniyeh area did not refuse to vote for inclusion in Irak. When the vote regarding the Emir Feisal was taken, they were not asked to vote because, as the previous British memorandum stated, "being a compact body of people of an entirely different race, they obviously required separate treatment." The people of Sulaimaniyeh have always recognised that their fate is bound up with that of Bagdad, which is practically their sole economic outlet.

The statement that "only the minorities of the town of Mosul . . . voted for Irak," whether it purports to be based on the British memorandum or on other information, is without any foundation in fact. As the British statement on this point has been disregarded, it is desirable to repeat it in greater detail. The proposal that the Mosul Vilayet should be connected with the rest of Irak and should be placed under the rulership of the Emir Feisal as King was supported by the whole of the

Mosul "liwa" (Zakho, Dohuk and Aghra included), by the Erbil "liwa," and by the Kifri portion of the Kirkuk "liwa." The amount of "pressure" brought to bear may be estimated from the well-known fact that a deputation from Kirkuk which visited Bagdad could elicit from the High Commissioner no reply to their enquiry as to the wishes of His Majesty's Government regarding the plebiscite, except the unvarying statement that they were free to do as they wished—a statement which the people of Kirkuk acted upon with absolute freedom. It may be admitted, however, that there is good foundation for the contention that many of those of the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet who voted for inclusion in Irak were actuated by self-interest. It is the basis of the British case that it is to the advantage of every inhabitant of the Mosul Vilayet to find himself within the boundaries of the mandatory area, rather than to be united to a race which from the time when the Tatar hordes destroyed the ancient irrigation system of Babylon has never done Irak any good.

In regard to the Kurdish element, the Turkish delegation puts forward a number of arguments. Perhaps the most curious is its representation of the bombing of Rowanduz and other places to which Turkish troops had penetrated as an attempt to weaken the attachment of the population to Turkey. On the other hand, the Turkish delegation passes over in silence the two important considerations adduced in the previous British memorandum, viz., (1) that in point of fact the Turkish Government was rarely or never in effective control of Southern Kurdistan, and (2) that the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan gave the Turkish Government no help during the great war. If such general considerations as those now adduced by the Turkish delegation are to be admitted, it is legitimate to recall that the Turkish Government had constant trouble with the Kurds in the Dersim and other areas; that in 1914 there was a serious Kurdish revolution in Bitlis, which was put down with difficulty; and that many Kurdish chiefs and their sons were exiled to Constantinople for years at a time lest the spirit of Kurdish nationalism should concentrate around them and break out in revolt against Turkish rule.

The Turkish delegation quotes the Kurdish representatives in the Angora Assembly as demanding that the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan (among others) should be united with Turkey. Since it is obvious that no elections to the Angora Assembly were ever held in Southern Kurdistan, the opinion quoted has no value in respect of the Sulaimaniyeh "liwa." In any case, it is open to anyone to form an independent judgment as to whether the Southern Kurds would prefer to accept an arrangement which, while connecting them with their market and supply centre, Bagdad, leaves them free to use their own language, to be governed by their own tribal leaders and officials, and to develop their native institutions, or to be placed under a Government whose representatives can find nothing to say to their national demands except that all Kurds are Turks.

3. Historical.

The British memorandum dealt very briefly with this consideration on the ground that "the argument from history . . . would justify the demand by any country for any city or province of which it had been deprived as the consequence of defeat in war." But if—for the sake of argument—the Turkish delegation's historical survey is accepted, it only supports the British case. The Turkish delegation will not deny that Mosul was built by Arabs and was an Arab town when the "Turkish" rulers first occupied it; and the claim is made that the Kurds were in possession of Kurdistan long before that date. Then followed, it is said, eleven centuries of Turkish domination. This domination was removed a few years ago, and it was found that the population was mainly, as it had been eleven centuries before, Arab and Kurdish, that it had neither been replaced by Turks nor assimilated to the Turks either in race or in language. A more striking proof of the artificial character of the connection of the Mosul Vilayet with the Turkish Empire it would be hard to find.

4. Geographical.

This argument, now raised by the Turkish delegation for the first time, leads nowhere. The Mosul plain, with its long, hot, rainless summer, its snowless winter, and only 13 inches of rain in the year, differs more from Anatolia proper than it does from Bagdad. But it would be possible to prove or to disprove anything by assuming that Anatolia, parts of which are many feet deep in snow for some months of the year while others are so hot that cotton can be grown, is a single geographical unit.

5. Economic.

It is a matter for regret that this important aspect of the case, which was treated in great detail in the earlier British memorandum, should have been dealt with by the Turkish delegation in so inadequate a fashion.

The British memorandum stated that the possession of the Mosul Vilayet is essential for the food supply of Bagdad. The Turkish memorandum does not contradict this statement, but adds that Bagdad needs grain from Diarbekr as well as from Mosul. The British delegation does not propose to draw from this argument the logical conclusion that Diarbekr as well as Mosul should be included in Irak. It is satisfied with pointing out that the extension of agriculture in Irak since the British occupation enables Irak to dispense more and more with Diarbekr grain, so long as the grain-growing areas of Mosul are included in her borders.

One important argument which was advanced in the British memorandum is admirably supported by the Turkish delegation. The latter lays stress on the possible importance to Mosul, in the future, of the Mediterranean ports. The British delegation is prepared to admit that the trade of Mosul with Bagdad and Basra may diminish, and its trade with Alexandretta, Beirut and Haifa increase. The British delegation recognises that the Irak State should enter into the closest economic and commercial relations with the two neighbouring States of Palestine and Syria, and has already pointed out the importance of the cross-desert trade between Syria and Mosul. The transfer of Mosul to Turkey would cut it off not only from Irak but from Syria as well, and would interfere seriously with communications in general between Syria on the one side and Irak and Persia on the other. In fact, three countries would be sacrificed in order to give unimportant economic advantages to one.

It is difficult to decide whether the Turkish case is more seriously damaged by the arguments which they advance or by the British arguments which they ignore. They quote as grounds for the retrocession of the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey the trade between Southern Anatolia and Persia, which is quite insignificant, and, in any case, finds its easiest route through Bagdad; the export of buffaloes from Mosul, though buffaloes are bred, not in Mosul, but in Lower Mesopotamia; and the construction of the Bagdad Railway, which, in point of fact, is useful to Mosul, not because it is a link with Anatolia, but because it unites Irak with its neighbour and customer, the Arab country of Syria. Of the British arguments, which the Turkish delegation has preferred to pass over in silence, the most important is the incontrovertible fact that Mosul can never get its principal imports (piece-goods, tea, sugar and coffee) from Anatolia.

6. Strategic.

The first argument in this section of the Turkish memorandum appears to be based on the entirely unfounded assumption that in any case Sulaimaniyeh and Kirkuk are to be restored to Turkey. The Vilayet of Mosul is indivisible, and the arguments in this memorandum and in that of the 14th December relate to the vilayet as a whole. The Turkish claim to Mosul (town) as an essential link between Sulaimaniyeh and Kirkuk on one hand, and Anatolia on the other, therefore falls to the ground.

It is not clear why the possession of Mosul should be necessary for the defence of Turkey. As a base for an attack on Irak its value is obvious, but it cannot be seriously argued that Turkey has anything to fear from the new State of Irak, even if the latter includes Mosul. Moreover, unlike the Jabal Hamrin, which is an insignificant range of hills of little importance as a barrier, the present boundary between Irak and Turkey is a serious military obstacle. The western flank is protected by a wedge of Syrian territory which both sides are bound to respect, the eastern by a mass of mountains in which military operations are extremely difficult.

Even if ethnographical, economic and other considerations were not opposed to the separation of Mosul and Bagdad, the Irak State might be pardoned for wishing to be separated from its powerful northern neighbour by the existing boundary rather than by the range of the Jabal Hamrin, which is not only difficult to defend, but is dangerously near to its capital and its vital communications. This question must be considered on its merits, and not confused by comparison with, e.g., the boundary of Eastern Thrace, where many considerations of an entirely different order have to be taken into account.

7. *The National Pact.*

The Turkish delegation ignores the arguments in the British memorandum which show conclusively that by no stretch of interpretation can the first article of the National Pact be read as demanding the retrocession of the Mosul Vilayet. The delegation simply repeat the statement that the National Pact does cover the Mosul Vilayet. More assertion of this sort does not necessarily carry conviction; nor would it be a sound innovation in international practice if documents were to be interpreted, not by what they palpably say, but by what their authors, years afterwards, claim that they meant but failed to say. In any case, it may be worth while to state in the clearest terms what the present claim of the Turkish delegation really means. It means that the Turkish Parliament of February 1920, or the Angora Assembly of December 1922, is to have the right to decide that the Mosul Vilayet (which is represented in neither body), with its little minority of Turkomans and its enormous majority of non-Turks, is to be taken away from the victors in the great war and to be returned to the vanquished. All intervening events are to be ignored. The growth of Arab and Kurdish nationalism; the development of the mandatory system, and the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of a mandate in respect of the three Vilayets of Basra, Bagdad and Mosul; the setting up of an Arab State with an Arab King; the adhesion of a large part of the population of the Mosul Vilayet to the Arab State; the establishment of an autonomous régime for the Kurds—all of these events are to be disregarded merely because the Turkish delegation chooses to advance this unfounded claim.

The British delegation is unable to deal with the case in this light-hearted and arbitrary manner. Faithful to its obligations to the population of the Mosul Vilayet, to its allies, and to the League of Nations, the British Government is bound to reiterate its refusal even to contemplate the surrender of the Mosul Vilayet, and is unable to see that any advantage can arise from further argument on the subject.